VZCZCXRO0027
PP RUEHPB
DE RUEHSV #0131/01 1060810
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 160810Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY SUVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1147
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2207
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0163
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY PRIORITY 1667
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0102
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0158
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0266
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0401
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SUVA 000131 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PLEASE PASS TO EAP/ANP AND INR/EAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2019 
TAGS: FJ KDEM PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: FIRST STEPS IN DEALING WITH POST-CONSTITUTIONAL 
FIJI 
 
REF: A) SUVA 000013 B) SUVA 000031 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I. RICHARD K. PRUETT. REASONS 1.5 ( 
B) AND (D) 
 
SUBJ:  First Steps for Dealing with Post-Constitutional Fiji 
 
REF:   A) Suva 000013   B) Suva 000031 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  The abrogation of Fiji,s 1997 
Constitution and the reinstatement of Fiji,s military-led 
interim government (IG) is the denouement of a series of IG 
blunders that has compounded the serious racial and economic 
problems already confronting ethnic and Indo-Fijians.  The 
challenge for the United States will be in striking the right 
balance between the need to pressure the IG to take the 
necessary steps to restore democracy as soon as possible and 
the imperative to engage with the IG in a measured manner 
calculated to help Fiji end its &coup culture.8  We need to 
continue to engage with Fiji to ensure that whatever form of 
democracy emerges from its current struggle is stable, 
functional, and durable, and protects minority rights.  The 
United States alone has succeeded in achieving and 
maintaining strong credibility with the IG, its largely 
Indo-Fijian supporters, and its democratic opposition. 
Mutual trust will be important to carrying forward the work 
of restoring democracy to Fiji and returning Fiji to its 
former position of regional leadership.  To help the parties 
establish that trust will not be possible if we lose our 
credibility with either side.  We need to find ways to 
register our strong disapproval of what has happened without 
sacrificing our ability to influence the present regime on 
important bilateral issues as well as such transcendent 
issues as the protection of fundamental human rights, an end 
to media censorship, genuine political dialogue leading to 
early elections, economic development, the re-integration of 
Fiji with regional institutions, and the rehabilitation of 
Fiji to a position of regional leadership.  End summary. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
¶2.  (C) The abrogation of Fiji,s 1997 Constitution by 
President Ratu Josefa Iloilo Uluivuda was undoubtedly at the 
urging of Commodore Josaia Voreqe &Frank8 Bainimarama, the 
commander of Fiji,s military, who until April 9 was Fiji,s 
interim prime minister.  Although Fiji,s head of state and 
theoretically the commander-in-chief of its armed forces, 
Iloilo is in fact little more than a figurehead, as reported 
in Ref A.  He serves at Bainimarama,s pleasure to give the 
IG a patina of legality.    Bainimarama,s apparent 
acceptance of the April 9 appeal court ruling against the 
legality of his interim regime was almost certainly a cynical 
ploy preparatory to his engineered reinstatement by Iloilo 
April 11.  The &necessity8 for abrogating the constitution 
was supposedly the power vacuum created by the April 9 ruling 
invalidating Iloilo,s 2007 appointment of Bainimarama as 
interim Prime Minister and the need to &map out a smooth 
path to holding parliamentary elections based on electoral 
reforms and other reforms as set out under the (People,s) 
Charter.8  However, the abrogation of Fiji,s constitution 
in order to hasten the return of democracy is akin to cutting 
down a tree to harvest its fruit.  Moreover, Bainimarama,s 
reappointment as interim prime minister raises the question 
of who was actually wielding the ax. 
 
¶3.  (C) Iloilo could have simply followed the court ruling by 
appointing Bainimarama as caretaker prime minister, ignoring 
the court,s non-binding obiter dicta calling for an 
independent figure to assume that role and to lead the 
country to early elections.  Embassy considers that the 
decision not to take such a direct approach is likely rooted 
in the IG,s fear that it would do nothing to restore the 
grant of immunity that Iloilo conferred on Bainimarama and 
his supporters at the time of Bainimarama,s 2007 
appointment.  Iloilo,s decision to abrogate the constitution 
was likely foisted on him by the IG for the purpose of giving 
the IG expanded powers and to foreclose the possibility of 
treason proceedings by a successive government.  The 
abrogation of the 1997 constitution also served to eliminate 
former Prime Minister Qarase,s claim to office.  Among the 
expanded powers the IG is seeking to exercise under Iloilo,s 
 
SUVA 00000131  002.3 OF 004 
 
 
purported emergency authorities are the complete replacement 
of Fiji,s judiciary, prohibitions against assembling in 
groups of three or more, and severe limitations on media 
freedoms.  At this writing, three foreign journalists have 
been deported since the abrogation, a small number of 
protesting attorneys have been arrested, and a small number 
of dissenting officials have been sacked, but the security 
situation remains relatively peaceful. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The road to Fiji,s abrogation is littered with 
broken promises and missteps by the IG.  The most prominent 
of these were Bainimarama,s July 2008 reneging on his pledge 
of elections by March 2009 to the leaders of the countries 
comprising the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and his effective 
scuttling of Fiji,s initially promising political dialogue 
process.  In fact, the appeals court ruling occurred on the 
very day that Bainimarama had chaired a lopsided Leaders of 
Political Parties (LOPP) &dialogue8 that deliberately 
excluded the main opposition parties, which together had 
amassed over 70 percent of the popular vote in the last 
elections.  Bainimarama told the opposition parties not to 
attend after they balked at accepting some last minute 
pre-conditions he sought to impose--such as a restriction on 
dealings with media or foreign governments--that flew against 
the principles of inclusion and open-mindedness set out in 
the first LOPP meeting.  The United Nations and British 
Commonwealth were to use the fruits of the LOPP process to 
lead a President,s Political Dialogue Forum (PPDF) to lead 
the parties toward fashioning an all-Fijian plan forward to 
political reconciliation and elections.  Tellingly, 
Bainimarama also excluded UN and Commonwealth observers from 
the April 9 LOPP meeting.  The UN and Commonwealth are said 
to be reviewing their plans for a joint mission in leading 
the PPDF process. 
 
U.S. ACTIONS/RESPONSE 
 
¶5.  (C) The United States, position on the dialogue process 
has been clear.  We have endorsed the joint mission,s 
insistence that any mediation be on the basis of a commitment 
by all parties to the principles that the process would be 
independent, inclusive, time-bound and without prejudice to 
its outcome.  The concluding statement of the April 9 
&rump8 LOPP also claimed to endorse those principles. 
Embassy Suva believes that the United States should encourage 
the IG and the UN/Commonwealth to move ahead with the PPDF 
process despite the IG,s bad faith dealings to date.  We 
believe that honest dialogue is the firmest and shortest 
route to the restoration of democracy in Fiji.  The first 
LOPP buoyed hopes of a dialogue process that would lay the 
foundation for durable democratic institutions and end 
Fiji,s &coup culture8 once and for all.  The IG 
effectively rejected dialogue in favor of a stultifying 
monologue.  Fiji needs the UN and Commonwealth to step into 
the role of honest broker and lift the process from the IG,s 
control.  It will not be an easy task: the IG likely will try 
to exert its control at every step of the way to weaken and 
delay the process.  The UN/Commonwealth joint mission should 
seek to recover the initial promise of the PPDF.  It should 
be led by a highly-reputable team and have generous donor aid 
with which to establish a secretariat.  Support for the joint 
mission and for genuine dialogue in general should be central 
elements of U.S. strategy in the earliest days of Fiji under 
its new order. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) U.S. policy toward Fiji has been far from 
&business as usual8 ever since the December 2006 coup 
d,etat.  In accordance with Section 508 of the Foreign 
Operations Assistance Act, the United States suspended 
military assistance and some foreign assistance programs 
because of the coup, and those restrictions will remain in 
force until Fiji returns to democracy.  In close coordination 
with our allies and partners in the region, we also imposed 
visa sanctions and took other targeted measures directed 
against the coup leaders and their supporters.  We have 
sought to avoid restrictions that would add to the suffering 
of the Fijian people.  The targeted nature of these sanctions 
has won widespread acceptance and even support among the 
Fijian people.  Those sanctions should remain in place and 
constitute an enduring element of our policy toward Fiji 
until it makes measurable progress on the path back to 
 
SUVA 00000131  003.3 OF 004 
 
 
democracy. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Although of intrinsic merit, restoring elections is 
not an end in itself, or even as a step to a new political 
order in Fiji; it is more importantly an essential 
prerequisite to our pursuit of expanded regional engagement 
and cooperation, and to greater harmonization of Pacific 
programs with U.S. interests.  Fiji,s role as a 
transportation hub makes it a key focal point for regional 
engagement.  Regional efforts toward addressing the daunting 
economic, environmental, security, energy and other 
challenges facing the Pacific island countries are unable to 
gain strong traction as long as Fiji is absent from the 
leadership on such issues and is instead itself a focus of 
regional insecurity.  It is therefore essential that Embassy 
Suva continue to work with all elements of Fijian society and 
regional partners to promote the rule of law, strengthen 
civil society, and encourage the rebuilding of democratic 
institutions.  Ref B lays out a strategy for calibrated 
engagement while underscoring the opportunity costs to the IG 
of continued intransigence through the loss of assistance, 
senior-level visits to Washington, an Open Skies Agreement, 
regional coordination and planning for future military 
cooperation. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) While enforcing existing sanctions, the United 
States should resist the temptation to levy new sanctions 
barring a significant deterioration in Fiji,s human rights 
situation.  We will monitor these carefully in the days 
ahead.  Fiji,s armed forces now play a constructive role in 
a range of peacekeeping operations, including in Iraq and the 
Sinai.  Until other contributors step up to make up the 
resulting shortfall, we should avoid punishing Fiji in such a 
way as to weaken our larger peace-keeping efforts. 
Nonetheless, Fiji,s military should remain subject to the 
visa sanctions and Leahy vetting, and future Fijian 
peace-keeping or Coalition deployments must wait until 
Fiji,s military and police are re-trained and 
re-indoctrinated for civil affairs missions. 
 
SUPPORTING PIF and UN-COMMONWEALTH INITIATIVES 
 
¶9.  (C) The PIF Forum Leaders Special Retreat Communique on 
Fiji of January 27 committed the PIF to targeted measures in 
relation to Fiji unless the IG announced an election date by 
May 1 and set that election to take place by December 2009. 
The PIF statement also tasked its Ministerial Contact Group 
with monitoring the situation in Fiji and directed it to 
report to the leaders before their next meeting scheduled for 
August in Cairns, Australia.  The concluding statement of the 
31st Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group meeting of March 4 
expressed its full support for the statement issued by the 
Forum leaders, including its milestones and benchmarks.  The 
PIF should take formal cognizance of what has happened in 
Fiji by convening its Ministerial Contact Group for the 
purpose of weighing the possibility of additional measures, 
which might include full suspension from the Forum.  The 
United Nations should perform a similar assessment to review 
Fiji,s progress and report it to the Commonwealth, as it 
requested at its March 4 meeting.  The statements from these 
meetings would be for the purpose of either bringing forward 
the deadlines or emphasizing their imminence, re-stating the 
serious consequences should they lapse without action, and 
underscoring the importance of an inclusive, independent, 
time-bound PPDF without predetermined outcomes as the only 
realistic way forward toward a Fijian solution. 
 
¶10.  (C) We cannot cast a blind eye to the follies of the 
interim government and its lead in Fiji,s descent to 
dictatorship.  Yet, neither should we now vilify the 
leadership of Fiji,s government of the day at the time 
President Iloilo is inviting the nation to assist it in 
&wiping the slate clean8 and cooperating with it as it 
flexes sweeping new powers.  It has already posted military 
and police in the offices of Fiji,s media to censure 
articles it deems injurious to the public order, such 
as Secretary Clinton,s remarks at the Australia-United States 
Ministerial.  (Similarly, a leading newspaper replaced the 
USG press statement on Fiji drafted by Embassy Suva with 
white space and the statement:  &This story could not be 
published due to government restrictions.8)  We intend to be 
 
SUVA 00000131  004 OF 004 
 
 
similarly &subversive8 in the days ahead by continuing to 
speak out.  At the same time, we need to maintain our 
existing channels to the IG.  This allows us to apply 
pressure directly, serving not only our own interests but 
those of our regional partners.  Their resident 
representatives have asked us to continue to engage in direct 
dialogue with the IG on Fiji,s future, and some of Fiji,s 
leading political parties have asked us to do so as well. 
 
¶11.  (C) We also need to anticipate that some of our regional 
partners may approach us regarding one or more of at least 
three possible initiatives.  The first is the idea of 
applying pressure directly on Fiji,s military by withdrawing 
our support for Fiji,s continuing deployments to the 
Multinational Force and Observers mission in the Sinai.  Post 
opposes this idea for the reasons stated in Para 8.  The 
second is the idea of pressuring South Korea to join the 
travel sanctions regime against Fiji,s military and 
supporters of the December 2006 coup.  Should it choose, 
Seoul could follow Tokyo,s example by imposing the travel 
sanctions but not announcing them.  Korean Airlines is the 
main air link now available to the IG for access to 
international air travel routes.  Seoul,s imposition of visa 
restrictions similar to those imposed by the United States 
and described in Para 6 would dramatically tighten Fiji,s 
international isolation.  The obligations of the United 
States as host country of the United Nations would remain 
unchanged and require our continuation of the present waiver 
policy for related travel, but we would need to exert the 
same discriminating care in any other waiver cases as we 
would hope to expect from the Koreans.  The third approach is 
to dissuade Japan from inviting high-level Fijian 
participation in the Pacific Island Leaders Meeting (PALM 5), 
now scheduled for May 21-23 in Hokkaido.  Canberra and 
Wellington have interceded with Tokyo against Fiji,s 
participation.  Under the present circumstances, we should 
ask Tokyo to consider restricting Fiji,s participation to 
its Ambassador to Japan, Ratu Inoke Kubuabola. 
 
¶12.  (C) Fiji,s challenge to the region and its institutions 
deserves the clearest possible regional response, beginning 
with implementation by the PIF of the targeted measures 
agreed to at Port Moresby.  The &Pacific Way,8 which 
emphasizes group consensus, tends to militate against a more 
robust response by the PIF.  A military intervention along 
the lines of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon 
Islands is unrealistic in Fiji,s non-permissive environment. 
 Unfortunately, a prime objective of the People,s Charter, 
pushed by the IG as its manifesto for Fiji,s future, is an 
even larger role for Fiji,s military.  So, the difficulty of 
mounting an adequate response may only grow as the military 
becomes more entrenched in Fiji,s institutions.  We need to 
engage the IG directly to dissuade it from pursuing that 
longer-term course.  Our best options now are to support the 
initiatives of the PIF, UN and Commonwealth, sustain the 
pressure of our present sanctions regime, seek new travel 
restrictions by other partners in the region, and continue to 
engage directly with the IG with a view to helping it resolve 
Fiji,s longer-term systemic issues.  We need to recalibrate 
our public diplomacy effort in Fiji by adding additional 
speakers and shifting other resources, in order to aid our 
effectiveness in speaking out against the excesses of Fiji,s 
military government.  At the same time, we need to temper our 
severe disapproval of what has happened with a dispassionate 
eye to all that we seek to achieve if we are to remain an 
effective intercessor with this government.  We believe that 
to be the best way to advance U.S. interests on bilateral 
issues and the broader regional agenda, and to influence 
better IG behavior on such transcendent issues as media 
freedom, judicial independence, democracy and human rights. 
 
PRUETT