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OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
DE RUEHC #2944/01 0932154
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 0182
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 0717
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 4766
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/NRC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 3624
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD IMMEDIATE 2101
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 5402
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 032944 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2019 
TAGS: KNNP MNUC ASEC KCRM PARM PINR GG ZJ
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON CESIUM-137 
SOURCE DISCOVERED NEAR KOPITNARI AIRPORT 
 
REF: A. A) TBILISI 000449 
     ¶B. B) TBILISI 000314 
     ¶C. C) TBILISI 000275 
 
Classified By: ISN/WMDT DIRECTOR, ACTING, THOMAS LOWE 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request for Embassy Tbilisi. 
Please see paragraph 3. 
 
¶2.  (C) BACKGROUND:  According to Ref A, the Georgian 
government has successfully recovered the four cesium-137 
sources found near Kopitnari Airport.   We are pleased that 
the Georgians recovered the sources, but are concerned that 
they did not follow proper procedures when responding to the 
incident as outlined in the Addendum to the Joint Document of 
Georgian and U.S. Delegations on Georgia's Priority Needs to 
Improve Its Capabilities to Combat Nuclear Smuggling.  The 
Addendum (see para 6) obligates Georgia to follow the IAEA 
Nuclear Security Series, which advises governments to 
investigate radiation alarms for possible criminal activity 
and preserve evidence for potential prosecutions.  However, a 
video of the recovery shared with us by the Georgian 
government suggested that the Georgians were not prepared to 
consider the possibility of opening a criminal case, since it 
appeared there was no law enforcement presence during the 
recovery operation, and no effort to follow proper procedures 
for the preservation of evidence.   Usually when radioactive 
sources are "abandoned", they are left in their original 
storage location and forgotten.  In this case, it appears 
several sources were removed from their place of origin and 
buried in another location.  It seems unlikely that this 
could have been done lawfully.   Even if there is not enough 
evidence to prosecute, it would be helpful to know whether 
the Georgians even considered the possibility that the 
abandoned sources were connected with criminal activity. 
 
¶3. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  Post is requested to congratulate 
the Government of Georgia on a successful recovery and 
express Washington's interest in continuing efforts to 
improve their capabilities to deter, detect, and disrupt 
nuclear and radioactive material trafficking.   In order to 
clarify information gaps, Washington seeks answers to 
additional questions (para 4) from appropriate Georgian 
officials.  Post is requested to provide a coordinated 
response to Washington via front-channel cable. 
 
¶4.  (S//REL GEORGIA) FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS ABOUT SEIZED 
MATERIAL: 
 
--  Has the Government of Georgia considered pursuing this 
case as a criminal matter?   Has it completely ruled out the 
possibility that the material was abandoned by smugglers? 
 
--  Is the road on which the sources were detected a known 
smuggling route for any other illicit activities, e.g. 
narcotics or human trafficking? 
 
-- How much confidence does the NRSS have that the material 
was buried without any intention of transporting it in the 
future? 
 
-- Is there any record of other cases in Georgia where 
radioactive or nuclear materials were discovered buried at 
previously unknown locations? 
 
-- Could the Georgians please elaborate on their explanation 
that the sources were buried two or three years ago, and why 
they do not think they will be able to determine their origin? 
 
¶5. Washington appreciates Post's assistance in answering 
these questions related to this case. 
 
¶6. (SBU) ADDENDUM TO THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF GEORGIAN AND U.S. 
DELEGATIONS ON GEORGIA'S PRIORITY NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS 
CAPABILITIES TO COMBAT NUCLEAR SMUGGLING: 
 
On February 2, 2007, Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Georgia 
 
STATE 00032944  002 OF 003 
 
 
John F. Tefft and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia Gela 
Bezhuashvili signed in Tbilisi the Joint Document of U.S. and 
Georgian Delegations on Georgia's Priority Needs to Improve 
Its Capabilities to Combat Nuclear Smuggling.  Since that 
time, the Government of Georgia has taken significant steps 
to address the needs identified in that document and the 
Government of the United States has secured commitments of 
assistance from several U.S. and international donors to 
assist Georgia in implementing those steps.  In light of the 
degradation of Georgia's capabilities to combat nuclear 
smuggling caused by the events of August 2008, delegations of 
the Governments of the United States of America and Georgia 
have agreed to supplement the Joint Document with this 
Addendum, which specifies additional and revised steps that 
should be taken to restore and further improve Georgia's 
capabilities. 
 
PREVENTION 
 
Securing Orphaned and other Dangerous Radioactive Sources 
 
o     Designate a ministry or agency with clear authority for 
the management of disused radioactive sources. 
 
o     Complete the consolidation of sources that are 
currently in temporary storage into the new interim storage 
facility as soon as possible. (Georgian Ministry of 
Environmental Protection and Natural Resources; 
Andronikashvili Institute of Physics; U.S. Department of 
Energy; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 
 
o     Establish a joint working group between the Customs 
Control Department at the Revenue Service of the Georgian 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
Georgia, and the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service (NRSS) 
at the Georgian Ministry of Environmental Protection and 
Natural Resources to develop procedures for responding to 
radioactive material detections at the state border.  As part 
of this effort, this working group will define existing needs 
at the border and present them to the U.S. side for 
discussion. 
 
DETECTION 
 
Improved Border Security and Capabilities of Law Enforcement 
Bodies 
 
o     Provide the MOIA, Patrol Police, Border Police, Customs 
Service, and other agencies with which they interact, 
reliable, robust, secure, and compatible communications 
technology and infrastructure. 
 
o     Enhance the capability of the Georgian Coast Guard to 
monitor Georgia's sea space.  This may include: 
 
-     Additional patrol vessels; 
-     Portable radiation detection equipment; 
-     Communications equipment; 
-     Other equipment and infrastructure; and 
-     Training. 
 
o     Develop a plan for monitoring of Georgia's green 
borders with aviation assets. 
 
o     Equip the Patrol Police and other relevant MOIA units 
with radiation detection equipment and provide appropriate 
training. 
 
o     Equip the Customs Service with appropriate radiation 
detection equipment and provide related training. 
 
o     Establish a center to provide centralized repair, 
maintenance, and calibration service for the radiation 
detection equipment of all agencies. 
 
RESPONSE 
 
Prosecution and Nuclear Forensics 
 
o     Commit to follow the standards for responding to 
incidents of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive 
material contained in the IAEA's Nuclear Security Series 
Documents and other relevant international guidelines. 
 
STATE 00032944  003 OF 003 
 
 
Georgia may need additional equipment or training to carry 
out some of these steps. 
 
o     Develop a written radiological and nuclear response 
plan to codify implementation of these standards. 
 
o     Conduct regular exercises to ensure the effective 
implementation of this plan. 
 
o     Participate in the Nuclear Forensic Workshop for the 
Caucasus region sponsored by the International Science and 
Technology Center (ISTC) and planned for December 2008. 
 
International Cooperation and Information Sharing 
 
o     Participate actively in the Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism. (MFA and other relevant Georgian agencies) 
 
o     Work with the governments of third countries to enhance 
regional cooperation to facilitate investigation and 
prosecution of illicit traffickers. 
 
The delegations agreed that the Government of Georgia would 
continue to work expeditiously to implement those steps in 
the Joint Document of February 2, 2007, as well as the steps 
enumerated above, that it is capable of carrying out on its 
own, and where assistance is needed, the Government of the 
United States of America would continue to seek to identify 
sources, within either the U.S. government or the 
international community, to provide such assistance. 
 
End Cable 
CLINTON