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DE RUEHUL #0527/01 0910745
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O 010745Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3864
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5575
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 5670
RUEAMDA/MDA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA CC SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000527 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019 
TAGS: KPAO MARR PREL PARM
SUBJECT: ALLIANCE COORDINATION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING A TD-2 LAUNCH 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 29932 
     ¶B. SEOUL 00514 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSEPH YUN.  REASONS 1.4 (b 
),(d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: Post has conveyed reftel A points on 
alliance coordination of public diplomacy following a 
Taepodong2 launch by the DPRK to MOFAT and Blue House 
National Security Advisor.  The Ambassador has underlined to 
National Security Advisor Kim that Seoul and Washington 
should be closely coordinated on public messages before and 
after the TD-2 launch, noting that we wanted to avoid 
creating a crisis atmosphere that would reduce our 
flexibility to pursue diplomat opportunities, including 
further progress in the Six-Party Talks.  NSA Kim and other 
senior MOFAT officials have expressed satisfaction with close 
Seoul-Washington consultations on this issue, agreed that 
either the Blue House or MOFAT would have the ROK lead in 
addressing the matter in public, and stated that the ROKG 
would respond calmly to the launch and did not contemplate a 
bilateral response, beyond their likely endorsement of PSI 
(reported ref B).  On April 1, MOFAT provided us with a 
preview of the talking points the ROKG intends to use after 
the launch (para 7).  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) On March 30, the Ambassador called on Republic of 
Korea National Security Advisor Kim Sung-hwan and conveyed 
reftel A points on alliance coordination of public diplomacy 
following a TD-2 launch by the DPRK.  The Ambassador 
underlined that Seoul and Washington should be closely 
coordinated on public messages before and after the TD-2 
launch, noting that Washington wanted to avoid creating a 
crisis atmosphere that would reduce our flexibility to pursue 
diplomacy, including further progress in the Six-Party Talks. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) NSA Kim responded that the ROKG was fully satisfied 
with close consultations between Seoul and Washington, and 
between MOFAT and Embassy in recent days.  Most recent public 
statements, including those of President Lee and SecDef 
Gates, showed that the U.S. and ROK would respond calmly to 
the North's TD-2 launch.  Thus far, NSA Kim shared, the ROKG 
was not contemplating any specific bilateral measures, 
because Seoul expected an international response, focused 
around the UNSC.  Most likely, the ROKG would also sign on to 
full participation in PSI (Proliferation Security 
Initiative), but even that was a multilateral measure, Kim 
noted. 
 
¶4.  (C) Earlier, post reviewed the public diplomacy points 
with Chang Ho-jin, Director General of the Bureau of North 
American Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, urging the ROKG to preserve diplomatic flexibility by 
responding calmly to the launch with points similar to our 
own.  To help assure that, the U.S. side would limit public 
statements to those from the White House and the Department. 
Chang said he too would seek to have only the Blue House and 
MOFAT address the media on TD-2 launch issues. 
 
¶5.  (C) Asked if the ROKG contemplated taking any other 
actions in response to the launch, aside from its likely move 
to join PSI (reported reftel B), DG Chang replied that he did 
not think so, and that if the ROKG intended to take any other 
measures, it would be sure to coordinate the move with 
Washington. 
 
¶6. (C) Vice Foreign Minister and Six-Party Talks Wi Sung-lac 
is heading a ROKG task force established to deal with North 
Korea's expected TD2 launch.  His deputy on the task force is 
DG for Nuclear Affairs Hwang Joon-kook, with Director of 
North Korea Nuclear Policy Ham Sang-wook assisting.  Other 
offices involved are North America Division I, Disarmament 
and Nonproliferation, International Treaties, and Public 
Affairs.  During an April 1 meeting, Director Ham told us 
that the ROKG was in sync with the USG's planned press 
guidance as well as the UNSC follow-up plan aiming for a new 
UNSC resolution with annexes. 
 
¶7. (C) Ham previewed a ROKG announcement to be made soon 
 
after the launch.  He said it would make the following 
points:  The DPRK long-range rocket was launched at xx 
date/time; ROKG is cooperating with the USG in confirming the 
details; despite DPRK claims, the launch violates UNSCR 1718, 
is a provocative act, and has consequences for the peace and 
stability of Northeast Asia and Korean Peninsula; ROKG and 
the international community repeatedly warned the DPRK to 
refrain from conducting the launch; the ROKG is concerned 
that the DPRK had committed this provocative act, and; the 
ROKG will take measures to strengthen its defenses.  Ham 
added that the ROKG would announce its full participation in 
PSI quite soon after the launch. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Blue House and MOFAT have both repeatedly 
expressed sincere appreciation for the USG's clear strategy 
on the public affairs message, and close coordination with 
the ROKG at this critical moment. 
STEPHENS