VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHYN #0569/01 0911419
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 011419Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1534
INFO RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1618

S E C R E T SANAA 000569 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP:AMACDONALD, 
NSC FOR JOHN BRENNAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2019 
TAGS: PREL KDRG YM
SUBJECT: ROYG FOLLOW UP ON MARCH 16 BRENNAN-SALEH MEETING 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Stephan A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 
 ¶1.  (S) Summary.  Deputy Foreign Minister al-Dhabbi called 
in Ambassador April 1 to express concern about the outcome of 
last month,s discussion between APDNSA John Brennan and 
President Saleh on GTMO detainees, and solicit the 
Ambassador,s views as to how we can move this issue forward. 
 Dhabbi agreed that Yemen can ill-afford to miss the 
opportunity to demonstrate its readiness to cooperate with 
the Obama Administration on an issue of such importance, but 
asked that we appreciate the internal pressures that limit 
President Saleh,s options.  Dhabbi repeated Saleh,s 
proposal that the US and KSA coordinate bilaterally on the 
transfer of Yemeni detainees to the Saudi program, leaving 
the ROYG out of the deal.  He also asked that we consider 
returning a small number of the least-dangerous detainees in 
coming weeks as a way for the ROYG to prove its commitment to 
working effectively with the USG on this issue.  We believe 
the first suggestion, working with Riyadh on a bilateral 
arrangement, merits follow-up at this time.  The second 
proposal, returning Yemenis to Yemen as a way to break the 
current impasse with Sana,a, may be something we will want 
to consider if our discussions with the Saudis fail to 
produce a way forward.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (S)  DFM Moheedin al-Dhabbi, a respected interlocutor 
with excellent ties to senior ROYG leadership, told the 
Ambassador at the outset that he understood the Brennan-Saleh 
March 16 meeting did not go well.  Ambassador said that was a 
fair characterization, recalling Brennan,s disappointment 
that the first high-level contact between the new 
Administration and the ROYG yielded so little in the way of 
results.  Dhabbi asserted, as Saleh and others have on 
repeated occasions, that the President cannot publicly agree 
to send Yemeni detainees to Saudi Arabia.  Dhabbi claimed 
that Islamists and tribal leaders would exploit such 
concurrence as a sign of weakness on Saleh,s part, 
undermining his authority and ability to manage events in the 
country.  The Saudis know this and are disingenuous in 
insisting that they need a green light from Saleh to accept 
Yemenis into their rehab program, he concluded.  Better to 
consider the President,s offer for a bilateral US-KSA 
agreement without Saleh,s concurrence, which will allow him 
to claim he wasn,t consulted and avoid much of the most 
pointed criticism.  Dhabbi also urged us to permit the Saudis 
to provide the necessary financing for construction of a 
Yemeni rehab facility as an investment in Yemen that Saleh 
can use to deflect some of the criticism he will inevitably 
face. 
 
¶3.  (S)  Dhabbi asked if we might consider sending a handful 
of the least-dangerous Yemenis in GTMO back to Yemen in 
fairly short order, to give the ROYG the opportunity to 
demonstrate its commitment to effectively managing the 
detainee issue.  The Ambassador noted that such a proposal 
was sure to meet with stiff resistance at home, as a reward 
Saleh has done nothing to merit.  Ambassador also noted that, 
were any returns to Yemen to take place, the ROYG would have 
to be prepared to provide regular, thorough and verifiable 
updates on each individual,s status and whereabouts, unlike 
the information we receive on those detainees returned to 
Yemen previously.  The Ambassador also asked Dhabbi if the 
ROYG would consider receiving five of its nationals at the 
same time as a similar number were sent to Saudi Arabia; 
Dhabbi repeated that this was not something the ROYG would 
agree to.  &The Yemenis have to come back home first,8 he 
asserted.  The conversation ended with Dhabbi stating that he 
would convey the substance of the conversation to appropriate 
figures in the regime, and get back to the Ambassador if he 
received any counter-proposals. 
 
¶4.  (S)  Comment.  Given al-Dhabbi,s ties to the regime, the 
fact that he undertook to raise the issue with the Ambassador 
likely reflects a certain realization on the part of the 
leadership that Saleh,s refusal to demonstrate any 
flexibility on the GTMO-detainee issue further undermined 
confidence in Washington regarding the ROYG,s reliability as 
a partner.   Nevertheless, given what we know of Saleh,s 
nature, we do not/not expect this discomfort to yield much in 
the way of concessions from the ROYG.  That being the case, 
we believe it may be time to revisit with the Saudis their 
insistence that Saleh publicly agree to permit Yemeni 
detainees to enter the KSA rehab program, given the repeated 
assertion, including from the President himself, that the 
more acceptable approach would be a US-KSA bilateral 
agreement that protects him from being accused of complicity 
in a plan that sends Yemeni nationals to another country 
rather than bringing them home.  Should those conversations 
fail to produce a way forward, we may wish to consider 
sending a couple of the least-dangerous Yemenis to Yemen as a 
way to break the impasse with the ROYG.  End Comment. 
SECHE