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DE RUEHYN #0560/01 0910653
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FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 000560 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2019 
TAGS: MCAP MOPS PGOV PHUM PREF YM
SUBJECT: SIXTH ROUND IN SAADA: WHERE'S THE TIPPING POINT? 
 
REF: 08 SANAA 2026 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  The threat of a sixth round of fighting 
between the al-Houthi rebels and government forces in Saada 
looms large.  Potential flashpoints include the issue of 
prisoners, tribal warfare in the northern governorates and 
the grim humanitarian situation.  The constant drumbeat of 
violent clashes in Saada and al-Jawf over the last two months 
suggests a resumption of hostilities that is likely to elicit 
intensified military action from a reluctant ROYG this 
spring.  END SUMMARY. 
 
FLASHPOINT: PRISONERS 
--------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The issue of prisoners has persisted as a point of 
contention between the ROYG and the Houthis since President 
Saleh declared an end to the fifth round of fighting in July 
¶2008.  In the intervening eight months, the Houthis have 
released a number of police officers held in Saada, 
ostensibly as a "show of good faith."  The ROYG, which has 
been relatively slow to release prisoners held in connection 
with the conflict, released 11 prisoners on March 26, 
according to press reports, including high-profile detainee 
Abdulkarim al-Houthi, held since 2006.  But Ali al-Dalaimi, a 
Zaydi human rights activist, told PolOff in February that 36 
prisoners remain in jail in Sana'a and 13 in Hajja in 
connection with the Houthi conflict, some of whom have been 
incarcerated for two years without formal charges or trials. 
At least 360 Zaydi and Hashemite prisoners have disappeared 
completely since the 2004 start of the conflict, according to 
Hassan Zayd, secretary general of the Zaydi-affiliated al-Haq 
party.  Human-rights activists claim that some prisoners have 
been detained due to their Zaydi or Hashemite backgrounds, 
which they share with the Houthi rebels, without any 
connection to the violent rebellion in Saada. 
 
FLASHPOINT: TRIBAL CONFLICT 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) In the nearly five years of on-again, off-again 
fighting between the ROYG and Houthi's "Believing Youth" 
rebels, tribes and civilians in Yemen's northwest region have 
been increasingly forced to choose sides.  The ROYG and the 
Houthis have competed for local support through provision of 
security and services, as well as intimidation.  For example, 
the Houthis require all returning IDPs to sign a loyalty 
pledge, according to the UNHCR (reftel).  As the region has 
become increasingly polarized, small-scale conflicts between 
tribal groups threaten to become a larger proxy war between 
the ROYG and the Houthis.  This polarization has expanded 
beyond Saada into al-Jawf, where many of the already 
anti-government tribes have sided with the Houthis against 
the ROYG, according to Majid al-Fahd, executive director of a 
local democracy NGO and a native of Saada.  Fahd told PolOff 
on March 23 that Hashid and Dhu Mohammed tribes in al-Jawf, 
once early backers of the Yemeni republic, have increasingly 
aligned themselves with the Houthis.  "Every day, there is 
killing (in al-Jawf)," Fahd said.  March media reports 
indicated at least six instances of fighting between 
government forces and Houthi supporters, each backed by armed 
tribesmen, totaling at least - and likely more than - eight 
Houthi and 10 government casualties and an unspecified number 
of injuries. 
 
FLASHPOINT: HUMANITARIAN CRISIS 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) The poor humanitarian situation in Saada has remained 
largely unchanged since last December, despite ROYG promises 
of aid.  On March 23, the Saada Reconstruction Fund approved 
a FY 2009 budget of approximately $53.5M for the 
reconstruction of houses, farms and public buildings.  (Note: 
The ROYG's entire budget for 2009 is $9.8B.  End Note.)  The 
ROYG, however, has paid out only a small percentage of 
reconstruction funds promised since last July, and as Islah 
official Raji Badi told PolOff on March 24, "This is just 
numbers, there is nothing on the ground, nothing concrete." 
The ROYG's lack of attention to the humanitarian front has 
progressively lost it local support and increased the 
relative popularity of the Houthis.  Al-Dalaimi and Zayd both 
said that the Houthi movement has grown from about 300 
supporters several years ago to "hundreds of thousands" of 
followers in Saada and al-Jawf today, largely because of 
pragmatic rather than ideological concerns.  The Houthis have 
garnered popular support by positioning themselves as the 
only provider of badly needed food and basic services.  On 
March 22, Houthi supporters seized Red Crescent trucks 
carrying food aid, stating that the relief organization was 
distributing the food in a manner biased towards the 
government side, according to local media.  The ROYG 
continues to ignore the public relations cost of military 
tactics that target civilian populations.  On March 28, 
Abdulmalik al-Houthi accused the ROYG of conducting 
airstrikes on the Saada village of Maran, killing eight, 
among them women and children, although there has been no 
independent corroboration of this allegation. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶5.  (C) The frequency and severity of clashes in Saada has 
steadily increased during 2009.  The question remains what, 
if anything, will prove the tipping point for the ROYG to 
reengage militarily with the Houthi rebels in a sustained 
manner.  Clearly, it is not in the struggling ROYG's interest 
to renew full-scale hostilities in Saada - and possibly 
al-Jawf.  A prolonged military campaign in Saada would drain 
limited military resources and distract President Saleh from 
major crises with al-Qaeda, the economy and the South. 
However, an increase in hostilities on the side of the 
Houthis might force Saleh's hand.  In a time when central 
control is under increasing challenge across Yemen, the 
President might feel he has no choice but to attempt to 
reassert his waning authority in Yemen's rebellious 
northwest.  END COMMENT. 
SECHE