VZCZCXRO3983
PP RUEHDH
DE RUEHRH #0568/01 1041208
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 141208Z APR 09 ZDK CTG SVC# 9524
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0004

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000568 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ICC SA SU
SUBJECT: COURTSHIP OF SAUDIS PAYING DIVIDENDS FOR SUDAN 
 
REF: A. RIYADH 789 
     ¶B. RIYADH 456 
     ¶C. NDJAMENA 102 
 
Classified By: CDA David Rundell for 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) KEY POINTS 
 
-- A recent diplomatic offensive in Riyadh by the Sudanese 
now yields benefits in public and private support. 
 
-- Saudi officials publicly greeted President Omar al-Bashir 
April 1 as he made a single day Umrah pilgrimage to Saudi 
Arabia, lending an air of official weight to an otherwise 
religious visit. 
 
-- Reportedly, Sudan has secured aid commitments from sources 
within Saudi Arabia, making up for the March NGO expulsion. 
 
¶2. (C) COMMENT: 
 
-- STABILITY, STABILITY, STABILITY:  The Saudis' interest in 
Sudan is pragmatic, as instability in Sudan can lead to 
instability at home.  First, the Saudis invest in Sudan not 
just for financial gain, but as a strategic path to future 
food security.  Second, over one million Sudanese live in the 
Kingdom, and some Saudis trace their ancestry to Sudan.  The 
Saudi government is unlikely to risk antagonizing this large 
constituency which adamantly supports President Bashir and 
vehemently opposes the ICC warrant. 
 
-- DONATION CONFIDENTIAL:  The Saudis hold closely the 
amounts of assistance they provide to other countries.  In a 
notable exception, the SAG publicly announced aid to Gaza 
Palestinians in the face of public outrage, although this was 
portrayed as a donation from individual royals.  Many Saudis 
criticize foreign aid and believe the money could be better 
spent at home.  Aid to Sudan would likely flow through the 
Saudi Red Crescent, or possibly other mechanisms such as the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference or Islamic Development 
Bank.  However, the exact figures will likely remain secret. 
 
-- THE MISBAHA ONLY HAS 99 BEADS:  An execution of the ICC 
arrest warrant would likely elicit vocal opposition from the 
Saudis.  They view themselves as already surrounded by 
diplomatic headaches, a list to which Sudan only adds. 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq and Yemen require the 
SAG's full attention, not to mention the Iran-Syria-Lebanon 
nexus.  Volatility among Bahrain's Shi'a literally hits close 
to home.  The Saudis would likely welcome any development 
that stabilizes Sudan and subtracts it from their list of 
concerns. 
 
END KEY POINTS AND COMMENT 
 
¶3. (C) SUMMARY:  Since the March 4 announcement of the ICC 
arrest warrant, the Sudanese have dramatically increased 
their presence in front of high-ranking Saudis.  Sudanese 
Presidential Advisor Dr. Mustafa Othman Ismael landed in 
Riyadh around March 7, staying for over a week and meeting 
with Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal (Ref B).  Soon after, 
Vice President Ali Othman Taha and State Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Ali Karti visited Riyadh, calling on King Abdallah. 
The payoff has come in three forms: public support, private 
assurances of increased aid, and the hosting of Bashir for 
the Umrah pilgrimage. 
 
----------------------------- 
SEEKING, AND GETTING, SUPPORT 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) BASHIR LANDS IN SAUDI:  In a brief yet significant 
April 1 visit, Bashir traveled directly from Doha to Jeddah, 
continuing to Mecca where he performed the Umrah pilgrimage. 
The SAG did not announce his visit in advance.  However, 
several mid-ranking Saudi officials greeted Bashir during his 
trip.  Jeddah mayor Prince Misha'al bin Majed bin Abdalaziz 
met Bashir as he landed in Jeddah, with photos of the pair 
 
RIYADH 00000568  002 OF 002 
 
 
appearing in local papers.  Saudi Press Agency released a 
short statement from Mecca, noting but not naming the "number 
of senior officials" who received Bashir at the city's Holy 
Mosque. 
 
¶5. (C) ASSISTANCE INCREASE:  Scattered reports have indicated 
that the Saudis are increasing assistance to Sudan and 
Darfur, though the Saudis themselves have not announced any 
increase.  Sporadic reports have come from Sudanese press 
sources, including one unattributed (and unlikely) claim that 
investment projects worth US $4 billion are under review by 
Sudan's Jeddah Consulate (Sudanese Media Center, April 9). 
The following local reports provide more reliable detail: 
 
-- March 24 Jeddah-based Okaz newspaper published an 
interview with Sudanese Interior Minister Ibrahim Mahmoud 
Hamid where he stated that a high-level Saudi security 
delegation would visit Khartoum in April, in a revival of 
agreements signed in 2005.  He added that Saudi Interior 
Minister Prince Nayef approved the visit which would focus on 
terrorism, organized crime and money laundering. 
 
-- April 3 the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 
announced a plan to increase aid to Darfur, according to a 
press report covering a conference of OIC aid ministers in 
Libya. 
 
-- April 10 the Saudi Press Agency announced that the 
Jeddah-based Islamic Development Bank approved $12.6 million 
to finance a water harvesting project and another $19.5 
million for a cotton project. 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) CONFIRMATION:  A Riyadh-based Egyptian diplomat 
confirmed the increase in aid, but not the specifics.  The 
diplomat cited a message from the Egyptian Embassy in 
Khartoum which stated that two unnamed organizations from 
within Saudi Arabia had agreed to provide humanitarian 
assistance.  The diplomat added that Cairo had also asked the 
Saudis to increase aid, reading directly from a document 
carrying this message. 
 
------------------- 
MORE VIEWS ON SUDAN 
------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) DQ RALLY:  The night of March 5, the day after the 
ICC announcement, a large group of enthusiastic Sudanese 
congregated at their Riyadh Embassy, just steps from the U.S. 
Embassy.  The raucous gathering came as close to a 
demonstration as one sees in Saudi Arabia, and speakers could 
be heard across the Diplomatic Quarter (DQ).  In a rare move, 
police allowed a large number of Sudanese onto the DQ and 
stood by during their "rally."  A British diplomat attempted 
to enter and observe, but police turned him away. 
 
¶8. (S/NF) AND OF COURSE, IRAN:  In late February, a Sudanese 
diplomat shared that Sudan fully backed the Saudis in the 
face of a growing threat from Iran.  He said his government 
feared Iran's growing presence, explaining how there were no 
Shi'a in his country twenty years ago - but you can find them 
today.  He also noted Saudi Arabia's many investments in 
Sudan, pointing out food security as a key issue. 
 
¶9. (S) VIEW FROM THE CHADIAN EMBASSY:  The Charge d'Affaires 
of Riyadh's Chadian Embassy declined to delve into the 
Saudi-Sudan fray in a recent meeting.  The Chadian CDA, Dr. 
Tahir Annadif Khatir (protect), ducked a query about the 
Saudi Ambassador to Chad (Ref C).  Discussing Saudi aid, he 
doubtfully asked if the Saudis would contribute more to 
Darfur.  On the Doha process, he expressed comfort in 
(Justice and Equality Movement leader) Dr. Khalil Ibrahim's 
ability to represent rebel factions, and commended the USG 
designation of a special envoy for Sudan.  He emphasized his 
government's principle goal of repatriating the 200,000 
Sudanese refugees currently in eastern Chad. 
 
RUNDELL