VZCZCXRO2910
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHPS #0150/01 0981833
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 081833Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8938
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 5239
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1157
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1664
RHFMISS/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUZEJAA/USNIC PRISTINA SR PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000150 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PASS TO EUR/SCE 
NSC FOR HELGERSON 
USAID FOR DCHA/DC (HENNING AND MCENERY) AND E&E (SOKOLOWSKI 
AND RUSSELL) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID UNMIKV KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: MAJOR ELECTION-RELATED CHALLENGES AHEAD 
 
REF: A. PRISTINA 78 
     ¶B. PRISTINA 131 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Tina S. Kaidanow for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Kosovo's political scene is increasingly 
focusing on municipal elections widely expected to take place 
in autumn-winter 2009, though no date has yet been set. 
Coalition and opposition parties alike see municipal 
elections as an opportunity to gain momentum for national 
elections, currently slated for 2011.  The municipal 
elections present several challenges:  the President's LDK 
party is counting on a strong showing to heal internal 
divisions, but may break apart and harm the governing 
coalition if it fails to do well; the Central Elections 
Commission (CEC), charged with conducting the elections, is 
seized with an ongoing power struggle between the two senior 
coalition partners, PDK and LDK, and is currently unable to 
direct the elections without external assistance; the OSCE 
Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) wants to offer technical assistance 
in administering and monitoring, but disputes within the 
OSCE's Permanent Council in Vienna over the recognition of 
Kosovo's independence may constrain this ability; and there 
is currently no other external actor on the ground who can 
provide necessary assistance to ensure that these elections 
are generally free and fair.  Given the high stakes involved 
-- Kosovo will be under intense international scrutiny to 
conduct a legitimate process, its first since becoming 
independent in February 2008 -- Embassy and USAID have begun 
contingency planning for IFES to provide substantial support 
to Kosovo's municipal elections.  END SUMMARY 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
¶2. (C) Kosovo last held comprehensive elections in November 
2007, when residents voted for national and municipal 
offices.  Despite speculation that Kosovo would again hold 
national elections in 2009 according to the Ahtisaari Plan's 
suggestions, President Sejdiu and International Civilian 
Representative Pieter Feith announced in December 2008 that 
national candidates elected in 2007 would have a four-year 
mandate and that no national elections would occur in 2009, 
arguing that the earlier elections were Ahtisaari-compliant. 
Municipal office holders, however, only possess a two-year 
mandate because the Ahtisaari Plan envisioned new municipal 
elections following the completion of decentralization that 
establishes local self-governance and creates six new 
Serb-majority municipalities.  (Note: Decentralization's goal 
is to empower Serbs with local control, thus increasing their 
motivation to participate in elections and integrate within 
Kosovo institutions.  Kosovo Serbs had extraordinarily low 
participation in 2007, with only 3297 Serbs (0.57% of votes 
cast) coming to the polls.)  Decentralization, however, is 
proceeding slowly, and it is unlikely that any of the new 
Serb-majority municipalities will be functioning this year. 
We also do not expect large numbers of Serbs in Kosovo to 
participate in upcoming elections absent approval or at least 
tolerance from the Government of Serbia (reftels).  End Note.) 
 
¶3. (C) Local speculation holds that President Sejdiu will 
make his announcement on a date for municipal elections in 
May or June.  The Law on Local Elections states that the 
President must call elections no later than four months and 
no earlier than six months before the date of the local 
elections.  The Law further states that municipal elections 
should occur in the same month four years following the 
previous election.  An UNMIK regulation, however, limited 
municipal mandates for the most recent election to two years. 
 This suggests that municipal elections could be called for 
November 2009.  A liberal interpretation of fine points in 
the election law would allow the President to delay the 
municipal elections until January 2010 or even move them up 
to October 2009.  We hear, however, that the GOK is hesitant 
to postpone elections until next year, fearing that this will 
increase pressure to hold national elections concurrently, 
 
PRISTINA 00000150  002 OF 003 
 
 
something opposition parties have lobbied for heavily. 
 
IMPACT OF ELECTIONS ON GOVERNMENT STABILITY 
 
¶4. (C) Municipal elections will likely have a direct impact 
on the governing coalition's stability.  Junior coalition 
partner LDK is in disarray, with competing factions fighting 
for control over the party's future.  President Sejdiu's 
loyalists count themselves in the party's old guard and see 
Sejdiu as the spiritual successor to former President Ibrahim 
Rugova -- credited among many as the political father of 
modern, independent Kosovo.  A dissatisfied element within 
the party, gathered loosely under the moniker "Gorenje 
Group"(named for a local hotel where this group meets), 
contend that Sejdiu's leadership is ossified and point to the 
LDK's poor showing in the 2007 elections as evidence that the 
party needs new direction.  Over the previous months, Embassy 
has been counseling representatives from both factions to 
work on party development focusing on policies and platform 
rather than wholesale reform which would result in a purging 
of party leaders to motivate quick change, but which could 
also bring down the coalition government and create 
instability in Kosovo. 
 
¶5. (C) The LDK suffers from serious internal problems, 
including poor organization and a disaffected grassroots, all 
stemming from a weak and divided leadership.  Another poor 
electoral outcome for the party coming after 2007,s 
disastrous results will likely engulf the LDK in a bloodbath 
of bitter infighting for control of what remains of the 
party.  We have already seen former LDK senior official 
Blerim Kuci defect to Ramush Haradinaj's AAK party, and 
rumors persist that other LDK members may follow.  A 
worst-case scenario following municipal elections this year 
is that some LDK MPs might leave the party, forming either 
their own splinter as the LDD did in 2007 or joining another 
Assembly caucus, most likely the opposition AAK.  Regardless, 
any fracturing of the LDK would destabilize the coalition and 
possibly motivate earlier-than-desired national elections 
that would throw senior officials into full-time campaign 
mode and distract them from progress on critical political 
and economic objectives. 
 
CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION 
 
¶6. (C) For municipal elections in 2009 to have a chance of 
success, the Central Election Commission (CEC) needs major 
capacity improvement.  Currently, the CEC's secretariat lacks 
a CEO, the official charged with directing the commission's 
activities.  The CEO's position has been vacant for months, a 
consequence of tensions between the PDK and LDK, as each 
party strives for influence on the CEC. 
 
¶7. (C) The CEC itself is an 11-member body with a chair that 
the Kosovo president selects from the Supreme Court and 10 
members from political parties represented in the Assembly. 
Zait Xhemajli, the CEC's current chair, tells us that the CEC 
is currently incapable of conducting elections on its own and 
requires technical assistance from the OSCE Mission in Kosovo 
(OMIK).  (NOTE:  Currently, OMIK has 20 staff working within 
the CEC, and OMIK has confirmed Xhemajli's warnings -- 
including concern about the possibility of counting fraud -- 
to us on several occasions. END NOTE).  Xhemajli has 
complained to us that the CEC members' political affiliations 
prompt inter-party conflicts, and he is concerned about what 
will happen when it comes time for the CEC to start counting 
votes.  He wants objective, expert assistance for a full 
range of functions, including organizing elections in Serb 
enclaves, managing vote counting, compiling and updating 
voter lists, developing an operational plan to allow 
displaced voters to participate, and registering political 
parties.  He has conveyed this same message to the OSCE on 
several occasions, including to OSCE Head of Mission Werner 
Almhofer, who has indicated his willingness to assist but has 
never offered a detailed plan of what OMIK can or will do. 
 
PRISTINA 00000150  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
ROLE FOR THE OSCE 
 
¶8. (C) OMIK is divided on how to proceed with its technical 
assistance on elections.  OMIK's Head of Democratization, 
Wilma Theuws, has an ambitious plan that would second an 
experienced OMIK local staffer to CEC as the new CEO.  This 
would give the CEC's Secretariat a non-partisan technocrat to 
plan elections, who could coordinate the CEC's activities 
with OSCE election workers that Theuws wants to provide for 
the months leading up to the election. 
 
¶9. (C) OMIK HOM Almhofer is far more circumspect about the 
plan and is nervous that if OMIK's support during the 
election is too bold, the non-recognizing OSCE member states 
on the Permanent Council will complain that OMIK's activities 
are inconsistent with OSCE's "status neutral" position 
towards Kosovo independence.  Almhofer allowed Theuws to 
submit her plan for election support to Vienna for approval, 
and we hear that OMIK is expecting a response within two 
weeks.  But even an affirmative response is no guarantee of 
future engagement.  While Theuws believes that she can 
navigate the Permanent Council's concerns with carefully 
worded reports that couch OSCE activities in terms of 
"monitoring," the possibility exists that OSCE, reflecting 
pressure from Moscow, Belgrade, or the five EU 
non-recognizing countries, could withdraw its assistance at 
any time during election preparations and derail the process. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶10. (C) The stakes for the upcoming municipal elections are 
high.  Kosovo will be under intense international scrutiny to 
conduct a free and fair process -- the first since the 
country became independent in February 2008.  A recent 
USAID/Washington elections assessment team heard concerns 
from a number of stakeholders here about the integrity of the 
elections, and we fear that a failed process would be 
destabilizing for Kosovo and the region.  Other problems loom 
as well:  security for these elections would be of paramount 
concern, particularly in Kosovo's north, and the unresolved 
question of the Strpce municipality (where the Serb majority 
boycotted the 2007 elections and a Serb parallel government 
now claims control) would again come to the fore.  As of now, 
the Central Election Commission is incapable of directing 
elections on its own, and OMIK cannot guarantee its 
continuing assistance. 
 
¶11.  (C) While we could seek to delay elections to allow the 
LDK time to get its house in order, give the CEC time to grow 
into its job with the OSCE's assistance, and give 
decentralization more time to develop and attract more Serb 
voters, we do not see any of these developments happening 
soon, and immense pressure from Kosovo's opposition to hold 
these elections gives the government little room for 
flexibility.  Given this situation, we have begun contingency 
planning to prevent a failed election.  USAID, with a grant 
to IFES, played a critical role to ensure that the 2007 
elections proceeded fairly, and we believe it could provide 
even greater assistance this year.  We need, however, greater 
clarity from OSCE on what assistance it will provide; this 
should be a topic of discussion for USOSCE in its dealings 
with the OSCE hierarchy and other delegations.  End comment. 
KAIDANOW