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FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7468
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 8075
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0202
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 3386
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OSLO 000220 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SCA/A TOM REOTT, EUR/RPM AARON COPE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2019 
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR MOPS AF NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY SUPPORTIVE OF AFGHAN POLICY IN PRINCIPLE, 
LESS SO IN ACTIONS 
 
REF: A. A: STATE 29482 
     ¶B. B: STATE 31102 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson 
for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Norway's special envoy for Afghanistan, Janis 
Kanavin, welcomed the conclusions of the U.S. Afghanistan 
Pakistan Strategic Review and stated that Norway was in broad 
agreement with the U.S. approach, particularly the need for 
increased civilian assistance and the implementation of the 
regional approach. The GON is currently considering what 
contributions they will announce at the NATO Summit and will 
not make the final decision until shortly before the Summit 
begins.  However, it appears that the GON is unable or 
unwilling to meet the majority of the specific requests 
listed in reftel B.  Funding for the ANA Trust Fund, LOTFA 
and ARTF appears to be the most promising area for Norway to 
contribute. END SUMMARY 
 
GON Likes the Ideas.... 
----------------------- 
¶2. (C) The concepts of intensifying civilian efforts to build 
capacities in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the linking of 
Pakistan and Afghanistan are music to the Norwegian MFA's 
ears.  The MFA itself created a joint Afghanistan/Pakistan 
section in the fall of 2008 and has long preached the need 
for increases in civilian aid and support for the UN. The GON 
has committed itself to significant military and civilian 
contributions in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, with 
a relative parity in money spent on military and civilian 
assistance.  In many ways the GON views the "comprehensive 
approach" as their own creation, and is committed to 
supporting Kai Eide's efforts to strengthen the civilian and 
UN aspects of the international effort in Afghanistan as well 
as continuing their military contribution. 
 
...but Contributions are Limited 
-------------------------------- 
¶3. (C) Despite their strong support for the conclusions of 
the U.S. Strategic Review, the GON will likely not announce 
any substantial increase in their contributions at the NATO 
Summit. Specifics on the GON decisions were not yet 
available, as the GON political leadership will not decide 
until right before the Summit. However, reviewing the list of 
Norway specific requests in reftel B with the MFA and 
Ministry of Defense revealed the limitations (real and 
self-imposed) that the GON has in responding. 
 
¶4. (C) On the military side, Norway has an OMLT team deployed 
in Afghanistan that is committed until October 2010.  They do 
not have the staffing resources to consider another Norwegian 
OMLT but are considering a Nordic OMLT.  Discussions on the 
latter are only at the initial stage.  Norwegian Special 
Forces are currently training elements of the Afghan police 
and the MOD would like to continue this training.  Norway's 
one new C-130J (delivered to the Norwegian Air Force in the 
fall of 2008) is currently unavailable for deployment due to 
damage suffered in a training exercise. It is expected that 
Norway will take delivery of additional aircraft in early 
summer 2009 and again in the summer of 2010 and begin 
training.  After that, this request might become viable. 
 
¶5. (C) On the civilian side the GON is actively considering 
contributions to the ANA Trust Fund, the LOTFA and the ARTF. 
The GON already contributes approximately 17 million dollars 
to the ARTF and has donated to the LOTFA last year.  Police 
mentoring teams are also being considered, as is the NTM-A 
proposal.  The GON hesitation on NTM-A arises from concern 
that development of the Afghan police be balanced with 
military and civilian aspects. The MFA was intrigued by the 
request for customs infrastructure at borders and promised to 
consider it. 
 
¶6. (C) Other items are more problematic.  The request for 
increases in PRT's support for governance and development is 
directly counter to the GON's strongly held policy of 
separating all civilian and military activities and would not 
be acceptable to the GON.  Similarly, the requests for 
technical experts in natural gas development and for 
contributions to power projects run counter to the GON's 
existing civilian aid priorities, which are good governance, 
education and rural development.  The GON did not reject the 
 
OSLO 00000220  002 OF 002 
 
 
request but stated that given the large amounts necessary for 
infrastructure projects they preferred to use their money on 
smaller projects. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶7. (C) Although the GON may not be able or willing to 
contribute at present with much more than money, it is quite 
useful to pressure them to consider the list of requests, 
particularly an additional OMLT, military police training, 
and civilian and technical experts in natural gas and power 
projects.  The capability is there for these items, but it 
will require political will to alter existing priorities. 
Sustained pressure from the Government of Afghanistan, NATO 
and the U.S. has been effective in the past in pushing a 
reluctant GON to change policy priorities. 
 
WHITNEY