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RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1071

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000290 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV USAU MR
SUBJECT: CONSIDERING THE SENEGALESE MEDIATION 
 
REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 282 
     ¶B. NOUAKCHOTT 269 
     ¶C. BOULWARE/HANKINS VTC OF APRIL 22 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and 
d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Democratically elected president Abdallahi 
intends to travel to Senegal on Sunday, April 26, accepting 
an invitation from President Wade.  The FNDD and RFD remain 
open to participation in a Senegalese/African Union mediation 
subject to several large reservations.  They believe (perhaps 
erroneously) General Aziz is, in fact, looking for a delay in 
the electoral process; therefore, they are pushing for a 
number of significant concessions.  The French see little 
utility in the Senegalese mediation and no chance of a delay 
in the June 6 elections; however, they recognize the 
elections will do nothing to gain Aziz domestic or 
international legitimacy.  End Summary 
 
¶2.  (C) FNDD Sees Itself on a Roll:  Charge met April 23 with 
FNDD "Foreign Minister" Mohamed Ould Maouloud at his bustling 
party headquarters.  Ould Maouloud explained the activity was 
do to the unexpected decision by the Governor of Nouakchott 
to authorize three anti-coup rallies later in the day.  Ould 
Maouloud said the FNDD had been caught off guard since they 
assumed the regime would refuse the marches -- the FNDD's 
main point being to highlight the repression of political 
dissent.  Organizers were now scrambling to get supporters 
out for marches they hadn't really expected to take place. 
Ould Maouloud characterized the decision as a sign of 
weakness on the part of General Ghazwany and Senate President 
M'Bare. 
 
¶3.  (C) Senegal:  Ould Maouloud told Charge President 
Abdallahi had decided to accept an invitation from Senegalese 
President Wade to visit Dakar.  Abdallahi will come to 
Nouakchott Sunday and fly to Dakar after a few meetings with 
supporters here.  Ould Maouloud confirmed previous comments 
from him and from the RFD's Ahmed Ould Daddah that the 
opposition was prepared to enter into political negotiations 
in Senegal under certain conditions.  Ould Maouloud 
emphasized that the opposition remains highly skeptical of 
Wade's intentions and certainly does not see him as devoted 
to democracy -- that said, they see Wade acting primarily out 
of ego.  Ould Daddah insisted that any talks must be under 
the auspices of the African Union with Wade ideally limiting 
Senegal's role to that of "host" and, at most, serving as 
"co-president" with Jean Ping.  He emphasized "we will never 
allow Wade to dictate internal Mauritanian policies" adding 
that the FNDD leadership saw Senegal as having encouraged 
ethnic strife in Mauritania for years.  Touching on the 
widely held belief that Senegal and Morocco had almost 
succeeded in getting the French to divide Mauritania between 
them at the point of independence, Ould Maouloud said Wade, 
"has never considered us as a real country and would welcome 
the chance to get the border territories. 
 
¶4.  (C) Despite their misgivings, Ould Maouloud saw political 
talks in Senegal as a means of derailing Aziz' election 
strategy.  He confided that in the last week parliamentarians 
allied with Aziz had told Senate President M'Bare that he 
should consider delaying the election date and that he had 
been lobbied by a friend of Aziz to call for a postponement 
of the elections.  He added that Senegalese Foreign Minister 
Gadio had told Ahmed Ould Daddah that Aziz was willing to 
push back the elections (According to Ould Maouloud, Gadio 
laughed when Ould Daddah said, "I understood Aziz had 
resigned.  How would he be able to change the election 
date?).  Ould Maouloud thought Aziz wanted to get the 
elections postponed since he has been unable to entice an 
opposition candidate with enough clout to give the elections 
the credibility Aziz needs.  Perhaps overstating the strength 
of his hand, Ould Maouloud suggested the opposition is now 
positioned to demand the cancellation of the election 
strategy, not just a postponement.  Ould Maouloud also 
thought they could secure the release of FNDD detainees 
(especially Prime Minister Waghef) and dictate the structure 
of the talks. 
 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000290  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Ould Maouloud stressed that any talks should include 
not just Wade and Ping but the rest of the International 
Contact Group and the UNSC P5 as co-guarantors.  He 
backstepped a bit suggesting the Arab League should be 
excluded because they had offered to send observers to the 
June 6 elections "in violation" of the February 20 
denunciation of the unilateral election process.  Ould 
Maouloud noted he had had a very positive meeting with the 
Swedish Ambassador in Dakar who he would welcome as the 
representative of the EU Presidency in any Dakar talks -- 
certainly over the German ambassador who currently represents 
the EU Presidency in Nouakchott and who is seen as a bit of a 
cheerleader for the coup. 
 
¶6.  (C) Ould Maouloud thought an opposition delegation to any 
Dakar talks would include Prime Minister Waghef as 
Abdallahi's representative, President of the National 
Assembly Ould Boulkheir, an FNDD Troika, and Ahmed Ould 
Daddah.  On the regime-side, he initially saw only General 
Ghazwany but then added Senate President Ba M'Bare could be 
included in his senate role but not as "Interim President." 
 
¶7.  (C) Despondent French:  French Charge Marc Flattot 
(protect) told Charge April 23 the French were disappointed 
that no significant opposition candidates had filed their 
candidacy before the midnight deadline April 22.  Flattot 
confided that France had heavily lobbied Ahmed Ould Daddah to 
participate in the elections but had been rebuffed.  Former 
Prime Minister Zein Zeidane had been hoped for, but he also 
had decided against participation.  Flattot recognized the 
final six candidates include Aziz, four "nobodies", and "one 
guy we've never heard of."  He added, "We have a nice picture 
-- Aziz, another White Moor, a Haratine, and an 
Afro-Mauritanian," but he lamented the weakness of the 
opposition will result in elections, "that won't win Aziz any 
credibility either with other Mauritanians or with the 
international community."  That said, he saw no chance the 
Aziz would delay the elections because Aziz recognized 
Mauritania's economic situation would only get worse as time 
goes on which could derail his election chances no matter how 
well he planned things.  Flattot dismissed the Senegalese 
mediation saying "Wade just wants to prove he exists and get 
another chance for his Nobel Peace Prize."  In the end, 
Flattot saw no way to turn off the Aziz electoral strategy 
but also saw no way to move forward after those elections. 
 
¶8.  (C) Recommendation:  Mauritania is going nowhere fast. 
The looming June 6 elections will only complicate things by 
creating three degrees of separation from constitutional 
order that can be traced through the coup, the current 
"Transition Government," and a future illegitimately 
"elected" government.  Without a wide range of options, the 
Senegalese mediation is the first effort the opposition has 
signaled they would participate in.  Post recommends 
approaching the Senegalese to urge them to pursue their 
efforts based on the conditions posed by the FNDD and RFD. 
We believe that the opposition will eventually back off on 
their demand for the cancellation of the June 6 elections and 
release of detainees, but believe the indefinite postponement 
of the elections would be a non-negotiable precondition for 
talks. 
HANKINS