VZCZCXRO9195
PP RUEHPA RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNK #0268/01 1041112
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141112Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8325
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0599
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0521
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0583
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2126
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0931
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0156
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1040

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000268 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV USAU MR
SUBJECT: RENEWED AU-LIBYAN MEDIATION EFFORTS 
 
REF: NOUAKCHOTT 266 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and 
d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary: The African Union and Libya have started a 
renewed mediation effort aimed at avoiding the need to apply 
sanctions.  The African Union questions whether the three 
main Mauritanian protagonists can ever come up with a 
consensual plan if left to their own devices, and suggests 
the international community needs to put something concrete 
on the table.  Discussions seem to lean towards the military 
agenda, but President Abdallahi said he is open to hearing 
what they might propose.  Absent General Aziz abandoning his 
electoral strategy, the FNDD sees no basis for mediation. 
End 
 
¶2.  (C) AU Peace and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra 
and Libyan Secretary for African Affairs Ali Abdel Salam 
Triki completed three-day visit to Mauritania on April 13 
during which they met with the full range of political 
players including President Abdallahi, President of the 
National Assembly Messaoud Ould Boulkheir and General Aziz. 
The emissaries did not meet with diplomats, but Lamamra spoke 
with Charge by phone the morning of April 13.  Lamamra 
indicated the AU was trying once again to find a consensual 
resolution to the Mauritanian crisis that could allow the 
return to constitutional order and avoid the applications of 
sanctions on the regime.  He said the AU's desire was to 
unlock the current deadlock between the hard positions taken 
by Abdallahi and Aziz.  He noted that, despite its recognized 
failings, Aziz' commitment to resign and to pass power back 
to civilian authority was at least something positive to work 
on.  Charge responded that we saw nothing promising in what 
we had seen to date in the process -- the ability to see 
where government funds were being directed was now nearly 
impossible, Aziz has spent months putting his people in place 
in all the positions that might ensure free and fair 
elections, and he continues to repress dissent and manipulate 
the political and judicial systems to bring down his enemies. 
 The U.S. can support early elections -- as also offered by 
President Abdallahi -- but not under the framework being put 
forward by Aziz. 
 
¶3.  (C) Lamara worried that the inflexibility of positions 
made it impossible to help the Mauritanians work out their 
own problems.  He recognized that the election process as 
currently spelled out was not credible and was subject to 
manipulation by General Aziz.  That said, he suggested it was 
time for the international community to put something 
concrete on the table that would at least meet international 
concerns -- suggesting this included a mechanism where 
Abdallahi accepts an interim presidency under the President 
of the Senate but with a consensus government that would in 
fact be independent of Aziz' manipulation and that would have 
enough time put together a credible electoral process.  He 
said that when he has met April 12 with President Abdallahi 
in Lemden he did not float any specific recommendations but 
the President had said he would be open to studying any 
proposal put forward.  Lamamra pocketed this, "at least he 
didn't say 'no'" response as something to work on.  Lamamra 
said he would be giving some thought to a specific proposal 
and might be back in Mauritania in a week to ten days.  He 
added he thought the AU might call another Contact Group 
meeting to discuss such a proposal before coming back. 
Charge told Lamamra that it was unlikely the U.S. would back 
any proposal that could not gain the consent of President 
Abdallahi and the FNDD. 
 
¶4.  (C) Charge spoke late April 13 with FNDD "Foreign 
Minister" Mohamed Ould Maouloud who had received readouts of 
the two AU/Libyan meetings with President Abdallahi and Ould 
Boulkheir.  Ould Maouloud saw the initiative as "exploratory" 
and an effort to restart after the debacle of Qadhafi's 
mediation effort.  He said the Libyan Triki had served as 
"head of delegation" to "save face" but found the message far 
more conciliatory than Qadhafi's.  The delegation had probed 
-- but not pushed -- to see whether the President and FNDD 
could be brought to accept the transition plan put forward by 
Aziz.  The Mauritanians had responded that they would be open 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000268  002 OF 002 
 
 
to renewed dialogue but that the General would have to cancel 
his electoral initiative first -- otherwise the FNDD would 
only be discussing participation in a process they see as 
critically flawed and not credible. 
 
¶5.  (C) Ould Maouloud said the FNDD in fact sees little 
utility in diplomatic activity at this time and is focusing 
most of its efforts on internal opposition.  Highly upset by 
the turn in French policy and still reeling from the Qadhafi 
whirlwind, the FNDD leadership is suspicious of the 
neutrality of the multiple negotiating efforts.  While 
speaking with the Charge, Ould Maouloud received a call 
saying Senegalese Foreign Minister Gadio was coming April 14 
to continue Senegalese mediation efforts (apparently 
uncoordinated with the AU).  Ould Maouloud could only smile. 
In a conversation later with the FNDD's Abdel Koudouuss Ould 
Abeidna (calling from Paris), Charge was told the FNDD sees 
the Senegalese as trying to keep them distracted so they 
can't focus on their own anti-Aziz strategy.  Ould Abeidna 
saw the heavy hand of France behind everything, adding that 
when they had pushed back at Qadhafi for his anti-democratic 
mediation efforts, Qadhafi responded, "but you understand its 
the French who sent me to do their dirty work." 
HANKINS