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PP RUEHPA RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNK #0240/01 0921545
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021545Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8289
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0571
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0493
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0555
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2098
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0903
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0128
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1012

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NOUAKCHOTT 000240 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV USEU MR
SUBJECT: ROUND UP OF CURRENT EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC VIEWS ON 
MAURITANIA 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reason  1.4 (b and 
d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Marked differn*ces exist between the French, 
Germans, Spanish and European Commission in Nouakchott.  The 
EC sees the Europeans poised to join the American hard-line 
against the coup with the release of its Article 96 
conclusions o/a April 6 (but at a lamentable cost for the 
Mauritanian people).  The French see an extended period of 
political and economic limbo under a short-sighted Aziz 
regime that increasingly causes concern.  The Spaniards warn 
that things could be worse than Aziz and note their main 
security concern -- illegal migration -- is well under 
control.  The Germans seem to believe that Aziz can still win 
credibility if he can get enough people out to vote on June 
¶6. 
 
----------------------------------- 
France -- The situation is confused 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Charge met March 31 with French Charge Marc Flattot 
in the wake of the flap over President Sarkozy's statement 
that there was no opposition to the August 6 coup.  Flattot 
(protect) was obviously having a bad week and said there 
seemed to be radio silence from Paris since he was getting no 
guidance on how to handle his president's remarks -- even as 
all of Mauritania's elite are calling to either praise or 
condemn the French.  Flattot said that Sarkozy's statement 
was obviously wrong and probably made without much thought. 
Unfortunately, Sarkozy's remark, as well as Foreign Minister 
Kouchner's Jeune Afrique quote suggesting President Abdallahi 
should return only to administer the June 6 elections being 
organized by General Aziz, had taken on far greater 
significance in Nouakchott than what the French leaders had 
intended.  Flattot recognized that anti-coup rallies being 
organized by Ahmed Ould Daddah's party on April 1 and by the 
FNDD on April 2 were "Sarkozy Protests" meant to underline 
that there is real resistance.  Flattot noted that French 
Ambassador Vanderpoorter (who has been away for over a month 
due to a detached retina) was livid over anti-coup statements 
that Sarkozy must have been ill-advised by his Ambassador to 
say what he said. 
 
¶3.  (C) Flattot assumed that Aziz will go forward with his 
election program lamenting the process will leave him and the 
country no better off than it is now.  He recognized that 
under the current circumstances there is no chance of a 
credible election.  While he assumes Aziz will be able to 
rustle up opponents from the dissident branches of Ould 
Daddah's RFD and Abdallahi's ADIL parties, he did not expect 
Ould Daddah to run except under the very doubtful 
circumstance where Vall also decided to run.  Flattot worried 
that Aziz would have a tenuous position at best as resources 
dry up -- suggesting Mauritania will be bankrupt by October. 
Flattot doubted Arab cash flows would be sufficient to offset 
Western assistance. 
 
¶4.  (C) Flattot saw Aziz' outreach to the Iranians as 
indicative of his poor policy skills.  While being able to 
gain some modicum of international recognition and much 
needed cash injections by playing with the Iranians, Flattot 
saw that Aziz had both upset his regionally powerful 
neighbors in Rabat and, perhaps more importantly, was 
undermining his own military support base by angering the 
anti-Shiite Bathist core of the military hierarchy.  Flattot 
saw this as typical of Aziz who, "takes actions quickly for 
the immediate situation but doesn't think through the 
consequences." 
 
¶5.  (C) While increasingly critical of what type of leader 
Aziz is proving to be, Flattot doubted the ability of the 
opposition to do anything about it.  He saw the FNDD and RFD 
foolishly allowing themselves to be divided over a personal 
animosity between Abdallahi and Ould Daddah. 
 
-------------------------- 
Spain -- It Could Be Worse 
-------------------------- 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000240  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Charge met April 2 with Spanish Ambassador Alejandro 
Polanco Mata who, as always, was frank in citing Spanish 
security concerns as driving their policies.  Polanco noted 
that Spain was very pleased with the Aziz regime's efforts in 
controlling illegal immigration to the Canary Islands.  Now 
is the period of ideal conditions for boat people sailing 
from Nouadhibou to the Canaries.  Last year in February and 
March, 23 boats made it to the Canaries.  With Aziz getting 
out the word to stop the flow, this year there were only 2 
boats.  Asked about Mauritanian military involvement in drug 
trafficking that also affects Spanish security, Polanco 
responded that he knew the rumors but that, frankly, the 
drugs issue was less of a priority than alien smuggling.  He 
also emphasized that he had no way of assessing the validity 
of the rumored military involvement in trafficking or even of 
evaluating how serious that traffic is.  He did note he saw 
an increasing number of resident Latin Americans who have no 
obvious reason for being here. 
 
¶7.  (C) Polanco was curious whether there was likely to be 
any change in U.S. position after the June 6 elections. 
Charge responded that we had already made clear our 
opposition to the unilateral election initiative that offered 
no chance of resulting in a credible process.  Assuming Aziz 
sticks to his plan, Charge said we will dismiss it as a waste 
of time and money that does nothing to alter his 
(non)legitimacy.  Polanco accepted the U.S. position but 
worried that it will result in a long-term stalemate that 
will make Mauritania effectively a "non-country." 
 
¶8.  (C) When asked about Aziz' overtures to Iran, Polanco 
responded, "sadly, I have to say that is primarily the result 
of the American and European Commission positions."  Polanco 
argued that Aziz had ardently hoped for an eventual softening 
of U.S. opposition given his decades of counter-terrorism 
cooperation with the West.  When that change was not 
forthcoming, Aziz was "forced" to reach out to Iran both for 
short-term money and recognition and as a political signal to 
the U.S. and Europeans that he has other options if aid is 
cut off.  Polanco acknowledged that the Iranian gambit caused 
Aziz problems with Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and his own 
military base but termed the Iranian initiative as mainly 
"theater."  He did question whether Aziz is capable of 
managing the Iranian relationship once he starts it. 
 
¶9.  (C) Polanco voiced concern about civil unrest in the 
months leading up to the June elections starting with the 
anti-coup march scheduled for today (April 2).  While saw the 
call to "take to the streets" is an unfortunate reaction to 
Sarkozy's dismissal of the opposition to the coup, but 
worried that the FNDD was not sophisticated enough to manage 
their supporters to avoid violence.  Polanco was particularly 
concerned by the rhetoric being used by President of the 
National Assembly Messaoud Ould Boulkheir which ran the risk 
of inciting violence on ethnic lines.  He hoped the 
international community would urge the FNDD not to prevent 
people from voting on June 6. 
 
¶10. (C) Charge and Polanco discussed how vulnerable Aziz will 
be between the time he resigns (April 18) and the June 6 
elections.  Polanco agreed that, "if anyone wants to move 
against him, that's the time."  That said, he did not believe 
anyone in the military -- even those who dislike Aziz -- will 
run the risk of turning on Aziz and potentially unleashing 
tremendous instability.  If anyone acts against him, Polanco 
assumed it would be from the business community that is 
seeing less revenue in a quickly shrinking economy and is 
worried by Aziz' anti-corruption efforts Polanco acknowledged 
Aziz' anti-corruption efforts are targeted on his political 
enemies and shelter his friends but added, "you have to start 
somewhere.  Polanco argued, "One thing the FNDD hasn't 
figured out is that there are far worse than Aziz," 
suggesting that any military counter-coup would likely be by 
more extreme elements who would make no effort to gain 
democratic legitimacy and would likely handle dissent with a 
gun. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000240  003 OF 004 
 
 
Germany -- Aziz can still gain legitimacy 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Charge met with German Ambassador Eberhard Schanze on 
April 1.  Schanze was more cautious than normal in his 
conversation, no doubt aware of previous U.S. concerns about 
his outspoken pro-coup positions.  Still, he managed to 
project the most supportive view of the regime of the three 
European missions. 
 
¶12. (C) Schanze spoke of the June 6 electoral process in a 
technical manner avoiding reference to its legitimacy. 
Despite the public dismissal of the unilateral process by the 
European Commission, the African Union, and the U.S., Schanze 
believes Aziz will be satisfied with Arab recognition 
confident that, eventually, the rest of the international 
community will come around.  "If he can get a good sized 
turnout and get a strong majority," Schanze argued Aziz will 
have the foundation of a legitimacy argument.  Schanze tended 
to dismiss the ability of the RFD and FNDD to muster much 
public opposition to the coup.  Concerning the European 
Commission's Article 96 process (Schanze represents the Czech 
European Union Presidency as part of a rotation system 
between the three European embassies), Schanze repeated 
veiled criticism of EC Commissioner Louis Michel who he saw 
as personally responsible for the harsh line taken by the 
Commission in response to the coup.  Schanze welcomed the 
idea of Louis Michel going back to Belgian politics offering 
the chance for a new (and presumably better) Commissioner. 
 
¶13. (C) Schanze lamented the expulsion of the Israeli 
Ambassador and the specter of enhanced relations with Iran, 
but added carefully, "One could argue Aziz did both of these 
things because the U.S. gave him no option."  The German 
Ambassador said he was not particularly concerned about the 
Iranians, "Aziz is using them now because he needs him.  If 
he gets legitimacy, he won't need them any more." 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
European Commission -- In a week we'll be with you, sadly. 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶14.  (C) European Commission Charge Geza Strammer told Charge 
April 1 he expected that the conclusions of the Article 96 
consultations would be released on or about April 6 putting 
the European Union, "on the same level as the U.S.," in 
condemnation of the coup.  Strammer, who will have the 
dubious pleasure of briefing Aziz, said, "this is going to be 
the end of the process, there will be nothing else Aziz can 
do to get around sanctions."  Strammer emphasized, "this is 
not something I'm happy about," because the European decision 
will stop hundreds of millions of Euros of development 
activity that has a direct impact on the Mauritanian people. 
Strammer noted the Mauritanians -- primarily Aziz -- could 
have avoided this but made no serious effort at finding a 
consensual solution.  Strammer, who has always sided with the 
U.S. in his frustration with the positions of the European 
member states present in Mauritania, said the Article 96 will 
leave the door open for future negotiation but only on the 
basis of a fundamentally different and consensual plan.  He 
emphasized the declaration will even commit the EC to finance 
and fully monitor any elections coming out of a truly 
acceptable political dialogue. 
 
¶15.  (C) Strammer raised concerns about the security of his 
staff after the European decision comes down.  Charge noted 
that despite the rough U.S. relations with the regime, they 
had not done anything yet to threaten our security.  That 
said, some local staff have reported increased negative 
comments from White Moors for their affiliation with the 
Embassy (Strammer said his staff reported the same thing). 
Strammer was also concerned about social unrest as we go into 
the summer due to the combination of political tensions 
related to the June 6 elections, rising temperatures that 
will frequently knock out Nouakchott's power grid, and the 
possibility that the lack of hard currency will prevent 
importers from stocking food shelves -- leading to an urban 
food shortage. 
 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000240  004 OF 004 
 
 
¶16.  (C) Strammer was confident (or, at least tried to make a 
good show of it) that the European ambassadors would not 
stray from the unanimous European Union position once 
declared.  "That will be the EUROPEAN common position," he 
stressed saying he assumed those who didn't fully personally 
embrace it, "will just stop talking."  Strammer said that 
press reports alleging that the German Ambassador had 
criticized Louis Michel's leadership on Mauritania, "are 
completely false."  Charge spared telling Strammer how 
Schanze had done just that 30 minutes earlier. 
 
¶17.  (C) Strammer lamented that the opposition allowed itself 
to be divided.  Noting the planned RFD rally for April 1 and 
FNDD march for April 2, a bemoaned, "why couldn't they have 
done it together?"  (In fact, the FNDD leadership ended up 
going to the RFD rally and RFD President Ahmed Ould Daddah 
urged his supporters to join the April 2 FNDD march). 
Strammer saw the opposition as spending too much energy 
worrying about the international community instead of trying 
to reach an internal political resolution. 
HANKINS