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FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1432
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000272 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR THE SECRETARY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS:  SCENESETTER FOR FM KYPRIANOU'S APRIL 20 
VISIT 
 
REF: NICOSIA 266 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Your April 20 meeting with Republic of 
Cyprus Foreign Minister Markos Kyprianou will demonstrate 
continued high-level U.S. support for reunification 
negotiations.  You will want to note that the international 
community has high expectations for these talks and that the 
status quo on the island cannot continue.  UN envoy Alexander 
Downer recently argued "it is time to inject some uncertainty 
in Greek Cypriots' minds that this cannot go on forever."  We 
ought to press Kyprianou on the RoC's unhelpful foreign 
policy turns; under President Demetris Christofias, Cyprus 
has sought to warm relations with Havana, Caracas, Tehran, 
Moscow, and Damascus.  Last, you might want to raise our 
continued interest in the cargo of the M/V Monchegorsk, a 
Russian-owned, Cypriot-flagged freighter carrying arms from 
Iran to Syria in contravention of UN resolutions.  Cyprus 
eventually ordered the ship to port and confiscated the 
cargo, but has yet to answer the UN Sanctions Committee's 
request for details on cargo ownership.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Tense Atmospherics in the Run-up to Your Meeting 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2.  (C) You last saw Markos Kyprianou in Prague, on the 
margins of the April 5 U.S.-EU summit.  The Cypriot FM pushed 
for increased pressure on Turkey to support the settlement 
talks.  A "new start in bilateral relations with the new U.S. 
administration" was also on his mind, in the form of more 
frequent political-level dialogue, greater U.S. support for 
Christofias, more "gestures" toward the Greek Cypriot (G/C) 
side, and a policy of "no surprises."  Kyprianou's chief of 
staff angrily cited that "no surprises" clause upon learning 
you intended to receive Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali 
Talat on April 15.  The Ambassador sought to re-engage 
Kyprianou regarding his visit before the FM's departure for 
Washington, but before a meeting could be arranged, the 
Minister traveled to New York for meetings with Secretary 
General Ban Ki-Moon and other UN officials. 
 
¶3.  (C) A degree of "visit neuralgia" now grips the Greek 
Cypriot community, spurring fears in this zero-sum region 
that U.S. efforts to strengthen relations with Ankara somehow 
downgraded our dealings with Greece and the Republic of 
Cyprus.  It reached fever pitch during the President's 
two-day visit to Turkey, but actually began with your own 
March 7 joint statement with Turkish FM Ali Babacan.  Your 
pull-aside with Kyprianou in Prague lowered temperatures 
temporarily, but they have jumped again.  You can expect 
Kyprianou to voice his displeasure over the April 15 Talat 
visit, perhaps even complaining about having learned about it 
from the media (the truth is that the T/C leader immediately 
contacted President Christofias with the news, before anyone 
released it publicly.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
Relations with Cyprus: "The Problem," and a Whole Lot More 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) During his 30-minute call on you April 20, Kyprianou 
will want to focus on efforts to resolve the Cyprus question. 
 We are supporting the talks from the sidelines, urging 
flexibility from the parties plus Turkey and Greece, 
coordinating messages with our P-5 partners both locally and 
in New York, discreetly funding substantive experts advising 
the UN team, and promoting enactment of confidence-building 
measures to improve the negotiating climate. 
 
¶5.  (C) President Christofias is invested heavily in getting 
a deal -- some say he has staked his legacy on it.  History 
shows, however, that G/C leaders lose little electorally by 
taking hard lines in the talks.  Christofias will not walk 
away from the table; the risk is that the talks could die 
slowly, with G/Cs citing Turkish and T/C "intransigence" as 
the cause.  To counter this, UN envoy Downer has adopted an 
"inject some uncertainty" stance, publicly underlining the 
negative outcomes for both sides if pro-solution leaders 
Christofias and Talat do not reach agreement.  Such 
consequences could include changes to the UN Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) mandate or force level.  We should support Downer 
in this campaign by underscoring to Kyprianou and other G/C 
leaders that now is the time to do a deal.  Hard compromises 
will be required from both sides, and the leaders have a 
special responsibility to educate and lobby their respective 
rank-and-file to support the process and an eventual deal. 
 
¶6. (C) A caveat is in order.  Negotiations to resolve the 
Cyprus Problem take place in a community-to-community 
framework, with the Republic of Cyprus president representing 
Greek Cypriots and, since the 1983 declaration of the 
"Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus," the "TRNC president" 
representing Turkish Cypriots.  As such, the RoC FM does not 
take active part in the bi-communal discussions.  Even so, 
Kyprianou has influence, and he attempts to shape debate in 
meetings of the Council of Ministers, formally the RoC 
executive branch's highest deliberative body.  In Brussels 
and with fellow EU foreign ministers, he constantly lobbies 
for tougher European positions vis-a-vis Ankara.  In Cypriot 
eyes -- and amongst many Europeans hostile to Ankara joining 
the Union -- Turkish EU accession is dependent on moves to 
normalize Turkey-Cyprus relations.  Here Kyprianou has taken 
a strong stance against the opening of further Acquis 
negotiating chapters until Turkey extends its Customs Union 
agreement to Nicosia, opens its ports and airports to Cypriot 
craft, and drops its opposition to Cypriot membership in 
international organizations of which Ankara is already a 
member. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
A Ledger That's Unfortunately Tilting Red 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) In regional and multilateral fora, there are 
positives to report.  Just three days ago, President 
Christofias personally approved our request for landing 
privileges for the aircraft carrying the lone surviving 
Somali gunman from the Maersk Alabama hijacking.  He voiced a 
commitment to work with the U.S. and others to fight seaborne 
piracy.  The government in March ordered the deportation to 
Greece of a terrorist wanted by Turkey, fully aware that 
Ankara would seek extradition from Athens.  Both are worthy 
of your mention to Kyprianou. 
 
¶8.  (C) Our desire for a better relationship with Cyprus is 
firm.  Since Christofias's election in February 2008, 
however, we have witnessed an ideologically-motivated attempt 
to turn back the clock to the heydays of the Non-Aligned 
Movement.  He has publicly praised Fidel Castro, welcomed a 
new Venezuelan Embassy in Nicosia, lauded Iran, and vilified 
NATO and the Partnership for Peace (PfP).  Christofias's 
commitment to Russian President Dimitri Medvedev to promote 
the latter's European security proposal within the EU seems 
gratuitous, and his outreach to Hugo Chavez and Venezuela 
strikes us as an intentional move to distance his government 
from the United States.  While the questionable policy shift 
is the president's making, you should call Kyprianou on it, 
urging him to use the new and/or upgraded relations with 
rogue states to demand better behavior and improvements in 
their abysmal human rights records. 
 
¶9.  (C) Cyprus's new direction under Christofias has made 
final resolution of the M/V Monchegorsk incident problematic. 
 Acting on reliable information, U.S. naval forces in January 
boarded the Russian-owned, Cypriot-flagged Monchegorsk, 
finding cargo and documents indicating it was carrying arms 
from Iran to Syria in contravention of UN resolutions.  Only 
a full-court international press from the UN Security Council 
and EU convinced Cyprus to summon the vessel to port for a 
more-thorough inspection and eventual seizure of the cargo. 
Subsequent RoC cooperation with the UN's Iran Sanctions 
Committee (ISC) has been half-hearted; we therefore recommend 
that you question Kyprianou regarding the UN request for 
Cyprus to share information on cargo ownership. 
 
------------------------------ 
What's Topping His To-Do List? 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (C) Upon departing for the United States on April 15, 
the Cypriot Foreign Minister repeated his mantra that the 
U.S. Government should pressure Turkey regarding a Cyprus 
settlement.  Kyprianou has not specified what he would have 
us press Ankara to do, however.  Our view, shared by the UN's 
Downer, is that Turkey mainly is observing the talks at this 
point, not directing them.  You might push Kyprianou for 
concrete actions the international community might take with 
Ankara to spur greater Cyprus Problem movement. 
 
¶11.  (C) He will get specific on two closely-related matters, 
however.  Part and parcel of its non-recognition of the 
Republic of Cyprus, Ankara regularly opposes Cypriot 
membership in international bodies in which the GoT already 
sits, from the Wassenaar Arrangement and Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR) to the Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).  Of greatest recent interest to 
Nicosia has been a spot in the Contact Group on Piracy off 
the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), since Cyprus maintains the 
world's eleventh-largest merchant fleet.  Both in Washington 
and on the island, Cyprus has sought our support in its bid 
to join, and Kyprianou may push as well; our general policy 
is to support Cypriot membership in entities that are global 
and inclusive in nature.  Turkey, which has contributed a 
ship and helicopter, opposes Cypriot participation in the 
CGPCS unless all UN states are admitted.  The FM may also 
raise Turkish naval vessels' recent harassment of 
Cypriot-contracted research vessels conducting natural gas 
and petroleum exploration off the island's southern coast. 
The RoC has responded by blocking the opening of the EU 
Acquis energy chapter in Brussels.  We have been urging 
moderation and restraint on both sides. 
 
--------- 
Who He Is 
--------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Son of former Republic of Cyprus President Spyros 
Kyprianou, the Cypriot FM was educated at all the right 
schools, including Cambridge and Harvard, and was groomed 
from an early age for politics.  His name recognition here is 
such that pundits refer to him only as "Markos," a la Elvis 
or Madonna.  Most Cypriots believe he will eventually become 
president, and both AKEL (far left) and DISY (right-center) 
approached him in 2007 to be a joint (but formally 
non-aligned) candidate to challenge then-President Tassos 
Papadopoulos.  Kyprianou demurred, mainly because 
Papadopoulos and he belong to the same DIKO party, albeit 
from different factions.  Once Papadopoulos failed to advance 
to the second round of elections in February 2008, AKEL's 
Christofias sought and obtained DIKO's support, acceding to 
the latter party's demand to name Kyprianou foreign minister 
if he emerged victorious.  Christofias won the race and 
brought the DIKO man into his cabinet. 
 
¶13.  (C) The relationship between the Cypriot president and 
his FM is icy by all accounts.  Their Cyprus Problem 
philosophies are miles apart, for example, with Kyprianou 
much more the hard-liner.  Personally, the small-townish, 
USSR-educated, and far-from-eloquent Christofias feels a bit 
diminutive next to his aristocratic minister.  The president 
has responded by isolating Kyprianou from the talks and 
minimizing his influence by seeking greater powers for the 
Presidential Diplomatic Office, staffed by more trusted 
confidants.  On the Monchegorsk incident and dealings with 
Syria, as well as on relations with Havana and Caracas, it is 
clear that the Christofias Palace, not the Kyprianou MFA, is 
clearly at the helm. 
Urbancic