VZCZCXRO1806
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0271/01 1061348
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 161348Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9795
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 5440
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0005
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1429

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000271 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: PRO-SOLUTION TURKISH CYPRIOTS HEADED FOR 
DEFEAT IN "PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS" 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 186 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 199 
     ¶C. NICOSIA 233 
     ¶D. NICOSIA 253 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1. Summary (C) The "governing" party in the Turkish Cypriot 
north, the pro-solution, center-left Republican Turkish Party 
(CTP), appears headed for defeat in April 19 "parliamentary" 
elections.  The main opposition, solution-skeptical National 
Unity Party (UBP), has forged and held a double-digit lead 
thanks to the public's discontent with the economy and 
disinterest in, or disillusionment with prospects for, a 
Cyprus solution, CTP's raison d'tre.  Still unclear, 
however, is whether UBP will score enough votes to "govern" 
independently or will have to form a coalition.  Pro-solution 
forces worry that a UBP victory will damage the ongoing 
UN-brokered settlement talks, while the party itself claims 
to support the negotiations and only wants a voice at table. 
Ultimately, this election will bring neither long-awaited 
economic reform or political stability to northern Cyprus, 
but is likely to limit T/C leader Talat's flexibility and 
worsen his operating environment at home. End Summary 
 
----------------------------- 
Polls show continued UBP lead 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) UBP has managed to hang on to a double-digit lead in 
a KADEM/KIBRIS poll conducted March 20-29 and released April 
4, garnering 44.6 percent of the vote versus 27.4 percent for 
"governing" CTP.  A similar poll conducted at the end of 
February and released on March 3 showed a similar outcome, 
with the margin between the leading parties at 15 points. 
Only two other parties pass the five-percent representation 
threshold in the latest poll:  the center-right Democrat 
Party (DP) with 12.4 percent, and the center-left Social 
Democrat Party (TDP) with 7.4 percent.  Those numbers would 
result in very weak UBP majority "government" in the 50-seat 
Turkish Cypriot (T/C) "parliament":  UBP-26; CTP-16; DP-6; 
and TDP-2. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Internal polling leaked to the Embassy on April 13 
paints an even grimmer picture for the "governing" CTP:  it 
scores a mere 26.9 percent, versus a whopping 53.1 for UBP. 
In the sampling, conducted at the end of March by a local T/C 
academic, only one other party crosses the threshold:  DP, 
with 10.4 percent.  Those numbers would translate into a 
strong UBP "government" of 32 deputies.  Unlike in the 
RoC-controlled area, where one Greek Cypriot newspaper 
counted 60 publicly-released polls in the run-up to RoC 
presidential elections in February 2008, there have been few 
voter surveys released in the north.  By "TRNC law," 
publishing public opinion surveys after April 4 is prohibited. 
 
-------------------------------- 
"UBP will be in power next week" 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Embassy contacts generally confirm polling results 
released so far.  Hasan Ercakica, the spokesman for T/C 
leader Mehmet Ali Talat and a CTP insider, bluntly told us on 
April 13 that "UBP will be in power next week," having won 
between 25-30 seats in "parliament."  Despite six weeks of 
active campaigning, he complained that his party's message 
did not seem to reach people.  Ercakica joked that CTP was 
the political "solution" party and had not taken power in 
2005 to reform the economy -- the main issue of the present 
campaign.  Unal Findik, CTP Nicosia campaign manager, was 
somewhat more optimistic, but still conceded on April 14 that 
UBP would probably gain a first-place finish. 
 
¶5.  (C) Former UBP chief and "parliamentary" candidate 
Huseyin Ozgurgun in an April 15 meeting with Embassy officers 
downplayed UBP's chance for an overwhelming victory, however. 
 He dismissed talk that the party would clear the 50 percent 
hurdle, as its present campaign slogan assures.  Ozgurgun 
said that his door-to-door canvassing did show a clear UBP 
advantage, which he pegged at around 40-42 percent (versus 
about 32 for CTP) -- not enough for single-party rule.  He 
thought that the contest had become a clear two-party race 
between UBP and CTP.  DP leader Serdar Denktash told us on 
April 16 that his polling gave DP a third-place finish with 
 
NICOSIA 00000271  002 OF 003 
 
 
16 percent of the vote, versus 40 for UBP and 26 for CTP.  He 
credited Democratic Left (DSP) Sisli Mayor Mustafa Sarigul's 
alleged financial support for UBP's success. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Ergenekon Charges Fall on Deaf Ears 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Attempts by CTP to tar UBP leader Dervish Eroglu with 
the Ergenekon scandal currently shaking Turkey also seem to 
have fallen flat, after CTP chief and "PM" Ferdi Sabit Soyer 
on April 9 ordered the T/C "Prosecutor General" to 
investigate links between Eroglu and detained Ergenekon 
suspect and "TRNC citizen" Mustafa Ozbek.  Soyer claimed 
publicly that a document leaked to him indicated "deep state" 
meddling in favor of Eroglu in 1998 "parliamentary" 
elections.  Ercakica subsequently told us the affair would, 
at most, energize the CTP base.  Basaran Duzgun, a 
pro-solution newspaperman and CTP sympathizer, told Embassy 
officers on April 13 that the effect of Soyer's charges would 
be minimal, given widespread cynicism in the Turkish Cypriot 
community.  Denktash told us that the move had probably even 
backfired on CTP. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Will a UBP victory hurt the negotiating process? 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶7. (C) Despite its fire-breathing "pro-TRNC" rhetoric, 
including a November 2008 "Cyprus Resolution" lauding 
separation as the solution, UBP officially claims to support 
the ongoing UN-brokered process.  Ozgurgun told us that the 
party's only demand regarding the talks is a seat at the 
negotiating table, either for the "Foreign Minister" or a 
party-appointed representative.  He added that on "big 
picture" items -- political equality between the two 
communities, the need for Turkish guarantees, and a 
constituent state for T/Cs within the unified republic -- 
there was no light between UBP and Talat. 
 
¶8. (C) Outside observers agree that UBP, eager to mend fences 
with Turkey's AKP, will probably not repeat its 2002 
performance, when it launched a head-on assault against the 
Annan Plan in the face of AKP support for it.  Party leaders 
know that Turkish officials have voiced full backing for 
Talat's efforts, last seen in an April 16 announcement by 
visiting Turkish EU Negotiator Egemen Bagis.  Press spokesman 
Ercakica told us that Turkish MFA Undersecretary Ertugrul 
Apakan gave the same message privately to Eroglu and other 
"interested" parties in the north.  Furthermore, any new 
"government" will be dependent on Turkish aid, even to meet 
the next "civil service" payroll.  Zeren Mungen, the T/C 
"Finance Ministry undersecretary," told us on March 19 that 
Turkey expects to sign a tough "Technical Cooperation 
Protocol" targeting public sector reform before releasing 
even part of the 500 million USD credit approved earlier in 
the year for the "TRNC." 
 
¶9. (C) Nevertheless, CTP and Talat insiders fear that even a 
nominally obedient UBP will use, at the very least, the bully 
pulpit of "government" to pressure Talat on the Cyprus 
question.  Ercakica said that the present pro-solution CTP 
"government" had always worked to minimize conflict with 
Greek Cypriots and provide cover for the T/C leader.  For 
example, it fully supported Talat's unpopular decision during 
2008 preliminary negotiations to accept a "single 
sovereignty" for the unified state -- a G/C demand -- without 
receiving in return a commitment that residual powers would 
fall to the constituent states, a crucial T/C desire.  A UBP 
"government," on the other hand, would magnify problems and 
incite the public against painful but necessary compromise. 
Ercakica also thought that UBP would upset the delicate 
balance between Talat and Ankara, fearing that the 
nationalist party would build alliances with anti-solution 
elements in the Turkish bureaucracy. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Single Party "Government" or Coalition? 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Under Article 106.2 of the "TRNC Constitution", 
"President" Talat is obligated to give the task of forming a 
"government" to the deputy who can win a vote of confidence 
-- not to a representative of the number-one vote-getter. 
 
NICOSIA 00000271  003 OF 003 
 
 
That individual has a two-week deadline to build a coalition. 
 While 26 seats form a simple majority in the 50-seat 
"parliament," most observers we contacted believe that 27 or 
28 is a minimum for functionality.  A party would need 
between 48-52 percent of the vote to form a "government" 
independently, a tall order.  A three-party coalition is 
possible, but, according to our contacts, highly awkward and 
never executed here. 
 
¶11. (C) Below is a list of feasible two-party coalitions: 
 
-- UBP/CTP Grand Coalition: Reportedly favored by the Turkish 
MFA in order to institute painful "public sector" reform. 
Never achieved in the past.  Ideological differences hinder 
its formation at present, though UBP has told us they would 
be willing to try.  CTP appears less keen. 
 
-- UBP/DP Coalition: Not favored by either UBP or the 
Denktash family, given bad blood between Father Rauf Denktash 
and Eroglu that was recently enflamed by Ergenekon charges. 
Serdar Denktash told us that he is against such a union 
unless his party is close to being an equal partner.  He is 
more willing, however, to support a UBP minority government. 
Power may tempt the younger Denktash, however; 
 
-- UBP/TDP Coalition: Tried in the past (1998), and both 
sides now tell us privately they would consider the option. 
TDP's pro-solution fervor and clean image is a plus.  This 
option depends, however, on a very good showing by TDP of at 
least 10-12 percent; 
 
-- CTP/DP Coalition: Former coalition broken by "PM" Soyer in 
2006, a decision he and CTP now regret. Combination of 
pro-solution forces and pragmatic nationalist Serdar 
Denktash.  Its formation would depend on one of the two 
parties doing much better than present polling indicates. 
Excellent relations between Serdar Denktash and Talat are a 
plus, though AKP remains distrustful of the entire Denktash 
clan.  This option might be possible if CTP finishes a very 
close second to UBP; 
 
-- CTP/ORP Coalition: Continuation of the present 
"government."  This option would be amenable to both parties 
as well as AKP, and cause the least disruption to the 
negotiating process.  It would depend, however, on an 
extremely good finish by either ORP or CTP. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) We expect a UBP first-place finish, though not of the 
magnitude to form a single-party "government."  While CTP has 
certainly not delivered on a solution and made a mess of 
"governance," UBP offered no new ideas during the campaign 
and its septuagenarian leader, Dervish Eroglu, is widely 
disliked and has proven extremely inarticulate in public 
appearances.  In forging its advantage, UBP has exploited an 
economic downturn and the T/C public's perception that 
Turkish Cypriots were left in the lurch by both the EU and 
the U.S. after the 2004 T/C Annan Plan "Yes" vote.  We do not 
expect a UBP-led "government" to be innovative or courageous 
enough to tackle long-overdue public sector reform, barring 
pressure from Ankara, and even then it will be a struggle. 
The party will also pester Talat over the negotiations 
limiting his flexibility, but probably not enough to hurt the 
process substantially given continued AKP support for it. 
UBP's impact on the outcome of an eventual referendum could 
be more of a concern. 
Urbancic