VZCZCXRO5470
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0257/01 1001336
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 101336Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9778
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1423
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000257 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS:  UN ENVOY SHARES REPORTING PLAN DETAILS 
 
REF: NICOSIA 193 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: The UN Good Offices Mission on Cyprus (UNGO) 
will orally brief the Security Council on/about April 30, 
Special Adviser Alexander Downer informed the Ambassador on 
April 9.  While the report will present a reasonably positive 
account of negotiations progress so far, it also will hint 
that UN peacekeeping assets are in short supply worldwide, a 
warning that UNFICYP's continuing presence on the island is 
not a given.  Downer did not favor formal discussion of 
changes to the force's mandate in the upcoming UNFICYP report 
or June rollover, however, reckoning that that exercise was 
better tackled in December.  Reiterating his earlier opinion, 
he claimed that the naming of a U.S. Cyprus Coordinator would 
not contribute meaningfully to a solution and might even 
derail progress in the short-term.  Regarding 
confidence-building measures (CBMs), the UN envoy confirmed 
news that leaders Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat 
would announce the implementation of two measures after their 
April 10 meeting.  Efforts to open the Limnitis Buffer Zone 
(BZ) crossing remained stalled, however, owing mainly to G/C 
negotiator George Iacovou's refusal to accept a UN-brokered 
compromise.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------- 
Travel Plans Firming Up 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Between April 9 meetings with the Cypriot leaders and 
dinner with the EU, UN Special Adviser on Cyprus Alexander 
Downer provided the Ambassador a 75-minute readout of his 
recent activities and future plans.  He started by discussing 
his upcoming oral report to the UN Security Council (he does 
not plan to submit a written report).  Downer intended to 
arrive in New York on April 28 for consultations, and would 
present his briefing to the Council on April 30 or May 1. 
The British were handling the logistical details with the 
Secretariat, he noted.  Downer was still mulling details, but 
he thought the report would recount UNGO developments 
reasonably positively, noting the good atmospherics between 
the leaders and progress inked so far but also establishing 
that significant challenges remained.  Deeper in the remarks 
-- but aiming to send a clear message nonetheless -- would be 
Downer's admonition that growing geopolitical instability 
made competition fierce for UN peacekeepers.  Their 
deployment to Cyprus, whose conflict was anything but hot, 
must be continually evaluated.  He welcomed the Ambassador's 
intention to collaborate with local UK High Commissioner 
Peter Millett in preparing building blocks for a Council 
Presidency statement that Downer hoped would follow the UNGO 
presentation. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Stronger Message in December, Not June 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Turning next to UNFICYP's twice-yearly written 
report, to be prepared in May and endorsed by the Security 
Council in June, Downer predicted its format would hew 
closely to past examples.  Even with Good Offices presenting 
a separate oral message to the Council, it still would 
contain political observations, and he and UNFICYP chief 
Taye-Brook Zerihoun would collaborate closely in its 
preparation.  Downer did not believe it appropriate to refer 
to changes to UNFICYP's mandate and/or a more frequent 
rollover in the written report and/or accompanying UNSCR that 
endorsed it this time around.  That discussion should occur 
in the November/December iteration, when he would have 
greater clarity of where the settlement process was headed. 
In this go-round, the mandate discussions should instead be 
informal, with a six-month technical rollover following. 
Nonetheless, UN staff in the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) already had begun a white paper-type 
exercise on the future of UNFICYP, Downer allowed. 
 
¶4.  (C) He believed it vital to keep the Russians fully 
involved in the UNFICYP/UNGO discussions and as "on board" as 
possible.  One of the reasons the 2004 Annan Plan had failed 
was Russia's feeling that the U.S. and UK had marginalized 
its role; Moscow thus had been all too willing to carry the 
G/Cs' water in opposing the plan in the Council.  Downer 
acknowledged the Russians' wont of late to echo G/C talking 
points on Cyprus, meaning that convincing them to speak and 
act constructively would prove difficult.  The French seemed 
less willing to support Greek Cypriot positions without 
question, Downer offered, complimenting the even-handedness 
of local French Ambassador Nicolas Galey.  And Paris, 
 
NICOSIA 00000257  002 OF 002 
 
 
reportedly aiming to scale back UN PKO deployments worldwide, 
might not oppose changes to UNFICYP.  (Note:  Our impressions 
of Galey are not as favorable.  At meetings of the local P-5, 
he defends G/C positions almost as strongly as his Russian 
counterpart.) 
 
---------------------------- 
Still No Love for Envoy Idea 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) The UN envoy remains opposed to the nomination of a 
U.S. Cyprus coordinator.  While the appointment might please 
Turkish Cypriots, Downer explained, it would "scare the 
horses" in the G/C camp and, on balance, upset the process. 
He had discussed the possibility of a U.S. coordinator 
nomination with AKEL Secretary General and close Christofias 
confidant Andros Kyprianou that same day, and Kyprianou had 
called it a bad idea.  Downer also shared a second-hand 
account that UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband had informed 
the Secretary that Britain did not intend to name a 
high-level envoy, mainly because he (Downer) had advised 
against it. 
 
----------------------------- 
Picture Not All Black on CBMs 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Details remained sketchy regarding the status of the 
proposed Limnitis BZ crossing, Downer admitted.  An April 8 
meeting with Iacovou had shed no light, but he hoped to gain 
greater clarity from his April 10 meeting with Christofias. 
On the bright side, Talat had assured Downer that the Turkish 
military was prepared to accept the latest UN compromise, 
which involved the Greek Cypriots supplying electricity to 
the nearby Turkish Cypriot military enclave at 
Kokkina/Erenkoy.  Interestingly, the T/C leader had viewed 
favorably Christofias's reported referral of the arrangement 
to the RoC National Council.  Talat thought the RoC president 
was attempting to put his political rivals on the spot, 
daring them to oppose a deal that would allow the politically 
popular crossing to open. 
 
¶7.  (C) G/C negotiator George Iacovou was holding up progress 
on Limnitis and the other CBMs, Downer ventured.  The vain 
(Downer's characterization) and often cranky (ours) 
septuagenarian remained upset that the Turks/TCs allegedly 
had broken an earlier gentlemen's agreement to open Limnitis 
without strings; seeking payback, he was erecting all types 
of roadblocks on CBM progress, usually citing his oppostion 
to "upgrading" the "illegal TRNC."  Iacovou had relented on 
allowing free ambulance passage through the BZ and on 
measures to improve law enforcement cooperation between the 
sides, however.  Downer expected these CBMs to be announced 
after the leaders' April 10 meeting.  (Note:  Talat told the 
Ambassador on April 10 that the agreement on law enforcement 
was "historic.") 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Less than four weeks ago, Downer's private message on 
the upcoming UNFICYP report and rollover resolution rang 
harsher than today.  "UNFICYP's continuation should 
definitely be in play in the upcoming (May/June) 
deliberations" he asserted to us on March 19, adding that the 
international community ought to use the discussions in New 
York to "inject some uncertainty" into the minds of Cypriots 
(reftel).  Why the more restrained view now, with the real 
UNFICYP crunch time put off until December?  Perhaps it is 
because moves on UNFICYP, which undoubtedly would shake up 
G/Cs, mostly would be met with yawns by Turkish Cypriots, who 
consider the Turkish Army their true source of security on 
the island.  It follows, then, that the international 
community should play this card only if Greek Cypriots 
clearly are the intransigent party in the talks.  Iacovou's 
blockage of the CBMs aside, the current reality is not nearly 
so black-and-white, so Downer's newfound hesitance in firing 
the UNFICYP bullet strikes us as reasonable. 
Urbancic