VZCZCXRO3874
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHNC #0256/01 0991454
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091454Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9775
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1420
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000256 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, H. H PLEASE PASS TO CONGRESSMAN 
BERMAN. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS:  SCENESETTER FOR CODEL BERMAN 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 223 
     ¶B. STATE 28633 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Embassy Nicosia looks forward to welcoming you to 
Cyprus, an island whose political complexity and strategic 
value belie its small size.  We have crafted an intensive 
program including calls on President Demetris Christofias and 
other high ranking Republic of Cyprus (RoC) officials, a 
meeting with Turkish Cypriot (T/C) leader Mehmet Ali Talat, 
and a visit to UN headquarters in the Buffer Zone (BZ) that 
divides this island.  We hope your visit will underscore for 
you the difficulties inherent in any reunification effort, 
but also the contributions an undivided island could make to 
U.S. interests.  The entire Embassy Nicosia team looks 
forward to your visit and will endeavor to make it both 
productive and enjoyable. 
 
-------------------------- 
Short Stay, Meaty Schedule 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Your visit commences at the Embassy, where we will 
provide you a Cyprus snapshot and discuss Mission goals. 
Next up is a call on RoC Foreign Minister Markos Kyprianou, 
son of late President Spyros Kyprianou.  He is likely to 
raise his desire for more high-level, political discussions 
between our countries, something to which your visit and his 
recent meeting with the Secretary of State naturally 
contribute.  After the Foreign Ministry, you will proceed to 
UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) headquarters for a meeting with 
UNFICYP chief Taye-Brook Zerihoun, a long-time UN diplomat of 
Ethiopian descent. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) A courtesy call on Turkish Cypriot leader Talat 
follows (President Christofias is unavailable later in the 
day.)  The most pro-solution mainstream leader in the north, 
Talat, unlike hard-line T/C politicians such as the legendary 
Rauf Denktash, truly wants to reunify the island under a 
bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, the preferred governance 
model since UN-brokered settlement negotiations commenced in 
the late 1970s.  He is feeling huge pressures from the right 
and the nationalists for not having delivered a deal, 
however, and his party is trailing badly in polls for the 
April 19 "parliamentary" elections. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Your program concludes with a visit to RoC 
President Christofias.  While personally engaging and always 
courteous with visiting U.S. officials, the president's 
ideology is far-left.  Christofias hails from the Communist 
AKEL party, Cyprus's largest, was educated in Russia, and is 
very fond of the former USSR.  Since winning election in 
February 2008, he has begun a shift in Cyprus's foreign 
policy direction.  Cyprus has returned to a more non-aligned 
foreign policy approach, entailing warming relations with 
Tehran, Havana, Caracas, and Moscow.  Regarding the Cyprus 
Problem, Christofias, like Talat, favors a reunified, federal 
Cyprus.  The two men share a long history in leftist, 
opposition politics and by all accounts like each other, 
although the rigor of the negotiations and the need to defend 
respective sides' interests naturally are causing some 
friction between them. 
 
------------------ 
The Cyprus Problem 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Taxi drivers, barbers, shop clerks -- to say 
nothing of politicians -- have strong opinions on the Cyprus 
Problem, the de facto division of the island since the 
violent conflict of 1974 (or 1963, in Turkish Cypriot 
reckoning.)  All will share their thoughts at the drop of a 
hat, and I can think of no country where a single issue so 
dominates.  For every compelling point made in one community, 
there exists a plausible counterpoint in the other.  To 
illustrate, Greek Cypriots call Turkey's 1974 military 
intervention an invasion and continuing occupation of 
sovereign Republic of Cyprus (RoC) territory, while Turkish 
Cypriots classify it a peace operation undertaken to prevent 
their community's annihilation at the hands of the much 
more-numerous G/Cs. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) U.S. involvement to mitigate damage from the 
conflict and effect the island's eventual reunification began 
almost before the smoke cleared in August 1974.  From feeding 
and housing refugees early on, our efforts morphed into 
infrastructure construction and later, fostering bi-communal 
cooperation.  While the United Nations has directed most 
 
NICOSIA 00000256  002 OF 003 
 
 
Cyprus Problem settlement efforts, all have featured some 
level of U.S. backing.  The last, known colloquially as the 
Annan Plan after then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, 
culminated in April 2004 simultaneous referendums that saw 
two of three T/C voters cast "YES' ballots but three of four 
Greek Cypriots vote "NO."  In his subsequent report to the 
Security Council -- which never became "official," owing to a 
rare Russian veto -- Annan urged the international community 
to end the economic, social, and cultural isolation of 
Turkish Cypriots, since they had cast their lot for 
reunification.  U.S. policy since 2004 has been that, while 
we have not and do not recognize the breakaway "Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus," we do maintain close contacts 
with leaders of the T/C community, attempt to engage them on 
matters of common concern, and are working to improve the 
north's economic performance in the hopes of reducing the 
cost and difficulty of a final Cyprus settlement. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Every day that passes makes cracking this nut that 
much harder.  And solve the Cyprus Problem we must:  the 
continuing division incurs great costs, both real and 
political, for the United States.  Our contributions to the 
43 year-old UN peacekeeping mission run well in the millions. 
 Cyprus Problem fallout exacerbates tensions between NATO 
allies Greece and Turkey, complicates Ankara's accession to 
the EU, and undercuts EU-NATO cooperation in hotspots like 
Afghanistan and the Balkans.  Finally, the two sides' refusal 
to date to cooperate on law enforcement and security matters 
hinders our counter-terrorism and non-proliferation efforts 
in the Eastern Mediterranean.  In short, it's not just the 
island's problem, and we have serious and significant reasons 
to want to see it solved. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Current Negotiations: (Baby) Steps in the Right Direction 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶8.  (SBU) For two-plus years after the failed referendums in 
2004, leaders in both communities alternated silent 
treatments with petty sniping, and hopes grew dim for 
restarting the talks.  Prospects improved in July 2006 when a 
visiting UN official secured a framework agreement between 
Talat and then-RoC President Tassos Papadopoulos, however. 
The deal reiterated the sides' commitment to a bi-zonal, 
bi-communal federation while committing them to enact 
confidence-building measures (CBMs) and initiate processes in 
which committees and working groups would form to tackle 
day-to-day life issues and final settlement matters. 
However, the so-called July 8 process was never to get off 
the ground. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) A settlement breakthrough occurred in February 
¶2008.  Surprising most political observers, Papadopoulos 
failed to advance to the second round of voting in his 
re-election attempt, a contest eventually won by AKEL 
Secretary General and House of Representatives President 
Christofias.  Within weeks of taking office, Christofias made 
good on his promise to resuscitate the working 
groups/technical committees process and put former Foreign 
Minister George Iacovou in charge of the G/C negotiating 
team; Talat responded by nominating UC Berkley-educated Ozdil 
Nami.  Once the negotiators and their experts began talks, 
they were able to prepare the ground for a series of meetings 
between Christofias and Talat, in which the leaders 
stipulated the overarching political goal:  to forge a 
bizonal, bi-communal federal Cyprus featuring politically 
equal constituent states, a single international personality, 
sovereignty, and citizenship.  At their fourth meeting in 
late July, they committed to starting full-fledged settlement 
negotiations under UN auspices in early September. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The UN Secretary General responded to the leaders' 
call by naming former Australian Foreign Minister and 
long-time MP Alexander Downer his Special Adviser on Cyprus. 
Downer leads the UN's "Good Offices" mission, technically 
separate from UNFICYP since it belongs to the Department of 
Political Affairs (DPA), not to Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPO).  Downer and Zerihoun, the latter being dual-hatted as 
the Good Offices deputy, enjoy a productive relationship. 
Zerihoun officiates at many meetings of the leaders and 
negotiators, since Downer's part-time UN contract means he 
usually is on-island only 10 days per month. 
 
------------------------------ 
Modalities Different This Time 
------------------------------ 
 
 
NICOSIA 00000256  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The 2004 Annan Plan and earlier settlement efforts 
featured high-profile UN mediators and similarly prominent 
special envoys from the countries most involved (the U.S. and 
Britain, mainly).  Greek Cypriots pushed hard and won a 
change this go-round.  Citing "asphyxiating timetables" and 
"unwanted intervention" from the international community as 
the reason G/Cs overwhelmingly voted no, Christofias, 
following predecessor Papadopoulos's lead, demanded that the 
current negotiations be "by the Cypriots, for the Cypriots." 
Talat accepted. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Under this framework, Good Offices personnel, 
Downer included, "facilitate" the talks; they don't 
officiate, mediate, or arbitrate.  The UN team does not even 
act as a secretariat, and the sides themselves spend 
significant time and effort determining what constitutes the 
official record.  As expected under these loose procedures, 
full-fledged negotiations covering the six core issues -- 
governance, property, EU matters, economy, territory, and 
security/guarantees -- has proven slow.  The leaders spent 
four months debating governance issues, for example, and 
remain at odds over fundamental matters:  the assignment of 
competencies between the federal and constituent state 
governments, and the model of the federal executive.  Gaps on 
property are significant as well.  Finally, despite fanfare 
this summer over agreed CBMs, the sides have proven unable to 
put even one into operation (we expect Christofias and Talat 
to announce a breakthrough on two CBMs at their April 9 
meeting, however.) 
 
¶13.  (SBU) There will be a short break in negotiations 
following your visit, to accommodate "parliamentary" 
elections in the north.  Once talks re-start in late 
April/early May, Special Adviser Downer hopes to skim through 
the two as-yet untouched chapters, territory and 
security/guarantees, then move into "Phase II," a study of 
areas of medium convergence that require bridging solutions. 
He does not expect major format/framework changes until 
"Phase III," when Christofias and Talat hopefully will engage 
in real give-and-take in an attempt to reach a deal.  Downer 
remains optimistic that the sides can reach a tentative 
agreement by the end of the year, with a fourth phase -- the 
leaders lobbying their respective communities to approve it 
via parallel referendums -- some time in early 2010. 
 
---------------------------- 
A Final Word On Atmospherics 
---------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Your stop in Cyprus falls just one week after the 
President visited Ankara and Istanbul and just three weeks 
after the Secretary of State paid a similar visit there.  In 
an area where zero-sum thinking regrettably remains 
commonplace, Greek and Greek Cypriot pundits characterized 
the high-level Washington attention on Turkey as a defeat for 
Greece and Cyprus.  The Secretary and Kyprianou conducted a 
bilateral meeting on the margins of the U.S.-EU summit in 
Prague, during which she invited him to Washington as soon as 
their schedules permitted.  A Talat visit to DC also remains 
a possibility. 
Urbancic