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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #1110/01 1191341
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P 291341Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001110 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG AZ
SUBJECT: MFA ON OSCE AND UNOMIG MISSIONS, INCIDENT 
PREVENTION MECHANISM, GENEVA PROCESS, NAGORNO-KARABAKH 
 
REF: A. TBILISI 808 
     ¶B. MOSCOW 1053 
 
Classified By: Pol M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In an April 28 meeting, MFA Fourth CIS 
Director Kelin showed no signs of flexibility on the OSCE 
mandate renewal.  He downplayed prospects that a UN mandate 
for Abkhazia could be extended to South Ossetia, but 
predicted Russia's proposal for the UN mandate would 
"surprise" the West by the scope of its transparency.  A 
UNOMIG redline will be Russia's insistence on its border 
guards securing the administrative boundary line, as per a 
GOR-Abkhazia security treaty.  Kelin praised the results of 
the first Incident Prevention Mechanism meeting, and said DFM 
Karasin and EU Morel had subsequently reached agreement to 
co-chair the meetings, with Ergneti remaining the venue, and 
English and Russian the agreed languages.  While Russia now 
fully supports the Geneva Process, Kelin downplayed 
humanitarian aid discussions, as South Ossetia already 
received all the aid it needed from Russia and the Red Cross. 
 Kelin had low expectations for progress on Nagorno-Karabakh, 
but told us that that Medvedev's talk of "new approaches" 
that could "inject new notes" in resolution talks alluded to 
the offer that the Minsk Group co-chair countries guarantee 
peace in the Lachin corridor, obviating the need for an 
international peacekeeping mission.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
OSCE: "We're the most important" 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) In an April 28 meeting, MFA Fourth CIS Director 
Andrei Kelin showed no signs of flexibility on the OSCE 
mandate renewal, despite reiterating Russian support for an 
OSCE presence in South Ossetia.  Asserting that the Greek 
proposal for one joint mission was unacceptable to South 
Ossetia, Kelin instead called for flexibility from the West. 
Acknowledging Russia was isolated in its opposition to the 
Greek compromise, Kelin stressed "I realize it's consensus 
minus one, but we're the most important."  Maintaining that 
Russia could not force South Ossetia to accept OSCE monitors 
or status-neutral formulations in a mandate renewal decision, 
Kelin said the OSCE observers' record before the August 2008 
conflict had rendered the South Ossetians stubborn and 
ideological, reducing Russia's influence.  Dismissing as 
"technical" the issue of permitting monitors to cross the 
administrative boundary line (ABL) between South Ossetia and 
Georgia proper, Kelin said the substantive issue at hand was 
the combination of the three elements -- an OSCE mission in 
Tbilisi, observers in Georgia, and observers in South Ossetia 
-- in a manner acceptable to South Ossetia. 
 
¶3.  (C) Kelin was skeptical about German and other proposals 
that a UN mandate expand to cover South Ossetia, should the 
OSCE presence end.  Geographic dissimilarities alone, he 
said, made it impossible apply a demilitarized and restricted 
weapons zone to South Ossetia.  Tskhinvali was only 12 km 
from the ABL and could not be left vulnerable to a Georgian 
attack as was the case in August 2008.  The irregular course 
of the ABL in South Ossetia also necessitated staffing a 
large number of border guard posts to control the many entry 
points. 
 
¶4.  (C) During our extended exchange on the virtues of 
Greece's creative ambiguity in circumventing status questions 
in its proposals and the importance of the OSCE mission on 
both sides of the ABL to provide transparency and increase 
confidence,  Kelin only reiterated South Ossetia's 
"ideological" opposition to a mission that did not explicitly 
reference South Ossetia in its title, and warned that too 
much Russian pressure only entrenched South Ossetian 
resistance. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
UNOMIG: "Our proposal will surprise you" 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Kelin said Russia was looking for a constructive 
approach in the UNOMIG mandate negotiations, and noted 
Abkhazia's desire to retain UNOMIG -- even if only to benefit 
from the jobs the UN's presence would create.  Kelin repeated 
Lavrov's positive assessment of elements on the UNSYG's 
paper, but also underscored redlines.  Both Russia and 
Abkhazia rejected the presence of UN police in Abkhazia, and 
 
MOSCOW 00001110  002 OF 003 
 
 
started from the premise that Russian border guards would 
protect the "borders."  Kelin said details of the border 
guard arrangements (as part of the broader defense MOU 
reached earlier with Abkhaz authorities) would be public 
"soon" and dismissed our objections to this breach of the 
August 12/September 8 agreements.  Cautioning that the GOR 
was still forging interagency agreement on the 
counterproposal it planned to submit before the May 15 SYG 
report, he predicted "our proposal will surprise you" with 
regard to its degree of transparency. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Incident Prevention Mechanism: "Much accomplished" 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶6.  (C) Kelin described the first meeting of the Incident 
Prevention Mechanism April 23 as a "good start" that had 
"accomplished much."  He related that DFM Karasin and EU 
coordinator Pierre Morel had "resolved" a number of 
outstanding questions that remained after the meeting (ref A) 
in an April 27 telecon.  The EU and Russia would co-chair the 
meetings, Ergneti would remain the venue, and English and 
Russian were the agreed languages for the mechanism.  There 
was still discussion on whether to investigate all incidents 
since the August conflict, or only new ones as they occurred. 
 With the next meeting set for the May 1-10 timeframe, Kelin 
said the international community should wait to see how the 
mechanism worked.  Noting that the Mechanism foresaw the 
possibility of monitors crossing the ABL in order to 
investigate incidents, Kelin called for "prudence" in light 
of South Ossetian sensitivities toward the presence of 
Georgian monitors in South Ossetia, and vice versa. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Geneva Process: "No aid for aid's sake" 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Kelin was not concerned by the lack of progress in 
the second Geneva Process working group on humanitarian 
assistance.  Deflecting our questions over Russian press 
reports onn the abysmal state of South Ossetia's 
reconstruction, Kelin said Russia had resolved outstanding 
concerns over accountability and that audit commission 
chairman Stepashin and Emergency Situations Minister Shoigu 
would travel to Tskhinvali to announce the breakthrough. 
Russia was prepared to meet the needs in South Ossetia. 
Noting Red Cross deliveries of assistance via Vladikavkaz, 
Kelin said South Ossetia had no need or desire for aid 
deliveries from Georgia "for aid's sake." 
 
¶8.  (C) In a departure from previous GOR statements, Kelin 
said Russia now fully supported the Geneva Process.  There 
were not many venues for international discussion of Georgian 
issues, and the Geneva format allowed South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia to express their views and talk directly with 
Georgian authorities, Kelin said. 
 
----------------------------------- 
EUMM: "We don't read their reports" 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Kelin reiterated criticism of the EU Monitoring 
Mission, saying it was hard to judge its effectiveness since 
"we don't read the EUMM's reports."   He complained that the 
EUMM observed but did not prevent incidents, and claimed it 
had done nothing about Georgian large-scale exercises at a 
tank training range west of Gori, which involved 28 tanks and 
17 BMPs conducting live fire exercises since April 23.  The 
MOU on the EUMM's activities was defective in allowing for 
significant military movements, Kelin said. 
 
---------------- 
Georgia protests 
---------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Kelin characterized the Georgian opposition as 
divided and leaderless, posing no real challenge to 
Saakashvili.  The fact that Saakashvili would remain in power 
meant that Abkhazia and South Ossetia could continue to be 
spurred to deepen their independence.  It was "inconceivable" 
that Medvedev and Putin would agree to engage with 
Saakashvili.  Russia would support cooperation with Georgia 
on the cultural and humanitarian levels, although requests 
from the Georgia Orthodox Church for contact had revealed 
there was not much to discuss. 
 
MOSCOW 00001110  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
---------------- 
Nagorno-Karabakh 
---------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Kelin was pessimistic that the Turkey-Armenia 
rapprochement would help spur a Nagorno-Karabakh resolution, 
arguing instead that it had intensified Azerbaijan President 
Aliyev's suspicions.  Russia favored the rapprochement, Kelin 
said, calling the prospective end to the blockade of Armenia 
economically beneficial and stressed the "no-win" situation 
that Russia found itself in with Aliyev.  He confirmed that a 
meeting between Aliyev and Armenia President Sargsian on the 
margins of the St Petersburg Economic Forum in June was 
contingent on the outcome of their May 7 meeting in Prague. 
Kelin clarified that Medvedev's talk April 18 of "new 
approaches" that could "inject new notes" in resolution talks 
(ref B) alluded to the offer that the Minsk Group co-chair 
countries guarantee peace in the Lachin corridor, obviating 
the need for an international peacekeeping mission.  There 
were no Russian proposals that bypassed the Minsk Group, 
Kelin said. 
 
¶12.  (C) Kelin reiterated that accusations of Russian arms 
sales to Armenia were forged, and claimed Azerbaijan finally 
had accepted this, too.  Kelin contended the notion of 
"sales" was unrealistic, as Armenia did not have money to buy 
arms, and the amount of equipment in Armenia already 
approached CFE ceilings.  However, certain circles in both 
Azerbaijan and Armenia opposed the settlement of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the disinformation campaign 
was designed to raise suspicions at a critical moment in the 
negotiations. 
BEYRLE