R 071547Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY LOME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9053
INFO DIA WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHINGTON DC
FBI WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T LOME 000108 
 
 
DS/IP/AF, DS/TIA/ITA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2029 
TAGS: ASEC PTER
SUBJECT: RESPONSES TO SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE 
QUESTIONAIRE 
 
REF: STATE 013023 
 
Classified By: RSO Matthew Golbus for reasons 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
------------------- 
 
¶I. (SBU) DEMONSTRATIONS - Responses listed below are keyed to 
reftel. 
 
¶A. No known ethnic or religious communities exist in-country 
that are prone to carrying out anti-American demonstrations. 
Official GOT estimates place the Muslim community at about 
14% of the population, but Embassy officials believe that 
figure is higher and non-official sources put the number 
closer to 20%.  There is a Lebanese expatriate community in 
Lome consisting of approximately 1,500 persons, both Muslims 
and Christians.  The exact number of Muslim Lebanese in Togo 
is not known, but their numbers are growing.  Post has 
received reports that new Lebanese Muslim immigrants are 
arriving directly from Lebanon.  Other reports suggest that 
Lebanese Christian immigrants continue to arrive from the 
Ivory Coast. 
 
i. Yes, the Committee of the Oppressed Diversity Visa 
Applicants (CODVA) has held a continuous sit-in that began on 
Friday, April 18, 2008 and ended in August 2008. The 
protestors were present six days a week and typically had 
about 100 people on business days.  They were not present on 
Sundays. 
 
ii. Yes, the demonstration sited above was across the street 
from the main CAC. 
 
iii. 100-120 People 
 
iv. The demonstrations were in response to frustrations and 
misunderstanding related to the consular green card lottery 
program. 
 
¶B. Peaceful. In previous reporting we noted that the CODVA 
had made public threats of violence and kidnapping, naming 
American and Togolese employees. RSO determined that these 
threats were not serious or credible.  Other than the first 
week of the sit-in, this behavior did not continue. 
 
i and ii are not applicable. 
 
¶C. No, however the primary opposition party, the Union de 
Forces Changement (UFC), often holds rallies and 
demonstrations in the capital. These rallies are generally 
peaceful and draw upwards of 300 people.  The frequency of 
such events is increasing as the presidential elections 
campaign season has begun. 
 
i. No 
 
ii. Does not apply 
 
iii. Permitted demonstrations are generally peaceful. 
Gatherings for which permits are not issued are usually 
dispersed and, on occasion, violence ensues. 
 
iv. No 
 
 
II. (U) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS 
 
¶A. No 
 
¶B. N/A 
 
¶C. N/A 
 
¶D. N/A 
 
III. (S) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES 
 
¶A. No. Gendarmes and Presidential Guard who man several 
roadblocks in Lome after dark regularly solicit bribes from 
drivers, including those with diplomatic license plates. 
Outside of Lome the roadblocks and associated corruption 
occur during the day as well.  RSO has responded to incidents 
of U.S. diplomats being taken into custody by Presidential 
Guard elements or the police.  In addition, Togo's long, 
porous borders make it virtually impossible for GOT officials 
to exercise effective border control. 
 
¶B. Yes, in November 2007 a 1 week course was held with 
security officers from the port of Lome. The Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service (NCIS) was the lead agency for this 
training.  Port security elements have implemented tactics 
and skills from the training.  The Regional Affairs Office in 
Accra has held three courses for the Togolese intelligence 
service in the area of counter narcotics trade craft.  Also, 
ICITAP sponsored human trafficking training for 30 police 
officers and gendarmes in late June/ early July 2008. 
 
¶C. Yes, while low level corruption can be seen on a day to 
day basis, RSO continues to hear references to and suspicion 
of corruption at the Ministerial level. 
 
¶D. Post does not have confidence in the Togolese government's 
ability to detect terrorist activities in Togo, mostly due to 
insufficient resources and training.  The GOT,s intelligence 
and security agency, the Agence Nationale de Renseignement 
(National Intelligence Agency - ANR), is the lead agency on 
terrorism issues. The agency's Director General has shown a 
great deal of interest in working with the Embassy and has 
been quick to act on any terrorism related information shared 
by Post. However, as this is a young agency it remains to be 
seen how 
effective it will be. 
 
¶E. Yes 
 
¶F. On November 16, 2002, Togolese police arrested an Al-Qaeda 
linked Lebanese national identified as Abdallah MOHTADI and 
extradited him to Lebanon in March of 2003.  In early March 
2003 Togolese police arrested a Lebanese citizen, Fakhri 
Youssef BAALBAKI, on suspicion that he was planning an attack 
against the U.S. Embassy should the USG resort to military 
action in Iraq.  The GOT deported BAALBAKI on June 22, 2003, 
when it failed to build a terrorism or criminal case.  The 
greatest current terrorism issue in Togo is Hezbollah 
financing.  In July 2008, a Togolese security service seized 
$1.5 million from a known Hezbollah associate and turned it 
over to the Ministry of Finance, signaling a readiness to 
deal with this issue.  In January and February 2009, the 
Togolese Minister of Security and Civil Protection signed 
expulsion orders for two resident Lebanese nationals who were 
allegedly linked to Hezbollah. 
 
¶G. For the most part the GOT has been responsive, but a lack 
of resources has hindered its ability to fulfill some Embassy 
requests.  The GOT provides compound security elements who 
are poorly motivated and do not show a high level of 
discipline on duty. Requests related to VIP and/or military 
visits have been adequately resourced. Post was disappointed 
with a lack of willingness to confront demonstrators when 
they became aggressive and/or harassed employees. 
 
¶H. POOR. In fact Air France does not rely on Togolese 
government security personnel entirely, but rather has a 
contract security company to conduct screening of passengers, 
luggage, and supplies.  Post has been informed by French law 
enforcement personnel, who provide advice to the GOT Civil 
Aviation Administration, that overall security at the airport 
is very poor. A new security administration for the airport 
assumed control January 1, 2007, though no significant 
changes have been made thus far. In a recent evaluation 
conducted by INL, it was determined that as of March 2009 
airport security in Togo remains far below internationally 
accepted standards. 
 
¶I. INEFFECTIVE. The Security Officer for the French Mission 
stated that he had provided tips to the GOT about suspected 
drug dealers transiting Togo.  The Togolese customs and 
immigration agencies did not stop these individuals.  In 
fact, it was reported that a customs officer escorted the two 
suspected drug dealers past all immigration and custom 
controls.  The chief of airport security recently confided to 
RSO that he does not have any staff he can trust and that his 
higher ups are unresponsive to his pleas for assistance and a 
freer hand in instituting procedural change. 
 
¶J. INEFFECTIVE. Border patrol forces are corrupt and 
regularly solicit bribes. In addition, they are only 
stationed at official border crossings.  It reportedly only 
costs the equivalent of $1 to bribe one,s way across a land 
border. 
 
-------------------- 
INDIGENOUS TERRORISM 
-------------------- 
 
¶I. (U) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS 
 
¶A. No 
 
 
¶B. N/A 
 
¶C. N/A 
 
¶D. N/A 
 
¶E. N/A 
 
¶F. N/A 
 
¶G. N/A 
 
¶H. N/A 
 
II. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS 
 
¶A. No 
 
¶B. N/A 
 
¶C. No. However, one opposition political group did stage an 
IED attack against the main Gendarme camp in Lome in February 
¶2006. Allegedly the attack was in retaliation against the GOT 
for its attempted arrest of an opposition leader.  No one was 
killed or injured in the incident. Additionally, two Molotov 
cocktails were tossed over the wall of the German Embassy in 
July 2006. The devices malfunctioned and the attack, believed 
to be the work of Togolese soccer fans angry after being 
denied visas to attend the World Cup in Germany, caused no 
injuries or damages. 
 
¶D. No 
 
¶E. No 
 
----------------------- 
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM 
----------------------- 
 
¶I. (S) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS 
 
¶A. Yes. Post has received reports that some members of the 
Muslim Lebanese community in Togo are associated with 
Hezbollah.  Post has also received information from customs 
officials regarding large sums of cash crossing the borders 
of Benin-Togo and Ghana-Togo. 
 
¶B. Post believes their primary focus is fundraising and due 
to their reported success in this regard, it is unlikely that 
Hezbollah would consider Togo as an operational theater. 
 
¶C. Post does not have any information to indicate that the 
GOT is sympathetic to Hezbollah; however, due to the level of 
corruption, it is likely that in the interest of personal 
gain, some Togolese government officials may allow members of 
the Lebanese community to engage in illegal activities such 
as narcotics trafficking and money laundering. The GOT has 
not made any public statements in support of a 
terrorist-supporting country on a terrorism related issue. 
The GOT has been, and continues to be pro-American and 
supportive of our efforts in the Global War on Terrorism. 
President Faure has sited Hezbollah fundraising as a specific 
issue of concern in consultations with two U.S. Ambassadors. 
 
¶D. Yes. The Agence des Musulmans d'Afrique (AMA).  English 
translation: Africa Muslim Agency.  A French police officer 
assigned to Lome as an advisor to the GOT reported that AMA 
has three offices in Togo, and that it is a Kuwaiti financed 
NGO that may be involved in arms smuggling throughout West 
Africa. The French police advisor also reported that this 
group has strong ties to the Algerian Islamic Movement and 
that the country director for Togo is Algerian. The President 
of Togo voiced concerns to post of possible GSPC activities 
in Togo. ANR provided post with a list of individuals of 
concern traveling to Sudan for advanced Muslim studies in 
April 2007. The list included 10 individuals affiliated with 
the AMA. 
 
Also, the Islamic NGO 'al muntada' has had a presence in Togo 
since the mid-1990's. Post has received information that this 
group has spent approximately $400,000 on charitable 
activities in Togo, such as building mosques and Islamic 
educational programs. Embassy officials have noted that many 
new mosques have been built in Togo in the past few years. 
 
There is also a known connection between some members of the 
Togolese Muslim community and the Accra based "Islamic 
Research and Reformation Center", which is an Islamic NGO. 
It is not known if any of these Islamic NGO's are associated 
with Hezbollah. 
 
¶E. Unknown. Togo's Muslim community, which comprises anywhere 
from 12-20% of the population, has historically been 
moderate.  A recent influx of Lebanese Muslims and growing 
population of Nigerian Muslims has raised concerns among some 
observers about the prospects for radicalization of the 
indigenous Muslim community.  Thus far we have not seen 
evidence to suggest this has happened. 
 
¶F. Low 
 
¶G. Corruption and porous borders mean that weapons and 
explosives could easily be smuggled into Togo. Major 
narcotics trafficking routes transit Togo highlighting the 
ease with which any contraband could be imported. 
 
 
HAWKINS