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C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 000543 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PETR PE
SUBJECT: SHINING PATH IN THE VRAE 
 
REF: A. LIMA 329 
     ¶B. LIMA 7 
     ¶C. LIMA 1678 
     ¶D. LIMA 1809 
     ¶E. LIMA 1699 
 
Classified By: Amb. P Michael McKinley for reasons 1.4b and d. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The Apurimac and Ene River Valley (VRAE), a 
remote jungle area east of the Andes straddling northern 
Ayacucho and parts of several other regions, is home to the 
most resilient of the remaining two armed factions of the 
Shining Path (SL).  The SL faction in the VRAE is led by 
three veteran SL commanders, who most observers estimate lead 
about 250 hardcore fighters backed by a network of some 350 
collaborators.  Most officials and analysts consulted by 
Poloff in Ayacucho argued that these SL remnants are 
primarily a narcotrafficking organization focused on 
self-preservation and making money whose political goals are 
now secondary.  (We do not fully agree with this view.)  To 
survive, the faction has adopted tactics designed to woo 
local communities and transform their image as hardened 
terrorists, and may be seeking to increase its contacts with 
the outside world.  A recent spike in killings by SL, 
including the deadly April 9 attack (septel), probably 
reflects a reaction to the government's military push into an 
SL stronghold (refs) rather than the oft-repeated 
"resurgence" of the organization.  End Summary. 
 
Background on the VRAE 
---------------------- 
¶2. (C) The Apurimac and Ene River Valley (VRAE), a 
subtropical area east of the Andes straddling northern 
Ayacucho and parts of several other bordering regions, is 
home to the most resilient of the remaining two armed 
factions of the Shining Path (SL) terrorist organization. 
(Note: The other armed faction holds out in the Upper 
Huallaga Valley in northern Peru. End Note.)  In the 1990s, 
SL retreated to the remote jungle-covered valley under 
pressure from the Peruvian military and established a refuge 
in an area called Vizcatan from which it has launched strikes 
throughout the VRAE and surrounding areas (ref A).  The 
valley has roughly 250,000 inhabitants dispersed among small 
communities and farms, according to a local contact, and the 
main agricultural product is the coca leaf, which is 
reportedly grown openly throughout the VRAE. 
 
SL Leadership in the VRAE 
------------------------- 
¶3. (C) SL in the VRAE is led by Victor Quispe Palomino (aka 
"Jose"), his brother Jorge (aka "Raul"), and his military 
commander "Alipio", who is believed to be Leonardo Huaman 
Zuniga.  Jose is in his early 50s, according to a security 
consultant that operates in the VRAE, and has been a member 
of SL since at least the mid-1980s when he was briefly 
arrested by police.  Jose is accused of leading SL fighters 
in a massacre of 69 peasants at Lunamarca in the 1980s. 
Raul, like his brother, has been an SL member for over two 
decades and is accused of leading several small attacks in 
the VRAE in recent years.  Alipio, described in press reports 
as a cold-blooded killer, is in his 70s and suffers from 
tuberculosis, according to the security consultant.  The 
three commanders describe their SL faction in pamphlets as 
the "Peruvian Communist Party -- Marxist-Leninist-Maoist" and 
their VRAE command as the Central Regional Committee.  Most 
analysts label them the SL "proseguir" faction because it 
broke with SL founder Abimael Guzman and determined to fight 
on against the government when Guzman called for a negotiated 
settlement in the mid-1990s.  An Ayacucho regional government 
official told Poloff that Jose and Alipio have so much blood 
on their hands that they could never reintegrate into 
society, but continue the fight out of lack of options and 
desperation.  They would much rather go into exile abroad 
than live in the jungle, the official speculated, but they 
have no choice. 
 
SL Forces in the VRAE 
--------------------- 
¶4. (C) Most observers estimate that Jose, Raul, and Alipio 
command about 250 hardcore fighters, backed by a network of 
some 350 collaborators.  According to a local Interior 
Ministry official with informants throughout the valley, only 
a few dozen SL fighters remain permanently mobilized, while 
most live among the communities of the area.  When SL wants 
to launch a major attack using thirty or more men, the 
mobilized units go from community to community collecting 
their comrades for battle.  SL terrorists use a wide variety 
of weapons of differing makes mainly in 9 mm, 5.56 mm and 
7.62 mm caliber sizes, which observers say suggests they do 
not have consistent suppliers.  SL leaders claimed in a 
recent manifesto that they get their weapons primarily by 
ambushing and robbing military patrols.  The Interior 
official alleged that SL is also seeking (without success) to 
purchase a shoulder-fired rocket to knock down government 
helicopters.  The same official also told us that his sources 
said SL fighters had fathered some 150 children who they keep 
under tight protection in a cave where they store obsolete 
weapons. 
 
Dogmatic Terrorists or Criminal Narcotraffickers? 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
¶5. (C) The majority of officials and analysts consulted by 
Poloffs in Ayacucho argued that SL in the VRAE is primarily a 
drug-trafficking rather than a subversive organization. 
According to this argument, Alipio and Jose still have their 
communist ideals and political dreams, but neither 
realistically believes they can achieve the power that SL 
enjoyed at its height.  With no other options for survival, 
the SL leaders turned to protecting drug traffickers and coca 
growers for payment.  Asked why SL continues to proselytize 
about Communism in pamphlets and directly to locals, one 
analyst argued that this was just a smokescreen to convince 
communities that the group is not simply a gang of criminals. 
 Another analyst observed that SL in the VRAE exhibits some 
characteristics of both a subversive and drug-trafficking 
group and cannot be described exclusively as one or the 
other.  But as time goes on, he argued, new recruits 
increasingly care about the financial and criminal aspects of 
the group rather than its political ideals.  Few true 
believers appear to remain. 
 
¶6. (C) (Note: Although the argument that SL is a 
narcotrafficking organization was prevalent in Ayacucho, we 
continue to believe that SL holds political views and follows 
military tactics more akin to a terrorist group.  And at 
least one prominent analyst argues compellingly that SL 
remains a terrorist group with scaled-down political goals. 
This analyst told Poloff that Jose had recently claimed 
publicly he wanted to start a new stage of combat targeting 
US counter-drug interests. Anti-US rhetoric was also a marked 
component of the VRAE faction's recent manifesto.  We will 
explore this argument more fully in septel. End Note.) 
 
Kinder, Gentler SL Thugs 
------------------------ 
¶7. (C) To adjust to their comparatively isolated and weakened 
state, the SL remnants have adopted tactics designed to woo 
the local population and to transform their image from 
battle-hardened terrorists and killers to something less 
menacing.  Although SL continues to use violence against both 
the security forces that confront them and "traitors" in the 
community, the group generally does not kill locals, innocent 
bystanders or outsiders passing through.  One contact said 
the SL briefly kidnapped a local mayor in 2005 to inform him 
that they believed in development and would accept the 
planned construction of a new road in the area as long as 
security forces did not use it.  Another contact told Poloff 
that SL once stopped him at a roadblock and lectured him and 
others for several hours on Communism and how SL no longer 
harmed civilians.  In October 2008, SL fighters reportedly 
entered the exploration camp of a US mining company, lectured 
the workers on Communism, stole munitions, and left without 
harming anyone (ref D).  Several local contacts also reported 
that SL fighters regularly enter communities and pay several 
times the going price for local products. 
 
Seeking Contact with the Outside World 
-------------------------------------- 
¶8. (C) Shining Path leaders in the VRAE may also be seeking 
to increase contact with the outside world.  The Interior 
Ministry official in Ayacucho told Poloff he had established 
indirect communication with some SL leaders via an informant 
in the VRAE.  SL requested that the official provide 
medicines and 230 identity documents to allow some of their 
fighters to come and go from the VRAE without risking arrest. 
 The official said he provided some medicines to build trust, 
and showed Poloff a letter in which an SL fighter thanked him 
personally.  He added that he had convinced the fighter to 
give him radio frequencies so he could locate his SL contacts 
in the future.  The security consultant operating in the VRAE 
told Poloff that in an effort to gather intelligence he had 
even contacted and met with Jose and Alipio, who had 
delivered him a video and requested that he show it to the 
outside world.  (Note: We have not yet seen the video and 
cannot confirm its existence. End Note.)  In late March 2009, 
Jose provided a media interview to a prominent counter-drug 
analyst in which he claimed that Abimael Guzman -- not Jose 
and his faction -- was responsible for all past human rights 
violations committed by SL. 
 
Comment: Shining Path More Entrenched Than Resurgent 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶9. (C) SL has long been entrenched in the VRAE, enjoying 
nearly a decade of free reign to operate across the area 
undisturbed by the presence of state security forces.  In 
August 2008, when the GOP began military operations to pacify 
the valley (ref), the SL's entrenched and powerful position 
enabled it to actively resist and respond to the incursion 
with high-impact violence.  In our view, this fact, rather 
than a "resurgence" per se of SL (as media and other reports 
have claimed) best explains the recent spike of terrorist 
violence, including the deadly April 9 ambushes against 
military forces, in the zone.  Whatever the case, SL in the 
VRAE remains and should remain a priority concern for a 
government interested in eliminating Peru's terrorist threat 
once and for all. 
MCKINLEY