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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000572 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM PINR ENVR ASEC BL ECON
PTER 
SUBJECT: NO ELECTION DEAL; MORALES: USG DEATH THREAT 
 
REF: A. LA PAZ 557 
     ¶B. LA PAZ 496 
 
Classified By: A/EcoPol Chief Charles Sellers for reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  After five days of often heated debate, as 
of 4:00pm April 13, President Evo Morales and his ruling 
Movement Toward Socialism party (MAS) have been unable to 
reach a satisfactory compromise with the opposition to pass a 
constitutionally-mandated Electoral Transition Law (ETL). The 
two sides are reportedly close to a deal, which would include 
a significantly updated electoral roll and allow voting by 
all Bolivians living abroad.  Morales, in the midst of a 
five-day hunger strike, announced he would not attend the 
Summit of the Americas due to the importance attached to 
passing the election law, but his spokesman later said he 
could still attend, pending approval of the law.  Morales 
again unleashed harsh criticism of the USG, saying the DEA 
tried to poison him in 2002 and that the Embassy is now 
working with ultra-right wing groups to overthrow him.  End 
summary. 
 
- - - - - 
ETL Update 
- - - - - 
 
¶2. (C) Although under significant pressure to come to an 
agreement, after five days of negotiation the 
opposition-controlled Senate has refused to agree to a 
compromise Electoral Transition Law (ETL).  The ETL 
establishes the rules for the December 6 election of the 
president, vice president, and members of the new 
Plurinational Assembly, but the opposition is concerned the 
MAS wants to pass a law that would effectively guarantee them 
a two-thirds majority in the new Plurinational Assembly, and 
with it the ability to modify the constitution at will 
(reftels). 
 
¶3. (U) Although the two sides were close to an agreement as 
early as April 9, they split rapidly after Vice President 
Alvaro Garcia Linera tried to prematurely force a vote when 
he saw that main opposition negotiators had gathered 
temporarily in the Congress hall to discuss strategy, 
creating a quorum.  After an exchange of insults, chants of 
protest, and an attempt by MAS members to physically prevent 
the opposition from leaving, the opposition managed to halt 
the vote and leave the Congress.  Upon leaving the building, 
opposition members including Senate President Oscar Ortiz and 
Representative Ninoska Lazarte were forced to run a gantlet 
of MAS deputies who mildly physically attacked and insulted 
them.  Although Garcia Linera proposed a reconsideration of 
the vote for April 10, the two sides were estranged. 
 
¶4. (U) After negotiating over the Easter weekend, the two 
sides again moved closer to an agreement that would include 
among its main features an electoral roll with biometric 
security features and voting for all Bolivians living abroad. 
 In the past, the MAS and members of the National Electoral 
Court (CNE) had insisted that revision of the electoral roll, 
particularly with advanced security features, would be 
impossible by the December 6 elections.  The MAS had also 
proposed to "phase in" voting outside Bolivia by 
enfranchising only Bolivians living in Argentina.  The 
opposition complained that the electoral rolls were 
fraud-ridden and that Argentina was a significant base of 
support for the MAS, and refused to cede on these issues. 
Over the weekend, President Morales suddenly changed course 
and gave in to both opposition demands, with President 
Morales agreeing to provide USD 35 million to create a new 
electoral roll and offer the vote to all Bolivians living 
abroad.  Morales had planned to use the funds to acquire a 
presidential aircraft. 
 
¶5. (C) Senate President Oscar Ortiz and others are now 
demanding that CNE President Jose Luis Exeni resign.  After 
stating for months that no major revision of the electoral 
rolls would be possible before the December 6 elections, 
Exeni quickly raised eyebrows when he gave his support for 
the new compromise.  His quick endorsement further confirmed 
opposition suspicions that he is untrustworthy, does whatever 
is politically expedient, and would try to deliver the 
elections for the MAS.  (Note: Under the old constitution, 
President Morales selected Exeni to be court president. 
Although he has shown signs of independence, the opposition 
considers him Morales' confidant.  End note.)  According to 
one opposition source, "momentum has built over the weekend 
for Exeni's ouster.  The MAS is proposing to keep Exeni but 
add one or two opposition members onto the court as well. 
This could happen, but the disagreement is prolonging 
negotiations."  Key to any agreement are the votes of 
opposition Senators Boerth and Ruiz, who have thus far hewed 
to the opposition agreement to prevent a quorum but are 
considered moderates and open to MAS persuasion (or bribes). 
 
¶6. (U) Last, late on April 13 the MAS changed its position on 
the electoral rolls, and is now demanding that anyone be 
allowed to register for the new electoral roll with any 
identification document, not only the official carnet as 
previously agreed. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
Morales Skips Summit? 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7. (U) On April 12, President Morales announced he would 
attend neither the Summit of the Americas nor the preceding 
shadow summit of ALBA countries.  In a telephone discussion 
with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, which was broadcast 
over Bolivian state radio, Morales said "Bolivia comes first. 
 Let us win this battle for the countryside, which has been 
oppressed, excluded, and marginalized by the oligarchy.  That 
is our battle."  Chavez responded: "This battle of yours is a 
battle of your people, and it is the battle of our people." 
Previously, Morales had signaled his desire to attend the 
Summit of the Americas to challenge President Obama to "lift 
the Cuban blockade."  The next day, Morales' spokesman said 
he could still attend the Summit, depending on whether a deal 
on the electoral law is struck. 
 
¶8. (C) Our sources say Morales undertook his hunger strike 
(now in its fifth day) to gain international sympathy, and 
because he did not have enough support from social groups or 
the military to forcibly close Congress.  Similarly, his 
announcement that he may skip the Summit of the Americas is 
designed to garner domestic and international support for his 
fight against the opposition. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
More (Imaginary) Death Threats 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9. (U) Also on April 12, Morales said in an interview 
broadcast on state television and radio that he had received 
new information about a DEA plot to poison him in 2002, that 
there are USG-financed paramilitary units in Santa Cruz 
working to overthrow him, and that the USG and "fascist 
right" are actively conspiring to kill him, along with the 
vice president and ministers.  "Perhaps our days are 
numbered, because they (paramilitaries) continue to prepare 
themselves.  So everyone in the Bolivian countryside should 
know, if anything happens to Evo, to Alvaro, to a minister, 
it is the work of the fascist right that is organizing with 
the support of the Embassy of the United States.  We have 
taken note.  This is a battle, a battle of ideas." 
 
- - - - 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶10. (C)  Post believes President Morales is indeed engaged in 
a battle of ideas, and that he will continue to work to 
solidify the "MAS revolution," using the USG as a convenient 
foil as needed to bolster domestic political support.  The 
opposition's negotiation strategy has yielded significant 
dividends, and Morales is looking for new ways to be seen as 
a sympathetic figure, especially among his base.  We believe 
Morales' comments preemptively blaming the U.S. Embassy 
'should anything happen to him, the vice president, or any of 
his ministers' to be not only irresponsible, but potentially 
a very real security threat to the Mission.  We are drafting 
a diplomatic note to that effect, to be delivered after the 
Summit of the Americas.  In the longer-term, our contacts say 
the MAS is still heavily favored in the December elections, 
as voting by Bolivians living abroad favors the MAS and is 
open to manipulation, despite the updated electoral roll.  We 
will continue to monitor any final election law compromise 
and the impacts on December elections.  End comment. 
URS