VZCZCXRO1170
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #0676/01 1060951
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 160951Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7672
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000676 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR, EUR/UMB, EEB/OMA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2019 
TAGS: EFIN EREL ETRD PGOV PREL XH UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: IMF LIKELY TO SUPPORT RISKY GOU MOVE TO 
STABILIZE PUBLIC FINANCES 
 
REF: KYIV 576 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM B. TAYLOR, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
¶1. (C) On April 14 Prime Minster Yulia Tymoshenko moved 
quickly after the Rada again failed to include key 
IMF-related anti-crisis legislation on the agenda.  Within 
hours of the failed vote, the CabMin passed 19 resolutions 
that aim to provide the fiscal discipline that the IMF 
expects in return for disbursing the long-overdue, $1.87 
billion second tranche of the Stand-By Arrangement.  The 
action was clearly prepared long before the Rada vote, and 
now appears to have had the full support of the IMF, which 
has indicated that it will accept the resolutions in lieu of 
laws.  The IMF now looks set to disburse the second tranche, 
and its local rep even indicated that the payment could be 
made in the form of direct budget support.  The IMF is less 
open to the GOU suggestion to combine the disbursement with 
the payment of the third, significantly larger tranche that 
could be disbursed in May.  Using resolutions instead of laws 
is a risky strategy, as both the President and Rada deputies 
could formally challenge the GOU moves in the courts, but the 
IMF now takes the view that the GOU had few other options in 
the current political environment.  However fragile and 
institutionally questionable the resolutions may be, they are 
the quickest option that the GOU has to meet IMF 
expectations. End summary and comment. 
 
Tymoshenko Acts Quickly After Yushchenko Fails to Deliver 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶2. (C) On April 14 the Rada again failed to address three 
laws aimed at implementing key IMF conditionalities.  None of 
the drafts received enough votes to be put on the agenda. 
The roll call ran largely along the lines of the unsuccessful 
March 31 votes on the same legislation (reftel), with 
ostensibly pro-presidential MPs failing to support the 
measures.  It is unclear whether Yushchenko could not, or 
chose not, to deliver the votes of MPs still considered loyal 
to him. 
 
¶3. (C) Afterwards PM Tymoshenko convened an extraordinary 
meeting of the CabMin, which quickly adopted 19 resolutions 
that aim to achieve the same fiscal results foreseen in the 
legislation. In a subsequent meeting with the Ambassador, 
Tymoshenko said that all CabMin members, including those 
ministers with close ties to President Yushchenko, supported 
the measures with little debate.  Tymoshenko told the 
Ambassador that IMF Mission director Ceyla Pazarbasioglu 
participated in the CabMin meeting and subsequently approved 
the measures.  According to Tymoshenko, the actions will 
allow Pazarbasioglu to recommend to the IMF Board that the 
overdue, $1.87 billion second tranche of the Stand-By 
Arrangement be disbursed to Ukraine. 
 
IMF Accepts Resolutions in Lieu of Laws 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The local media quoted Pazarbasioglu as saying that 
Ukraine had now done all it could under the present 
circumstances.  The IMF would now discuss the individual 
resolutions with the GOU in greater detail in the coming 
days.  IMF resident rep Max Alier confirmed to us on April 15 
that the IMF had not yet studied the resolutions in detail, 
but looked prepared to accept the results.  "Of course having 
the measures approved by the Rada would have been more 
kosher," Alier told us, "but if the Rada is not game then we 
will have to live with the resolutions."  Earlier, he told us 
point blank that the IMF Mission team could not back out of 
Ukraine a second time without disbursing the second tranche. 
He said the IMF made a calculated decision that the GOU would 
not get budget legislation passed, and decided to accept that 
the GOU can tackle the fiscal deficit via resolutions. 
 
¶5. (C) It now appears clear that the Tymoshenko government 
had prepared the resolutions long in advance of the April 14 
meeting. Tymoshenko and Deputy PM Nemyrya showed the 
Ambassador the voluminous stack of resolutions and supporting 
documentation, all of which would have required significant 
planning in Ukraine's slow bureaucracy.  The IMF was aware of 
this fallback plan when the Mission returned to Ukraine last 
week, with Pazarbasioglu telling the Ambassador on April 11 
that she was impressed at the GOU's preparations of a 
 
KYIV 00000676  002 OF 003 
 
 
comprehensive "Plan B" for the event that the Rada vote 
failed.   At that time she had already indicated that the IMF 
would be open to accepting resolutions in lieu of laws if 
they achieved similar fiscal results.  She said the measures 
would leave a forecast budget deficit of roughly 4 percent of 
GDP, which at current exchange rates equals roughly $4 
billion. 
 
Bank Recap Group to Designate 6-8 Banks 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Tymoshenko also told the Ambassador that she would 
chair the first meeting of the newly created GOU board 
dealing with bank recapitalizations on April 15.  At the 
meeting, which both IMF and World Bank will attend as 
observers, the GOU would announce the first group of banks 
that will receive recapitalization funds from the government. 
 Separately, Nemyrya had told the Ambassador that the board 
would announce a group of six to eight banks that had been 
identified using objective criteria.  The results of the 
stress tests conducted by the NBU earlier this year would 
play a major role, as well as whether the bank was deemed 
systemic (barometer would be the relative size of its deposit 
base) and whether the bank was already under temporary NBU 
administration, Nemyrya said. 
 
Second Tranche in the Form of Budget Support? 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Tymoshenko said the GOU was asking the IMF to pay out 
the $1.87 million tranche directly to the state budget, as 
the situation on the foreign exchange market had stabilized 
while the overall fiscal situation was deteriorating by the 
day.  She also said the GOU hoped to combine the disbursement 
of the second and third tranches, which was originally 
scheduled to be disbursed on May 15, and should total about 
$3.6 billion, or double the amount of the second tranche. 
Later on April 14 IMF resident rep Alier told us that a 
payment directly to the budget was possible, and even likely. 
 Combining the tranches, however, was "a pie in the sky," he 
said.  In her discussion with the Ambassador, Tymoshenko had 
acknowledged that the IMF had said combining the tranches 
would significantly delay their joint disbursement, possibly 
to the end of May.  She asked the Ambassador that the USG 
weigh in with the IMF to accelerate a joint disbursement, as 
the political situation in Ukraine was making it increasingly 
difficult to get anything done, and that the budget 
desperately needed the funds. 
 
Can Resolutions Work in Lieu of Laws? 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Cabinet of Ministers decrees are commonly used policy 
tools in Ukraine's volatile political environment.  We have 
observed that the current GOU has resorted to resolutions on 
trade-related issues when the Rada has either passed 
legislation that violates Ukraine's international 
obligations, or failed to support international commitments 
that the GOU has promised.  However, under Ukrainian law 
cabinet resolutions are generally used for setting the 
procedures to implement laws.  They cannot contradict laws or 
presidential decrees, and they are generally far easier to 
reverse than acts of law. 
 
¶9. (C) It remains to be seen whether the resolutions adopted 
on April 14 will provide a sustainable policy environment in 
the mid- to longer term.  Cabinet of Ministers resolutions do 
not carry the same status as laws passed by the Rada or 
presidential decrees, and they are vulnerable to challenges 
from both the President and from parliamentarians. 
President Yushchenko can issue a decree suspending CabMin 
resolutions while he challenges them in court.  In addition, 
a  group of at least 45 Rada MPs can challenge the legality 
of CabMin resolutions in court, during which time the 
resolutions are automatically suspended. 
 
¶10. (C)  As yet, however, Yushchenko has not indicated that 
he will contest the CabMin's actions.  On April 15 he called 
the GOU approach "exceptionally positive" but said the 
results were not ideal from an economic point of view.  He 
said that the Presidential Secretariat would investigate the 
legal, economic and political implications of the 
resolutions.  Separately, he had indicated that the price 
hikes for energy could cause an increase in inflation.  In 
the Rada, pro-presidential Our Ukraine-People's Self Defense 
deputy Vjacheslav Kyrylenko called the resolution hiking 
 
KYIV 00000676  003 OF 003 
 
 
pension contributions illegal, arguing that the payments are 
akin to tax payments and hence fall under the purview of the 
Rada.  He did not indicate a willingness to formally 
challenge the measures, however. 
 
"Inconsistencies" Opened Path for Some Resolutions 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶11. (C) Nemyrya told the Ambassador that the GOU "used 
inconsistencies in the law" when drafting the resolutions. 
The Ministry of Justice, led by Yushchenko supporter 
Onyshchuk, had reviewed the measures and deemed them to be in 
accordance with the law, he said.  For example, one 
resolution will increase the monthly amount that small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) pay to the pension fund from 80 UAH 
($10) to 208 UAH ($26) per month, a measure that should 
increase revenue by 1.9 billion UAH ($237 million) for the 
remaining eight months of 2009, Nemyrya said.  SMEs have 
enjoyed lower pension payments since former President Kuchma 
issued a corresponding decree in 1998, he said.  Hence the 
CabMin was confident it could change the decree by passing a 
resolution.  Nemyrya said he expects Yushchenko's supporters 
to attack the measures, but expressed confidence that the GOU 
could defend its actions because the pension privileges that 
SMEs enjoyed put other groups with higher pension fund 
contributions, such as teachers, at a disadvantage and 
actually forced them to subsidize the pensions of small 
entrepreneurs. 
 
12.(C) Two other resolutions aim at improving the financial 
situation at Naftohaz.  One resolution makes a 
"recommendation" to the independent tariff regulator to 
introduce higher, sliding scale gas and electricity prices 
for retail households that consume large amounts of energy. 
Another resolution introduces a 2 percent surcharge on the 
price of natural gas delivered to some industrial users, a 
measure that Energy Minister Prodan said would boost revenues 
by UAH 560-580 million (about $70 million.) 
 
¶13. (C) The resolutions pertaining to pensions appear to 
contain measures nearly identical to the measures foreseen in 
the failed pension reform draft.  As yet it is unclear, 
however, whether the energy-related resolutions will help 
fully plug the holes in Naftohaz's finances.  The failed 
legislation had foreseen measures to compensate a UAH 6.1 
billion ($762 million) deficit at Naftohaz which will arise 
because the company sells gas domestically at 
administratively set prices far below what it pays for gas 
imports from Russia. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14. (C) The IMF understands the vagaries of Ukrainian 
politics, and it is now clear that it would not make its 
decision to disburse the next tranche dpendent on the 
outcome of the April 14 Rada vote.  It and the GOU are 
walking a thin line with this approach, but in Ukraine's 
volatile political environment this is the quickest option as 
long as President Yushchenko is unwilling or unable to 
convince his remaining supporters to support crisis-related 
legislation.  The IMF recognizes that Ukraine's fiscal 
situation is deteriorating rapidly -- in the first three 
months of this year, a time when the budget normally has a 
seasonally induced surplus, the budget deficit was 1.5 
percent of GDP.  Hence action is needed.  With no other 
sources of budget support on the horizon, the IMF realizes 
that taking the (unrealistic) high road won't help Ukraine in 
the short- to medium-term, and would actually work against 
what the Fund is trying to achieve in Ukraine.  The 
resolutions are still open to challenge by the  President, or 
Rada deputies.  However fragile and institutionally 
questionable, the resolutions are the quickest option that 
the GOU had to meet IMF expectations.  End comment. 
TAYLOR