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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KUWAIT 000316 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/ARP, NEA/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018 
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS KU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AF CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL SCHWARTZ 
VISIT TO KUWAIT 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 270 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 265 
     ¶C. KUWAIT 255 
     ¶D. KUWAIT 244 
     ¶E. KUWAIT 233 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
¶1. (C) General Schwartz, my staff and I look forward to 
welcoming you to Kuwait. Your visit will provide an excellent 
opportunity to engage with senior Kuwait military leaders as 
the bilateral relationship adapts to our changing profile in 
Iraq and new challenges in Afghanistan/Pakistan.  Your 
interlocutors will be keen to discuss how best to sustain 
robust security cooperation in this changing environment. 
 
Kuwait Snapshot 
--------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Kuwait is a country that is small in area (about the 
size of New Jersey) and in population (approximately one 
million Kuwait citizens and two million expatriates), but its 
small size belies its economic weight, its strategic 
importance and, above all, its value as a welcoming platform 
for U.S. military and strategic engagement in this troubled 
region.  Beneath Kuwait's sands lie the world's 5th largest 
reserves of oil, a resource that has served as a boon 
allowing Kuwait to fund extensive social services and a high 
standard of living for its population and provide aid to 
other Muslim states.  Of course, the oil resource has also 
had an historic downside, serving as a lure that inspired 
Saddam Hussein to launch his 1990 invasion and, to this day, 
leaves Kuwaitis wondering what threats could emerge in the 
future.  Nestled at the head of the Arabian Gulf between Iraq 
and Iran -- two large and periodically aggressive countries 
-- Kuwait has always relied on outside benefactors to 
safeguard its strategic location.  The British filled this 
role for much of the 19th and 20th centuries, and we have 
filled it since 1971.  In return, the U.S. has received 
unparalled support for U.S. military and strategic engagement 
in Iraq and elswhere in the region, a relationship that led 
us to designate Kuwait a major non-NATO ally in 2003. 
 
A Vibrant But Adolescent Democracy 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Kuwait is a vibrant but tempestuous young democracy -- 
topped by a fractious ruling family -- which is in the midst 
of a campaign to select new members for Parliament, with an 
election scheduled for May 16.  The Amir dissolved the last 
Parliament on March 18 following repeated attempts by Members 
of Parliament to "grill" the Amir's hand-picked Prime 
Minister (also a member of the ruling family) on a variety of 
charges.  Overall, Kuwait is experiencing a period of drift 
owing to weak leadership emanating from the ruling family and 
the Government on one hand, and disruptive and sometimes 
irresponsible challenges from Members of Parliament, on the 
other.  To a considerable degree, these difficulties reflect 
the political emergence of a growing class of "tribalist" 
Kuwaitis who are now challenging the grasp on power that 
Kuwait's mercantile class has traditionally enjoyed. Kuwait's 
present parliamentary troubles are, however, largely an 
internal matter and there is nothing in them to suggest a 
threat to the immediate future of the US/Kuwait bilateral 
relationship, which enjoys strong public support. 
 
Massive Kuwaiti Support for OIF 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) While it has been argued that the U.S. and Kuwait have 
evolved into a "co-dependent" relationship under which Kuwait 
enjoys relative security and the U.S. gets an operations 
platform and logistical support, what the U.S. gets out of 
the relationship is undeniably large.   In particular, 
Kuwait's contributions to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM have been 
massive and indispensable. Grateful for the U.S. role in 
freeing Kuwait from Iraq in 1991 (although this gratitude may 
be waning), Kuwait  provides us with approximately USD one 
billion in benefits assessed annually that include waived 
port fees, waived ground support fees for military aircraft, 
cost-free use of bases, convoy escorts and security and 
customs waivers for imports and exports.  Kuwait has also 
been supportive in allowing the transhipment through its 
territory of military equipment to Iraq.  The USG-Kuwait 
 
KUWAIT 00000316  002 OF 005 
 
 
military relationship is conducted within the framework of a 
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that was initially signed 
in 1991 and renewed in 2001 for a period of ten years.  The 
DCA has the stated purpose of "strengthening the security and 
stability of the Gulf region." 
 
 
Kuwait, the USG, and the Neighborhood 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Kuwait's regional concerns focus on Iraq and Iran. 
While, in general, Kuwaitis are heartened by recent progress 
towards stabilizing Iraq, they worry that a premature U.S. 
departure could lead to resurgent instability in Iraq, with 
dangerous consequences for Kuwait and the wider region.  Much 
of Kuwait's concern regarding Iraq centers on the large Shia 
population in southern Iraq and on Iranian influence there. 
Iran remains something of a 'bete noire' for the Kuwaitis, 
who believe the Shia Iranian regime is bent on expanding its 
influence throughout the Gulf region.  Kuwaitis are also 
deeply worried about Iran's nuclear ambitions, but favor 
diplomatic engagement over force as the only viable option 
for alleviating this threat.  As a small, relatively weak 
country, Kuwait looks to the U.S. as its ultimate protector, 
but also works energetically to expand its ties with Saudi 
Arabia and the GCC States, which it views as a 
Sunni-dominated counter-weight to expanding Iranian 
influence. 
 
¶6. An important priority for the USG has been to promote the 
restoration of the Kuwait/Iraq bilateral relationship. 
Kuwait has taken several forward-leaning steps, including 
sending an Ambassador to Baghdad and setting aside funds to 
relocate a number of Iraqi families presently residing inside 
Kuwait.  To Kuwait's chagrin, Iraq has dragged its feet on 
naming an ambassador to Kuwait and has been -- in GOK eyes -- 
intransigent on issues including debt repayments, border 
demarcation, and the recovery of the remnains of Kuwaitis 
abducted during the Gulf War.  Embassies Kuwait and Baghdad 
provided extensive support (mostly milair logistics support 
and security) to help Kuwait's Ambassador establish his 
embassy. 
 
¶7. (C) The GOK plays a generally positive role in support of 
Israeli-Palestian peace efforts, including backing for the 
Palestine Authority and for the Quartet Principles, and has 
been an advocate of moderation in Arab League discussions. 
There remains, however, an underlying sense that the US 
favors Israel in its disputes with Arab countries and, in 
particular, with the Palestinians.  The December 2008 Israeli 
incursion into Gaza caused a great deal of anguish here. 
Kuwait has contributed significant assistance to the 
Palestine Authority. 
 
Shift of USG Focus to Afghanistan/Pakistan 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) While the GOK has misgivings about a 2011 U.S. 
withdrawal from Iraq, it appears to be generally 
understanding of a recent USG policy re-focus on Afghanistan 
and Pakistan.  GOK leaders have told USG interlocutors that 
they view the presence of extremist elements on the 
Pakistan/Afghanistan border as a threat to the wider region. 
We believe they will be generally supportive of the 
President's new emphasis on an expanded effort in the 
Pakistan/Afghanistan area that combines diplomatic and 
civilian tools along with military ones, but would have 
misgivings about the indefinite use of Kuwait as a staging 
base for operations in that region.  The GOK frequently urges 
USG interlocutors to place an increased emphasis on 
developing a dialogue with Iran as a means to advance 
regional stability and has urged us to work more closely with 
the Russians and Europeans to convince Iran to back away from 
its nuclear ambitions; the GOK has repeatedly emphasized its 
concerns over possible development of an Iranian nuclear 
program, but believes only dialogue and diplomacy can achieve 
these ends without putting the region at risk of a conflict. 
 
Mil-to-Mil Relationship 
----------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The US/GOK military to military relationship is 
generally excellent, although there have been some recent 
fits and starts.  While supportive of the US role in Iraq and 
 
KUWAIT 00000316  003 OF 005 
 
 
prepared to support our withdrawal, members of the Kuwait 
military have said they do not want Kuwait to be utilized 
indefinitely as a platform for US military operations outside 
Kuwait; some have suggested that an optimal US post-Iraq 
presence could include a brigade dedicated to the defense of 
Kuwait.  Kuwait Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lt. General Fahd 
Al-Amir (with whom we have requested a meeting for you) has, 
at times, demonstrated a prickly side toward the US presence, 
temporarily halting training at one site due to misplaced 
concerns over the presence of depleted uranium residue and 
mandating a temporary delay to construction at Ali Al-Salem 
Airbase.  He has also, at times, demonstrated an interest in 
balancing US military purchases with French or other nations 
military capabilities.  The COS has said his bottom line is 
that he favors a close relationship with the US, but such a 
relationship must be based on mutual interest.  The 
relationship between the COS and the (acting) Minister of 
Defense has been tense at times.  It should be noted that the 
Kuwait military gets relatively high marks for its 
professionalism (a recent parade and flyover related to 
National Day was an impressive delay of Kuwait's military 
capabilities) and the US/Kuwait mil-to-mil relationship is 
characterized by dialogue and mutual respect. 
 
 
Kuwait Air Force Background 
--------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Kuwait Air Force HQ is located at Al Mubarak Air 
Base, with the remaining forces stationed at the Air Defense 
Brigade, Ali Al Salem Air Base and Ahmed Al Jaber Air Base. 
The Kuwait Air Force numbers approximately 2,500 officers and 
enlisted personnel.  The Kuwait Air Force was formed with 
British assistance in early 1950s and was initially equipped 
with British aircraft (Hawker Hunter and BAC Lightning).  In 
the 1970s, interceptor aircraft were supplied by France 
(Mirage F1) and ground attack aircraft by the U.S. (A-4 
Skyhawks).  In the 1980s, the need for training aircraft was 
filled by the Hawk and the Tucano.  The delivery of the 
Tucano was delayed by the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. During 
the invasion, the Kuwait Air Force attempted to defend Kuwait 
before most of its aircraft were evacuated to Saudi Arabia. 
After the first Gulf War, the Kuwait Air Force was 
reorganized and the F-18 C/D Hornet replaced the Mirages and 
Skyhawks. 
 
Foreign Military Sales Overview - USAF Cases 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) OMC-K currently works with SAF/IA and the Air Force 
Security Assistance Command (AFSAC) at Wright-Patterson AFB 
to coordinate on 15 active/implemented FMS cases valued at 
approximately $163M. To put this effort into perspective, 
OMC-K manages 115 FMS cases valued in excess of $8B. 
USAF FMS cases support the Kuwait Air Force with their legacy 
C-130/L-100s, provide USAF and contracted training through 
AFSAT at Randolph AFB, and provide technical support for the 
Kuwait AF AGM-65 Maverick missiles. A Letter of Offer and 
Acceptance for Shared Early Warning was signed in January 
¶2009. A NSA COMSEC Letter of Offer and Acceptance was signed 
in January as well. These will provide Kuwait with a five 
year shared early warning capability commencing approximately 
February 2010. 
The USAF is responsible for OMC-K,s bi-annual support case, 
which provides assistance in kind services for our personnel, 
as well as funding for all the specific security assistance 
advisors who work directly within the Kuwait Armed Service. 
The current OMC-K Support Case funds 38 man years; 21 
officers, 8 enlisted and 9 civilians over a period of 2 
years. OMC-K has already received the request from the Kuwait 
Ministry of Defense for our next follow-on support Case, 
which we expect to be valued at $27.996M for FY 2010 and 
¶2011. It will fund 42 man years, 22 officers, 10 enlisted, 
and 10 civilians. 
 
Two new FMS cases were presented to the Kuwait Ministry of 
Defense in January 2009 for their review/approval. These 
cases are designed to provide advanced weapons systems for 
their current fleet of F/A-18 C/D aircraft. 
JDAM (KU-D-YAB) - 50 Tail Kits (Case Valued at $7.2M) 
-- LOA forwarded to KMOD 22 JAN for review/approval; Offer 
Expired 18 FEB 09, then extended until 31 MAR 09. 
-- This case was signed on 31 March 2009. 
AMRAAM (KU-D-YAC)  - 60 Missiles (Case Valued at $69.3M) 
 
KUWAIT 00000316  004 OF 005 
 
 
-- LOA forwarded to KMOD 27 JAN for review/approval; Offer 
Expires 10 APR 09. 
-- Status as of 23 MAR: With KMOD waiting funding from 
Ministry of Finance or review of Annual Budget to determine 
capability to fund. 
-- This requirement was highlighted to Commander AFCENT by 
the Kuwait Armed Forces Chief of Staff in 2008 as a high 
priority issue. 
-- Chief, OMC-K spoke with the Commander, Kuwait Air Force on 
25 March who indicated that this capability was in fact a 
high priority and make appropriate phone calls to ensures 
required timelines were met. 
 
The Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense has been briefed that if the 
AMRAAM cases are not signed by current expiration dates, 
AFSAC will not be able to automatically extend the offer date 
and the Offers will be withdrawn. Should Kuwait desire to 
pursue after the expiry date, it is estimated to take 3 
months, at a minimum, to reoffer the case. 
 
It is interesting to note that in October 2002, Kuwait was 
offered an LOA for 80 AMRAAM missiles, but this Offer expired 
with no action taken by Kuwait. The original offer expiration 
date was 27 April 03; the offer expired and was extended 3 
times until it finally expired on 20 September 2003 without 
another request for extension. Kuwait,s explanation for its 
decision was that their F/A-18s did not have the IFF MOD IV 
capability at that time, which is a requirement to use the 
missile. For reference, the IFF Mode IV upgrade was completed 
summer 2008 on all of Kuwait,s F/A-18 aircraft. 
 
Other Signficant FMS Efforts 
--------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) On 4 September 2008, OMC-K received a request from 
Kuwait Ministry of Defense for a Letter of Offer and 
Acceptance for the purchase of six (6) KC-130J aircraft and 
associated support equipment, with an option for the purchase 
of two (2) additional aircraft. A pre LOA site survey was 
conducted at Abdullah Al-Mubarak Air Base during the week of 
25-29 January 2009. A team from the US Navy conducted an 
inventory of the existing C 130/L  100 ground support 
equipment to determine what equipment can be reutilized in 
support of KC-130Js. In addition, several clarifications to 
the August 2008 Letter of Request (LOR) and Statement of Work 
were discussed with key Kuwait Air Force members. Since the 
completion of the pre-site survey, the PMA-207 program office 
has been working expeditiously to complete the development of 
the KC-130J LOA data, based on the official LOR that KMOD 
sent in August 2008, as well as the clarifications discussed 
during the pre-site survey. As LOA development continues to 
progress and moves through the various approval stages 
(NAVYIP approval, DSCA Case Writing Division, and 
Congressional Notification and Approval), we have assured the 
Ministry of Defense that we will keep them informed of the 
progress. We note that this purchase will require funding 
outside Kuwait,s normal annual FMS budget; therefore we 
expect them to submit a special budget funding request to the 
Ministry of Finance in support of the procurement. Objective 
is to provide LOA to Kuwait not later than the 15th of June 
2009, but with all reviews required this will not be easily 
achieved. 
In response to a Ministry of Defense request during August, 
Price & Availability (P&A) data was provided for the C-17 
aircraft during October 2008. The total estimated cost for 
two (2) C-17 aircraft was $1,179,614,645. The official 
response received was that the C-17 was not an operational 
requirement for the Kuwait Air Force and that a LOR would be 
not forthcoming. There is no current initiative to submit and 
LOR for C-17s. 
 
Future Kuwait Air Force Aircraft 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Chief, OMC-K was convoked by the Commander Kuwait Air 
Force 26 March in response to an offer by the Deputy Under 
Secretary of the Air Force, the Honorable Bruce Lemkin, to 
provide a US Air Force team to present the capabilities of 
the F-16. Chief, OMC-K was directed to inform the US Air 
Force that there is no need to send a team to Kuwait as there 
are no plans to expand the Kuwait Air Force fighter fleet 
with a new aircraft. Commander Kuwait Air Force did indicate 
that the F35 is under consideration for procurement during 
20152018 timeframe. 
 
KUWAIT 00000316  005 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶14. (C) We have requested meetings with the following Kuwait 
MOD officials: 
 
-- LTG Fahed Al-Amir, Chief of Staff, Kuwait Armed Forces; 
 
-- MG Yousef Al-Otaibi, Commander, Kuwait Air Force; 
 
-- BG Khaled Al-Dae, Ali Al-Salem Base Commander 
 
And have also scheduled meetings with the following USG 
military officials: 
 
-- MG Charles Anderson, Deputy Commanding General, USARCENT 
 
-- BGen C.L. "Chuck" Hudson, Chief, Office of Military 
Cooperation-Kuwait 
 
-- Col Cameron Torrens, Commander, 386 Air Expeditionary Wing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
********************************************* ********* 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
visit Kuwait's Classified Website at: 
 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it 
********************************************* ********* 
JONES