VZCZCXRO8209
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0501/01 1030832
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 130832Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3509
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000501 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/E 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MCAPS EFIN EAID ASEC AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SE GRATION MEETING WITH UN RC DAVID GRESSLY 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  The UN Resident Coordinator for Southern Sudan 
told U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration that with 20 months 
left until the 2011 Referendum, the international community, and 
particularly partners to the CPA, must re-focus their energies on 
achieving implementation of only those elements of the peace accord 
that will take Sudan through and beyond the remainder of the Interim 
Period.  The CPA's ability to affect Sudan's broad-based democratic 
transformation was dead by 2006; with the Referendum looming on the 
horizon, the international community must now focus on extending the 
peace past 2011.  Abyei's resolution, the demarcation of the 
North/South border, and Referendum laws for both Abyei and the South 
need to be concluded by the end of 2009.  Only by reducing the CPA 
to its lowest common denominators can the world avoid a resurgence 
of North/South conflict.  This arithmetic does not require 
elections, he noted, emphasizing that "while not un-useful or 
un-important, they are not essential to the peace."  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) UN Resident Coordinator for Southern Sudan David Gressly 
briefed SE Gration on the status of CPA implementation and the 
viability of North/South peace on April 6 in Juba.  While upbeat 
about the changes the CPA has brought to Southern Sudan since 2005, 
Gressly maintained that overall, the public nature of the 
agreement's non-implementation (Abyei, census, JIU formation, 
wealth-sharing irregularities) of the accord has been so public over 
the past three years that should 2009 end without agreement on a law 
governing the 2011 Referendum, it will be clear to Southerners that 
their "rights will be denied again and change the dynamic of peace 
in Sudan."  The Special Envoy asked if Southern independence was a 
foregone conclusion, noting concerns that expectations for what 
independence will hold might outstrip the reality.  Gressly hedged 
and noted that the point of the Referendum is to assess that belief. 
 In his opinion, the expectations gap needs to be managed at two 
levels:  what does unification or separation mean in terms of 
tangible deliverables to the people, and how can either outcome be 
made more "comfortable" for the two CPA parties. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Gressly counseled the SE against reading too much into 
continued SPLM/NCP dialogue.  "Yes, they are still talking but there 
has been no meaningful advancement," he said, "the transformative 
promise of the CPA is no more."  Instead, the international 
community needs to focus on selective CPA implementation that will 
carry Sudan through the Referendum in an environment of an enhanced, 
and extended, peace.  The census and DDR, for example, are important 
but not essential for the Referendum.  "Both sides will do the easy 
parts of DDR, but neither will significantly downsize," Gressly 
noted.  On the other hand, resolving Abyei, demarcating the 
North/South border, and Referendum Acts for both Abyei and the South 
need to be concluded by the end of 2009 - or by early 2010 at the 
latest. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Gration pressed Gressly on his assertion that elections are 
not an essential element of the CPA.  "That's correct, because they 
are not essential to North/South peace," Gressly continued.  "If the 
parties reject the Permanent Court of Arbitration's ruling on Abyei, 
this will be a serious blow to the CPA; a Referendum without an 
established border could call into question its legitimacy, but the 
UN can handle the Referendum without elections, if it is required." 
The Special Envoy reviewed his belief that elections are an 
important educational tool in advance of 2011, for both the populace 
and government.  Gressly did not disagree with the point, but noted 
that he questioned the mechanics of the timeframe just released by 
the National Election Commission - such as Southern voter 
registration during the rainy season.  "We can still have credible 
elections, but it requires a good deal of organization by all 
parties," he said. 
 
¶5. (SBU) SE Gration reviewed current thinking on the possibility of 
trilateral discussions between SE Gration, Kiir, and Taha.  Gressly 
suggested packaging together CPA-mandated post-referendum 
arrangements in order to maximize each sides' maneuvering room 
during talks.  Essential elements covered should include border 
demarcation, a limited-period extraordinary wealth-sharing 
agreement, and specific provisions for the accommodation of 
migratory groups (e.g., Misseriya).  (NOTE:  In the past, NCP has 
also focused on liabilities sharing, or the South assuming a 
percentage of Sudan's national debt.  END NOTE.)  Gressly also 
counseled that the SPLM views the CPA as a path to the Referendum, 
and anything that deviates from that path, or a set of benchmarks 
that deviate from it, will be resisted.  SPLM sees its compliance 
with the CPA as guaranteeing the international community's 
endorsement of the 2011 Referendum's outcome.  "SPLM legitimacy is 
tied to their very attempt to implement the CPA.  Kiir has taken 
very personalized hits, and even alienated himself from his cabinet 
on issues such as the census, in order to get the South to that 
point," he said. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000501  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Gressly departed from the topic of CPA implementation to 
turn to the evolution of Southern Sudan.  While he understood donor 
concern about the budget crisis, Gressly opined that it held a 
silver-lining:  it provides Juba with a second chance to get its 
financial systems right.  The GOSS's present revenue totals mirror 
those of 2005/2006, and while not a comfortable period in the 
fledgling government's history, "it proves they can manage this, and 
hopefully learn from it," to better utilize their oil revenues in 
the future. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Gressly then outlined the three main security challenges 
for the South: 1) professionalization of the SPLA (for which he 
credited USG assistance efforts) 2) building the capacity and 
legitimacy of the Southern Sudan Police Service 3) inter-tribal 
conflict tied to the cultural importance of cattle and scarce 
natural resources.  While none of these alone are enough to derail 
the prospects of a lasting peace, continued GOSS distraction from 
reform efforts - as a result of Khartoum-Juba tensions or drag on 
the economy because of Khartoum's non-payment of arrears, could 
spark violence that would lead to delays in CPA consolidation - 
delays within a time-period in which there is virtually no margin 
for error. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment: We agree with Gressly's assessment that the most 
critical aspects of the CPA - in terms of maintaining peace and 
stability - are the referendum and items linked to the referendum 
such as border demarcation and wealth-sharing post 2011.  Elections 
are important in order to keep the CPA on track and attempt to 
deliver something to greater Sudan on the "democratic 
transformation" promise of the CPA, but not as important as the 
referendum in terms of maintaining peace.  Many observers have made 
the argument that elections have the potential to create more 
instability if not handled carefully. 
 
¶9.  (U) SE Gration reviewed this message before transmission. 
 
FERNANDEZ