P R 211700Z APR 09
FM REO HILLAH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1183
INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE
REO HILLAH 1256

C O N F I D E N T I A L HILLAH 000033 
 
 
CORRECTED COPY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/21/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PINR IZ
SUBJECT: DA'WA EFFORTS TO GIVE AWAY BABIL GOVERNORSHIP 
 
REF: A) HILLAH 30, B) BAGHDAD 1036 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth M. hillas,  PRT Leader, Babil PRT, Dept 
of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
¶1. (C) In a 20 April meeting with the PRT, Da'wa provincial 
chairman and PC member Abu Ahmed Al-Basri confirmed media 
reports that the national Da'wa leadership had promised the 
Babil Governorship to ISCI and that local Da'wa officials had 
reneged. He said that he had received eleventh hour instructions 
from Baghdad late last week to allow ISCI to gain the 
Governorship, but that ISCI had sought to have Salim Saleh Mahdi 
Al'-Muslmawi reelected, or alternatively another ISCI candidate, 
Ali Issa, both of whom were unacceptable to the Da'wa-led 
coalition in the PC. Al-Basri did not specify what Da'wa had 
hoped to get back from ISCI on the national level in return, but 
he made clear that there was a larger deal. 
 
¶2. (C) Faced with a revolt by Da'wa PC members and coalition 
partners, Al-Basri refused to follow the instructions that he 
said came from PM Al-Maliki's office, offering his resignation 
to underscore his point. Adding tension to ISCI Da'wa relations, 
in the last ISCI-Da'wa negotiating session in Al-Hillah, 
Al-Basri reportedly called Al-Muslimawi a "failure" and Ali Issa 
a "thief." 
 
¶3. (C) Reflecting on the reasons for Baghdad's efforts to give 
away Da'wa's electoral gains, Al Basri said there is great 
nervousness within the national Da'wa office over the 
survivability of the Al-Maliki Government. He said ISCI was 
prepared to "sell out Iraq" to advance its own political goals, 
referencing ISCI support for Kurdish demands with regad to 
Kirkuk. He implied that Da'wa efforts to co-opt Sadrist 
moderates -- for which he has been a strong proponent -- were 
taking on more momentum as Da'wa's relations with ISCI worsened. 
He agreed that it was vital that Da'wa efforts to co-opt Sadrst 
moderates not give extremists any breathing space, and he gave 
assurances that aggressive ISF targetting of Special Groups in 
Babil should not diminish but rather needed to show results. 
 
¶4. (C) Comment: This is the first confimation we have received 
that the Prime Minister's office had agreed to give up the Babil 
Governorship to ISCI, although we knew that Baghdad was 
encouraging a political accommodation of some sort (reftels). In 
this environment, the likelihood of changes in Babil's ISF 
leadership could take on new impetus, if Da'wa draws the 
conclusion that ISCI/Badr are prepared to use violence or the 
threat of violence to initimdate Da'wa or force political 
concessions in Babil. Regarding Special Groups, Al-Basri 
understands that while the PRT and USG have supported bringing 
Sadrists into the political process and for strengthening 
Sadrist moderates, there is a red line when it comes to any 
weakening of ISF efforts to vigorously pursue Special Groups, 
which he acknowldged are behind most of the recent IED attacks 
in central and southern Babil. 
 
HILLAS