VZCZCXRO2147
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDH #0074/01 0980607
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 080607Z APR 09
FM AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0075
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0099

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAHRAN 000074 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
PASS TO NEA/ARP JOSHUA HARRIS AND EEB/ESC MICHAEL SULLIVAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/8/2019 
TAGS: SA QA PGOV ECON ENRG EPET
SUBJECT: SAUDI "GAS PRINCE" CONTROLS THE KINGDOM'S INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
REF: A. 91 RIYADH 6692 
     ¶B. 09 JEDDAH 62 
     ¶C. 09 DHAHRAN 17 
     ¶D. 08 RIYADH 130 
     ¶E. 08 RIYADH 1624 
     ¶F. 09 RIYADH 271 
     ¶G. 08 RIYADH 867 
     ¶H. 07 RIYADH 1950 
 
DHAHRAN 00000074  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Joseph A. Kenny, Consul General, EXEC, DOS. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1. (C/NF) KEY POINTS 
 
 
 
-- HRH Prince Faisal bin Turki bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (FbT), 
Advisor to the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, 
controls the highly subsidized gas feedstock allocations for the 
petrochemical and power generation industries. 
 
 
 
-- The prince is known as being incorruptible and intelligent, 
but highly demanding and a tough negotiator when granting gas 
allocations. 
 
 
 
-- He utilizes his control over these allocations to require 
businesses to invest in a wide variety of "social obligations" 
consistent with the Kingdom's development goal of job creation 
and training for Saudis. 
 
 
 
-- Demand for the gas feedstock from the private sector is 
virtually unlimited at the very low subsidized price. 
 
 
 
-- Approximately 60% of Saudi Arabia's gas reserves are 
associated with oil recovery, and exploration efforts to find 
new commercially viable non-associated gas supplies have been 
largely unsuccessful to date. 
 
 
 
¶2. (C/NF) COMMENT 
 
 
 
-- At the highly subsidized rate of US $0.75 per million Btu, 
demand for Saudi gas feedstock is essentially unlimited. 
Therefore, the "Gas Prince" can afford to be patient and 
demanding when deciding to grant a gas allocation to any 
individual investor.  His marching orders from King Abdullah are 
to maximize the value obtained from each unit of gas allocated. 
More specifically, the prince's goal is to create jobs, thereby 
easing high unemployment among the youth and warding off other 
social ills related to an idle and young population.  Developing 
the Saudi workforce is essential to the long-term stability of 
the Kingdom.  The relatively little known Gas Prince will remain 
a very influential player in determining Saudi Arabia's ability 
to diversify their economy and employ tens of thousands of Saudi 
youth in the coming decades. 
 
 
 
End key points and comment. 
 
 
 
THE GAS PRINCE 
 
 
 
¶3. (C/NF) HRH Prince Faisal bin Turki bin Abdulaziz Al Saud 
(FbT) has worked as an advisor to the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Mineral Resources (MinPet) for more than two decades (ref A). 
He was born in 1965 and attended Saudi Arabia's premier 
university, King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals in 
Dhahran.  Saudi and foreign businessmen alike (quietly) talk 
about the influential role he plays in MinPet; specifically that 
he has absolute control over the heavily subsidized gas 
feedstock allocations made to the petrochemical and power 
generation industries.  (Note:  FbT also controls subsidized oil 
feedstock allocations (at US $2.60 per barrel), used 
predominantly in electricity power plants as fuel.  However, gas 
is significantly more sought after, as the value-adding 
 
DHAHRAN 00000074  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
petrochemical industry places a much higher value on the natural 
gas allocations.  End Note.) 
 
 
 
¶4. (C/NF) FbT has a reputation in the Eastern Province (EP) of 
Saudi Arabia as being incorruptible and intelligent but highly 
demanding and a tough negotiator.  He is known to have smart and 
trustworthy advisors -- mainly Western -- working in his 
Riyadh-based office.  Several Saudi contacts describe FbT as 
having the full support of King Abdullah, which makes him strong 
enough to shield off corrupting influence from other members of 
the royal family. 
 
 
 
¶5. (C/NF) Several prominent business contacts have described FbT 
as the "obstructive Gas Prince" and hold him responsible for 
their difficulties in obtaining the discounted feedstock. 
Khalid al-Fuhaid (protect), the president of the Midad Holding 
Company, said the prince, with whom he has worked directly on 
the gas allocation issue, is "clean [i.e., not corrupt], but he 
complicates things [for the private sector]."  Another prominent 
businessman in the mining industry, Dr. Said al-Qahtani 
(protect), said that the "problem" with feedstock allocations is 
FbT, not a gas shortage.  However, a high-level American 
executive disagrees noting it is inevitable that gas will be 
scarce when it is so heavily discounted, and he points to power 
generators switching from gas to oil as evidence of a gas 
shortage.  In the end, he asserted, "The prince is tough, but 
he's fair." 
 
 
 
¶6. (C/NF) Several contacts described the long and arduous 
process for obtaining an allocation from the Gas Prince.  First, 
just to meet with FbT, you must be affiliated with a large, 
international oil or petrochemical firm or an influential Saudi 
partner.  Next, you must present a detailed business plan laying 
out how you will meet your "social obligations" to the Saudi 
people, specifying the number of jobs that will be created.  FbT 
also demands that you outline training programs that you will 
establish for Saudis, possibly including building a new college 
or training center.  (Note:  FbT demanded and Exxon Mobil agreed 
to build a technical college from scratch.  End Note.)  Then, 
FbT demands that you establish downstream operations, even if 
they are not within your business's competency.  Finally, only 
after you have met all of the demands, he will direct MinPet to 
order Saudi Aramco to grant you the gas feedstock allocation. 
(Note:  One contact said that the actual letter granting the 
allocation is on Aramco letterhead, though they play no role in 
the decision-making process.  End Note.) 
 
 
 
¶7. (C/NF) With the gas allocation in hand, you can request that 
the Royal Commission of Jubail and Yanbu grant you a land 
allocation in the industrial areas, but not before.  The entire 
process often takes years and each time you go back for a new or 
increased allocation, FbT raises the social programs and job 
creation requirements.  Though several Saudi businessmen have 
complained about the difficulty of obtaining an allocation, 
several experienced executives in the petrochemical industry 
noted that FbT is only looking out for the best interest of his 
country - i.e., maximizing job creation, training opportunities 
and economic prosperity from the Kingdom's natural resources. 
 
 
 
PETROCHEMICALS AND ELECTRICITY DEMAND SUBSIDIZED GAS 
 
 
 
¶8. (U) Saudi Arabia hosts two substantial petrochemical 
production areas: The Royal Commission Cities of Yanbu in the 
west (ref B) and the much larger Jubail in the east (refs C, 
D).  Current plans to expand the already massive industrial 
cities have no shortage of interested investors.  Saudi Arabia's 
key to success in the petrochemical industry is the allocation 
of cheap gas feedstock (predominantly ethane, but also methane 
and other molecules).  Fixed at US $0.75 per million British 
thermal units (Btu), Saudi Arabia offers stable and cheap gas 
prices for the petrochemical industry's most significant basic 
input.  In contrast, the much more expensive and volatile 
internationally accepted benchmark for natural gas prices, the 
Henry Hub spot price, has gyrated from more than US $13.00 per 
million Btu in July 2008 to less than US $4.00 in March 2009. 
 
 
 
DHAHRAN 00000074  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶9. (U) The SAG's emphasis on diversifying the Saudi economy, as 
well as its booming population growth, has substantially 
increased the country's demand for electricity production.  In 
particular, new desalination, aluminum smelting, and other 
industrial ventures consume increasingly large amounts of 
electricity.  Fuel oil and natural gas (primarily methane) 
provide the bulk of electrical power generation, with a 
preference for the cleaner burning gas.  However, the insatiable 
demand for gas has led the SAG to switch the fuel for many 
electric power plants from scarce gas to plentiful oil and to 
begin considering alternative sources of energy, such as nuclear 
power (ref E) and solar technologies (ref F). 
 
 
 
¶10. (C/NF) On March 31, Saudi Aramco's Senior Vice President for 
Exploration and Production, Amin Nasser (protect), told the CG 
and EconOff, "We can never keep up with demand for gas from the 
private sector."  In reference to the discounted rate of gas 
Nasser added, "Seventy-five cents [per million Btu] is 
attracting everybody, even Qataris!"  (Note:  The tiny Gulf 
nation of Qatar has the third largest gas reserves in the world 
and substantially more than Saudi Arabia.  End Note.)  Industry 
analysts estimate that Saudi Arabia's demand for gas will 
increase from 5.5 billion standard cubic feet per day (scfd) to 
14.5 billion scfd (1 cubic foot of natural gas equals 1,028 Btu) 
over the next twenty-five years. 
 
 
 
THE NATURE OF SAUDI GAS 
 
 
 
¶11. (U) Though Saudi Arabia is estimated to have the fourth 
largest gas reserves in the world, about 60% are associated with 
oil.  Therefore, the amount of gas produced in Saudi Arabia is 
closely linked to the amount of oil produced.  Since Saudi oil 
production topped out at approximately 9.7 million barrels per 
day (mbpd) in July 2008, Saudi Aramco has cut production by 
roughly 20% to a reported 7.8 mbpd in February 2009, thereby 
significantly reducing associated gas production.  In order to 
make up for this decline in gas, the country has increased its 
use of fuel oil as an alternative to natural gas in its power 
plants.  As a result, Saudi Arabia halted fuel oil exports three 
months earlier than it usually needs to in order to cover the 
annual spike in summer electricity demand.  In fact, Saudi 
Aramco announced earlier this year that it would import more 
than 10 million barrels of fuel oil from Japan and India for the 
power generation and transportation industries. 
 
 
 
¶12. (U) Recent efforts to find new large, commercially viable 
non-associated gas reserves have been unsuccessful (ref F). 
(Note:  "Non-associated gas" is found in reservoirs that contain 
only gas and insignificant quantities of oil.  End Note.)  The 
originally high expectation of finding non-associated gas in the 
Empty Quarter of southeastern Saudi Arabia (Rub al-Khali) looks 
bleaker with each passing day.  Also, to date, most 
non-associated gas reserves are ethane-poor, which is fine for 
power generation (high methane content), but bad for the 
petrochemical industry, which primarily relies on the ethane 
molecule.  Saudi Aramco's largest non-associated offshore gas 
field, Karan, is scheduled to come on stream sometime in 2011, 
ramping up to eventually produce 1.8 billion scfd (1.84 trillion 
KENNY