VZCZCXRO4686
OO RUEHDE
DE RUEHDM #0288/01 1100824
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 200824Z APR 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6266
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 7585
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1053
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 5130
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 3884
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2376
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 8064
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0526
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0495
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0148
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0282
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0237
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0597
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000288 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, EEB/ESC/TFS; NSC FOR 
SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT; COMMERCE FOR BIS/CHRISTINO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2019 
TAGS: EAIR ECON ETRD ETTC PGOV PREL GE SP SY
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: MFA REQUESTS EMBASSY HELP FOR 
SYRIAN AIR 
 
REF: A. DAMASCUS 279 
     ¶B. DAMASCUS 192 
     ¶C. DAMASCUS 188 
     ¶D. 08 DAMASCUS 661 
     ¶E. 08 DAMASCUS 599 
     ¶F. 08 DAMASCUS 438 
     ¶G. 07 DAMASCUS 950 
 
DAMASCUS 00000288  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4(b,d) 
 
(C) Due to a technical error occurring in transmission, 
DAMASCUS 286 contained only eight paragraphs of a 
twelve-paragraph cable.  This corrected copy of DAMASCUS 286 
should have twelve paragraphs. 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) In an April 15 meeting requested by Vice Foreign 
Minister Faisal Miqdad, the Director General of Syrian Air 
asked for the Embassy's help in obtaining export licenses for 
maintenance on 17 aircraft engines and three auxilliary power 
units.  Two Airbus A320 engines are involved in a contractual 
dispute with Lufthansa Technik of Germany, while 15 V2500 
engines (also for the A320) need maintenance and service 
bulletins from the Connecticut-based company IAE.  One 
Honeywell-brand APU is currently stuck in Spain, while two 
others in Damascus await major repairs.  Further down the 
airline's wish-list, the Syrian Air executive expressed her 
desire to purchase new aircraft from either Airbus or Boeing. 
 Charge advised the Director General and Vice Foreign 
Minister that the purchase of new aircraft should be 
addressed as a political, rather than a humanitarian, issue. 
End summary. 
 
------------------------ 
MFA Follows Up on Syrian Air 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) After the March 7 meeting in which FM Walid al-Muallim 
raised the issue of an export license for a Syrian Air Airbus 
engine with NEA A/S-designate Feltman and NSC Senior Director 
Shapiro (ref B), Post sent a dipnote offering to brief MFA 
officials on the subject of trade sanctions and export 
licenses, particularly relating to civil aviation.  In 
response to our dip note, Vice Foreign Minister (VFM) Faisal 
Miqdad requested a meeting on April 15 with Charge, Econoff, 
Miqdad's Chef de Cabinet Husam Ala'a, Director General and 
CEO of Syrian Arab Airlines (Syrian Air) Ghaida Abdullatif 
and Syrian Air Technical Director Mohiedin Issa. 
 
¶3. (C) VFM Miqdad opened the meeting by saying the Syrian 
government had "welcomed" A/S-designate Feltman's remarks in 
the March 7 meeting that the Obama administration considered 
civil aviation safety to be a humanitarian issue, and the MFA 
appreciated the Embassy's efforts to follow up.  Miqdad said 
these steps were indicative that the U.S. genuinely wanted a 
"new approach" towards its relations with Syria, as were 
A/S-designate Feltman's meetings in Washington with Syrian 
Ambassador Imad Mustafa.  "This," Miqdad offered, "is the 
correct approach."  Arriving at the point of the meeting, 
Miqdad concluded that the first issue that "we must address" 
is Syrian Airlines. 
 
-------------- 
Syrian's Air's Wish List 
-------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Painting a grim picture of Syrian Air's current 
 
DAMASCUS 00000288  002.4 OF 003 
 
 
condition, Abdullatif enumerated the airline's "top three 
priorities."  First, she said, was convincing Lufthansa 
Technik to re-export an Airbus A320 engine that Syrian Air 
had paid to have reconditioned in Germany (ref A, B).  She 
claimed that Syrian Air had contracted with Lufthansa Technik 
in 2004 to overhaul two A320 engines.  (Note: Based on past 
conversations with Issa, we believe Syrian Air only shipped 
one of the two engines to Germany and the other remains in 
Damascus.  End note.)  Abdullatif claimed that any financial 
dispute between Lufthansa Technik and Syrian Air had been 
resolved (ref A), but Lufthansa Technik was now "afraid" of 
applying for an export license for fear of exposing itself to 
U.S. government legal action for performing the overhaul 
without first obtaining a license -- which Lufthansa 
Technik's attorneys evidently believe may have violated U.S. 
sanctions. 
 
¶5. (C) Technical Director Mohiedin Issa added that Syrian Air 
faced a similar situation with respect to three Honeywell 
auxilliary power units (APU) that were in need of overhaul. 
Syrian Air sent one APU to Spain to be overhauled by a 
company affiliated with Iberia airlines.  The company had 
previously received an export license to install a navigation 
system for Syrian Air, and was surprised when its application 
for a license to overhaul the APU had been denied.  According 
to Issa, the company now fears that it may be in violation of 
sanctions for having performed the overhaul and refuses to 
ship the APU back to Syria.  Abdullatif argued that the APUs, 
which provide electrical power to the aircraft while on the 
ground, are essential to the safe operation of the aircraft 
by powering the lights and communication systems while the 
plane is at the gate and passengers are on-board. 
 
¶6. (C) After explaining our understanding of the trade 
sanctions and the export license application process, we 
suggested that Syrian Air might encourage Lufthansa Technik 
to seek an advisory opinion from BIS if it wanted an official 
USG opinion of its legal position with respect to sanctions. 
 
¶7. (C) The airline's next priority, according to Abdullatif, 
was obtaining maintenance service from International Aero 
Engines (IAE).  She said that Syrian Air had purchased 15 
V2500 engines from the Connecticut-based company prior to the 
imposition of U.S. sanctions to operate on its fleet of six 
A320s.  She claimed that after sanctions had been imposed, 
IAE had received an export license in 2004 to maintain its 
service contract on the 15 engines.  IAE's subsequent 
application to renew its license in 2006, however, had been 
denied.  Since that decision, IAE had ceased providing any 
spare parts or daily service bulletins for the 15 engines. 
Other companies that were capable of providing similar 
services -- Pratt and Whitney, Rolls Royce, Japanese Aero 
Engines and MTU Aero Engine (Germany) -- had all refused to 
work with Syrian Air based on the USG's refusal to renew 
IAE's export license in 2006.  Abdullatif said that Syrian 
Air's inability to receive spare parts and daily bulletins 
from IAE significantly degraded the safety of Syrian Air's 
A320 fleet, which currently numbered just four operational 
aircraft. 
 
------------------ 
We Need New Planes 
------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) Syrian Air's third priority, according to Abdullatif, 
is purchasing new aircraft.  She explained that Syrian Air 
had signed an MOU with Airbus to purchase eight narrow-body 
aircraft from the A320 family, but said the MOU contained a 
clause that made the purchase dependent upon Airbus' receipt 
of an export license from the U.S. government.  She described 
 
DAMASCUS 00000288  003 OF 003 
 
 
her recent meeting with Boeing Commercial Director for the 
Middle East and Africa Donald Galvanin (ref A) as 
"excellent," and said that Syrian Air hoped to sign a similar 
MOU with Boeing to purchase 737 and 777s. 
 
¶9. (C) Charge advised Miqdad and Abdullatif that it was 
unlikely that Syrian Air's desire for new aircraft could be 
justified on humanitarian grounds, and would be better 
addressed as a political issue.  She suggested that the 
Syrians should raise this issue with Washington visitors who 
want to have political discussions in Damascus, and reminded 
them that Ambassador Mustafa is also in position to raise it 
in his meetings in Washington. 
 
¶10. (C) Miqdad acknowledged the Charge's point, and said he 
would raise it with FM Muallim.  He also asked the Charge to 
convey the Syrians' desire to purchase new aircraft in her 
report on this meeting to Washington in order to start the 
discussion as soon as possible.  "It's good to have these 
kinds of frank discussions," Miqdad said.  "We hope this 
meeting will facilitate a good beginning." 
 
--------------------- 
Conveying a Request to Meet Again 
--------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) The Charge next informed Miqdad of the proposed visit 
A/S-designate Feltman and NSC Senior Director Shapiro to 
Syria on April 27.  Miqdad responded that the proposal was 
"excellent news," but expressed concern that "no one" would 
be available to meet with the delegation on April 27.  (Note: 
FM Muallim may be accompanying President Asad to Austria for 
meetings on April 27-28.  End note.)  He promised to convey 
the request to FM Muallim and respond by April 16 with an 
alternative date if April 27 is, in fact, not possible. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) Abdullatif's frank description of Syrian Air's 
"priorities" paints an even grimmer picture of the airline's 
desperate condition than our internal assessments had 
indicated.  Although we were aware of the two engines 
requiring maintenance from Lufthansa Technik, this was the 
first we had heard of the 15 engines needing service from IAE 
or the three Honeywell APUs.  Notably absent from Syrian 
Air's presentation was any discussion of the two export 
licenses to recondition the Boeing 747-SPs.  Laying their 
cards on the table, the Syrian regime has 
uncharacteristically acknowledged its need for our help. 
They will see our response as a metric by which to guage the 
seriousness of our desire to engage them. 
CONNELLY