VZCZCXRO6050
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHCH #0264/01 0910759
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010759Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7822
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH 0012
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1926
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 CHISINAU 000264 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP; DS/ICI/CR 
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
FRANKFURT FOR RCO 
 
DEPT PASS KCC WILLIAMSBURG KY 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC KTIP MD
SUBJECT:  Fraud Summary - Chisinau: September 2008 -February 2009 
 
REF: 08 STATE 74840 
 
¶A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS:  Before its forced annexation into the Soviet 
Union in 1940, Moldova was part of Romania for 21 years, and hence 
enjoyed close ties to Europe.  Those historic ties, and the ability 
of many Moldovans to quickly learn Romance languages similar to 
their native Romanian, have made it possible for hundreds of 
thousands of Moldovans - between 25% and 33% of the working-age 
population - to live and work in Western Europe, particularly in 
Italy, Spain and Portugal.  Most Moldovans also speak Russian and 
many more work in Russia.  Although Moldova's per capita GDP has 
more than doubled in the last five years, the current international 
financial crisis now threatens that growth as remittances from those 
working abroad decline.  Business and investment suffer because of 
corruption, excessive bureaucracy and official interference.  Many 
public services, particularly healthcare, are being overwhelmed by 
the combined impact of budgetary constraints and an aging 
population. 
 
Moldovan passports are considered secure, although most other 
documents provided by visa applicants are unreliable.  School or 
university diplomas, drivers' licenses and employment booklets can 
be purchased on the local market.  False documents are available 
from some Moldovan officials.  Local firms advertise visa assistance 
services in newspapers and help applicants secure letters of 
invitation and prepare documents. 
 
Moldova's law enforcement and judicial systems are under-funded, 
poorly trained, often corrupt, and lack public support and 
credibility.   EU and U.S. training assistance efforts have helped 
the host government revise legislation, improve effectiveness, 
increase transparency and impose accountability.  However, criminal 
prosecution of document and passport fraud is very limited in 
Moldova. 
 
A separatist regime controls a narrow strip of land in the 
Transnistria region of eastern Moldova.  Many Transnistrian 
companies are not legally registered with Moldovan authorities and 
operate in contravention of Moldovan law.  Verification of work and 
travel documents from this area is extremely difficult.  Residents 
of Transnistria frequently hold Russian or Ukrainian passports in 
lieu of Moldovan passports. 
 
Chisinau is a medium fraud post. 
 
¶B. NONIMMIGRANT VISA FRAUD: 
B-1/B-2:  Moldova's weak economic condition and lack of criminal 
prosecution are the main factors contributing to NIV fraud.  Most 
Moldovan citizens who commit NIV fraud do so to travel to the United 
States to work illegally.  Their destinations are usually the larger 
Moldovan refugee communities, most commonly in and around 
Sacramento, CA, Portland OR, Tacoma, WA, and Asheville, NC.  Others 
attempt to go to Russian-speaking communities in Brooklyn, NY, or 
Los Angeles, CA.  Given the large disparity between wages in Moldova 
and the United States (in Moldova, professionals normally earn 
monthly salaries between USD 200-500, and construction workers 
usually earn up to around USD 500 monthly), many applicants are 
willing to pay hundreds and even thousands of dollars for forged 
documents to support their case for an NIV. 
 
Post has observed that most applicants using fraudulent documents to 
obtain visas are between 18 and 35 years of age, but many older 
Moldovan citizens also try to work illegally in the U.S.  Post 
regularly sees applications from middle-aged women going to Los 
Angeles claiming to visit long-resident relatives, but actually 
intending to work in nursing homes.  Applicants in the above 
categories normally are dispatched through INA 214(b) refusals. 
 
A large number of NIV applicants are sponsored by churches and 
religious organizations in the United States, usually to visit 
communities with large Moldovan refugee communities.  Post has not 
detected significant fraud or abuse of visas by applicants in that 
category. 
 
In the past year post has seen several applicants planning to attend 
intensive English language training programs, most often in New York 
City.  The applicants claim to have located the U.S. schools and 
applied for SEVIS without the aid of middlemen.  However, searches 
of SEVIS by school and nationality show that groups of applicants 
attending the same school enter SEVIS at the same time, frequently 
on the same day.  The improbability that they are acting 
independently, usually combined with completely unrealistic expenses 
and weak social and work ties, result in INA 214(b) refusals. 
 
J-1 - The Summer Work and Travel Program:  Post received a record 
 
CHISINAU 00000264  002 OF 004 
 
 
7,000 applications for the Summer Work and Travel (SWT) program in 
2008, and issued 5,500 visas.  We conducted a thorough validation 
study in November, 2008 and found that 23% of SWT applicants had 
remained in the United States after the completion of their 
programs.  Roughly half of those had applied to USCIS for an 
adjustment of status.  The validation survey determined that final 
year students constituted the highest risk for overstay (51%).  It 
also noted other significant risk categories (e.g., Sports 
University, older students, specific U.S. employers), but found that 
wide differences in return rate between local recruiting companies 
seen in 2007 had been largely eliminated. 
 
Post works closely with the Ministries of External Affairs and 
Education to curb SWT abuses.  We maintain close contact with U.S. 
sponsors active in Moldova to better inform them about local 
conditions and recruiting companies. 
 
J-1 Trainees and Interns:  Post continues to see (and refuse) 
ostensible J-1 training and intern programs for hotel housekeeping, 
food and beverage, fast food restaurant workers, and other unskilled 
labor positions.  Most of these applicants are former SWT program 
participants who have recently graduated university and face poor 
employment prospects in Moldova. 
 
H-2B Visas:  Post detected a new trend in H2-B applications during 
the reporting period, receiving applications from those who could 
clearly not earn enough money working legally in the United States 
to pay for program expenses.  When post placed calls to local 
recruiting companies, posing as potentially interested clients for 
H-2B programs, we were quoted "processing fees" from USD 1,900 to 
3,000 Euros.  When we asked applicants at visa interviews how much 
they paid for their applications, they responded with obviously 
coached answers that they paid a certain amount, usually USD 600. 
One petitioner instructed his applicants to state that they pay 
nothing up front for the program.  One applicant, quizzed on this 
point, speculated that the petitioner ran a charity organization. 
Our calls to that petitioner's local recruiter revealed an actual 
processing fee of USD 3,000 for those who obtained visas. 
 
Frequently applicants admitted that they could not cover expenses 
but that they would get a second (illegal) job.  We also saw a case 
in which it appeared that the petitioner (for housekeeping jobs in 
Miami, FL hotels) was fronting for a poultry processing plant in 
Virginia.  After contacting employers in the U.S. about work 
arrangements, it became clear that another petitioner was obviously 
benching hotel workers, and hiring them out on an as-needed basis to 
hotels, other than those identified in the petition, in and around 
Naples, FL. 
 
Adjustment of Status in the United States:  Post has detected 
several institutions that have many Moldovans on their student 
rolls, all or most of who have applied for their I-20s or DS-2019s 
while already in the United States on a B-1/B-2 or J-1 visa. 
Whenever post receives an F-1 application at post from an unfamiliar 
institution, we search SEVIS using the school name and the Moldovan 
country code.  We now routinely run results of ADIS searches that 
indicate an individual has applied for a change of status to F-1 or 
J-1 through SEVIS to spot schools hosting other visa holders who 
have failed to return to Moldova. 
 
¶C.  IV FRAUD:  Immigrant Visas for Moldovans are processed in 
Bucharest.  Post takes occasional I-130 petitions and processes 
I-604 (Request for and Report on Overseas Orphan Investigation) for 
international adoption cases originating from Moldova.  We have not 
seen suspicious I-130 petitions during the reporting period. 
 
¶D.  DV FRAUD:  Embassy Bucharest processes all DV applications for 
Moldovan citizens.  On occasion Bucharest requests assistance with 
checking the legitimacy of Moldovan documents, usually diplomas, 
with local authorities.  Post has confirmed a few fake diplomas 
submitted by Moldovan applicants to Embassy Bucharest.  Post has 
been contacted by a few Moldovans who have had their winning DV 
entries intercepted and held hostage by the companies that submitted 
their entries.  The applicants then have to pay the companies USD 
1,200-1,400 to receive their winning applications. 
 
¶E.  ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD:  In November, Post received a CRBA 
application from a naturalized American who falsely claimed 
sufficient presence in the United States to transmit citizenship to 
his newborn child.  ADIS checks of his travel record contradicted 
his account on several points, and he withdrew his application. 
Chisinau has not otherwise encountered incidences of U.S. passport 
and citizenship fraud. 
 
¶F.  ADOPTION FRAUD:  As noted above, Chisinau does not process IV 
 
CHISINAU 00000264  003 OF 004 
 
 
cases, but it does process I-604 overseas orphan investigation 
requests.  Local authorities administer international adoptions 
carefully and post has not encountered a suspicious or fraudulent 
adoption. 
 
¶G.  USE OF DNA TESTING:  Post has not employed DNA testing. 
 
¶H.  ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD:  Chisinau has not seen 
direct evidence of asylum cases or DHS benefits fraud.  We see fewer 
than five lost I-551s per year.  However, post notes that a large 
number of NIV applicants traveling to visit "refugee" relatives 
indicate that their relative emigrated for reasons other than 
credible fear of persecution.  When asked why they thought their 
relatives applied for refugee status, visa applicants commonly refer 
to abuses that occurred in the Soviet period.  Many of these 
refugees return regularly to Moldova for family visits.  Communities 
with large refugee populations are also primary sources of 
suspicious invitations for NIV applicants. 
 
¶I.  ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, AND TERRORIST 
TRAVEL:  While we are aware of reported trafficking of Moldovans to 
Turkey, Western Europe, and other former Soviet states, post has 
seen little evidence of transit to the United States.  We are not 
aware of the production in Moldova of fake U.S. travel documents. 
An Amcit accused of operating a ring trafficking electricians to 
Baltimore on H-2B and H-3 visas last year was sentence to five 
months in prison and a $250,000 fine on November 14. 
 
The RSO has cultivated an excellent relationship with local law 
enforcement officials.  Based on their information, we have entered 
the identities of nearly two hundred known and suspected Moldovan OC 
figures into CLASS.  Post has no indication of terrorist travel from 
Moldova. 
 
¶J.  DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS:  The Consular Section has not 
initiated investigations at post in the past year requiring RSO 
assistance. 
 
¶K. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCRUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY: 
Host country identification documents are of high quality and 
considered secure.  Post has not detected a false Moldovan passport, 
but is aware of a recent case in which Government of Moldova 
authorities detected a genuine passport issued with fake supporting 
documentation.  Moldova began issuing biometric passports in March, 
¶2008.  Regular-issue Moldovan passports are machine-readable and 
those manufactured after June 2005 contain a digitalized photo. 
 
The host government authorizes the simultaneous possession of two 
valid tourist passports.  Moldova has begun in the past year to 
issue machine-readable official and diplomatic passports with 
digitalized photos.  Older versions still in service are not 
machine-readable and contain laminated photos.  Regular Moldovan 
Passports cost USD 12 and can be obtained in one month; however, for 
a USD 100 expediting fee, a Moldovan passport can be ordered and 
received in one day.  Applicants for passports must present birth 
certificates, proof of identification, and in the case of university 
graduates, diplomas. 
 
¶L.  COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: The Consular 
Section has an active relationship with the Ministry of External 
Affairs.  As noted above, the RSO maintains excellent relations with 
host government law enforcement, including its Center for Combating 
Economic Crime and Corruption and the Center for Combating 
Trafficking in Persons.  The Ministry of Education and the General 
Department of Civil Records are reliable sources when we seek to 
verify educational, marriage and birth records. 
 
¶M.  AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN:  With several thousand Moldovan 
students recently participating in Summer Work and Travel program 
jobs in the United States, Chisinau is concerned that many have been 
actively sought out and encouraged to adjust status in the United 
States by members of their respective immigrant communities and 
"facilitators" for immigration attorneys.  These facilitators 
actively advertise services to assist Moldovans in the United States 
to adjust status to F-1 or H2B with USCIS in order to prolong their 
stays.  In the past two years, according to ADIS data, more that 
1,000 Moldovan SWT participants (10% of the total) sought to adjust 
status in the United States.  This rate of applications to extend 
status strikes us as far higher than might be reasonable expected 
and that Moldovan exchange program participants are being encouraged 
by various third parties to remain in the United States. 
 
¶N.  STAFFING AND TRAINING:  Chisinau has one full-time Consular 
Officer, Consul David Franz, who attended fraud prevention training 
at FSI in 2007.  The Fraud Prevention FSN, hired in 2008, has not 
 
CHISINAU 00000264  004 OF 004 
 
 
attended fraud prevention training. 
 
CHAUDHRY