VZCZCXRO9555
PP RUEHBZ RUEHGI
DE RUEHGI #0080/01 1041654
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 141654Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0883
INFO RHMFISS/AFRICOM
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0151
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0253
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0264
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0165
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0112
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0440
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0424
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0420
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1105

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000080 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
PARIS FOR RKANEDA 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
AFRICOM FOR KOCH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: A STATE OF DECAY 
 
REF: (09 BANGUI 56, 60, 62) 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: From all corners of Central African society 
and the international community, there is a creeping sense that 
the Bozize government is increasingly feeble and may not last 
out the year.  Post stresses that it has no/no solid evidence of 
any credible external or internal threat and everything that we 
are hearing may simply be a noxious combination of despair on 
the part of friends of the regime and wishful thinking on the 
part of its enemies; this telegram must not/not be interpreted 
as a warning of any imminent event.  END SUMMARY 
 
-------------------------------- 
RUMORS ABOUND - Facts are scarce 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Recently, Post has begun to hear rumors of impending 
trouble for the government from a variety of people.  Though 
generally vague in nature and substance, the diversity of 
sources is disconcerting enough to merit reporting.  Sources 
have included [STRICTLY PROTECT ALL] the FOMUC second in 
command, a former vice minister and CAR Ambassador, several 
expatriate businesspeople (30 year veterans in the CAR), and 
Post's FSNI who says that `feelings of 2003 are in the air' 
[Note: 2003 was the year Bozize overthrew former President 
Ange-Felix Patasse].  A French Embassy development official told 
POLOFF that he is, `happy the French army is at the airport'. 
 
----------- 
THE PLAYERS 
----------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The last thirty years have been a steady downward slide 
and real development has been almost nonexistent.  A few 
examples: 
 
-- 80% of Central Africans live on less than one dollar a day, 
 
-- One in five children die before their fifth birthday, and, 
 
-- Life expectancy is 44 years of age. 
 
Not surprisingly, frustration with the government is very high 
and does sometimes flair into violence (09 BANGUI 60). Popular 
frustration at the lack of electricity, water, and medical 
attention, coupled with violent crime and the impunity of the 
Presidential Guard could still trigger a serious popular 
uprising. But, POLOFF has been told a number of times that with 
all the hardships facing Central Africans, rising up against the 
government is not worth the risk to life and limb (`they have 
guns, we have nothing!'). Still, while all of these are not new 
realities in the CAR, Post believes that the majority of people 
are willing to wait for elections.  For, despite the fact that 
Bozize's blatant corruption and misrule is obvious to all but 
the most diehard members of his clan, he has been able to 
portray himself as a force for stability. This is seen as an 
acceptable alternative to the anarchy of another coup, 
considering that the excesses of previous ones are still fresh 
in the minds of Central Africans. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The conventional wisdom in Bangui today is that the 
armed opposition (known locally as the `politico-military 
groups') is incapable of posing any real threat to the Bozize 
government.  The rebellions in the north, though devastating to 
life there, are nothing more than a nuisance to daily life in 
Bangui.  Central African politics have always been shaped by 
powerful men rather than societal forces and the CAR's five 
rebel groups are prime examples.  Lacking any clear political 
objectives, the groups are almost all personality driven and 
some appear to be the pawns of foreign powers.  While they give 
lip service to ending the abuses of the CARG, the groups command 
little real popular or regional support.  Foreign observers (and 
many Central Africans) note that the game is simple -  if you do 
not get the post you want in the government, you form a rebel 
group, grab some territory to control (and `tax'), and wait to 
be paid off as a condition of signing a peace accord (It is not 
unheard of to receive the payment and then take up arms a second 
time to get more). There is thus little indication that any 
rebel force, as presently constituted, has the immediate ability 
 
BANGUI 00000080  002 OF 003 
 
 
or desire to actually march on Bangui unless robustly supported 
by an external power.  Both Presidents Qadhafi and Deby have 
displayed their unhappiness with Bozize of late (09 BANGUI 56, 
62) through support of rebel groups and one embassy source 
recently went so far as to say, `They are tired of Bozize. He 
should not have lasted this long,' but Post has no/no 
information to confirm that they have any interest in seeing the 
Bozize government actually fall. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The military, though frustrated, is not likely to lead 
a power grab.  A well regarded colonel recently informed POLOFF 
that, `the leadership of this country lacks all political 
conviction and will'.  Clearly frustrated, the colonel 
complained to POLOFF about the lack of funding for the military, 
noting that the Armed Forces of Central Africa (FACA) have not 
recruited new enlisted men since 2006 or fired ammunition in 
training since 2005.  The FACA, according to President Bozize's 
son, the Minstre Delegue (Vice Minister) of Defense (PROTECT), 
is suffering from an AIDS rate of 30 per cent and is so ill 
equipped that there are more company sized detachments in the 
Army than working vehicles to transport them.  Overall, there 
appears to be an intentional decision by President Bozize who, 
though titled as Minister of Defense and Commander of the Army, 
fears the threat it poses to his regime and prefers it to be 
weak.  Bozize, like the Emperor Bokassa before him, depends 
heavily on the Presidential (formerly Imperial) Guard, or `GP'. 
The GP is made up of close members of Bozize's clan with a 
healthy leavening of Chadian mercenaries, also known as the 
former `Liberators'.  They have two very different functions: 
the first is to serve as physical protection of the President, 
and the second is to serve as a strike force to reinforce the 
FACA in the provinces.  (Many reports of the burning of villages 
or the killing of civilians specify that the actions were 
committed by the GP and not the FACA.)  The FACA, whose 
estimated combat strength is 1,300 [Note: according to the FACA 
Chief of Staff, the total strength of the army is 5,000, but 
only a fifth are capable of combat operations], is dispersed 
throughout the country in anti-rebel and anti-poaching 
operations and therefore appears logistically incapable of being 
the core of a push against the CARG. 
 
¶6. (SBU) There is always a possibility that the threat to the 
CARG might come from within.  The recent death of Bozize's 
mother, a matriarch of the clan, may mean that power dynamics 
are changing.  A possible threat to Bozize is his nephew and 
Minister of Mines, Sylvain Ndoutingai.  The money man of the 
regime, Ndoutingai is reportedly in control of the praetorian 
Presidential Guard.  A former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs 
[PROTECT SOURCE] told the Ambassador, `He would love to 
overthrow Bozize, he told me so'.  But Ndoutingai is still young 
and deeply unpopular among the population.  Although this does 
not preclude him from attempting to seize power, he would most 
likely bide his time until he has consolidated his position 
further or Bozize loses the confidence of their clan.  At this 
time, other candidates within the Bozize power structure that 
may make a push for power are hard to identify, but may very 
well exist.  It is interesting that RUMINT has it that Bozize's 
people have distributed weapons to youths in Bangui 
neighborhoods considered loyal to him as an insurance policy in 
case of a move against him. 
 
------------- 
STEPS BY POST 
------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Confrontations in Bangui have always been violent thus 
Post is taking several precautionary measures. 
 
-- On March 11, 2009, the Ambassador hosted a Town Hall Meeting 
at his residence where AmCits were informed of Post's emergency 
plans.  CA recently published a new Travel Warning dated April 
3, 2009, recommending against all but essential travel outside 
Bangui.  Post has ordered extra radios for its designated 
wardens and is in the process of setting up an SMS warden 
notification system. 
 
-- Post recently dug emergency wells at the CMR and has ordered 
sufficient food (MRE) for 100 people for two weeks. 
 
BANGUI 00000080  003 OF 003 
 
 
Additionally, Post stays in close contact with the French 
embassy concerning their planning and opinions on the current 
situation.  (If the French development official is `happy' that 
there are French troops at the airport, Post is `unhappy' that 
the French contingent is down to half that which was available 
the last time that AmEmbassy Bangui had to be evacuated. 
Specifically, the French no longer have enough troops to hold 
the airport, airport road, fuel depot, and French chancery 
compound - they can hold one but not all.  Thus all E and E 
plans are contingent on the arrival of additional troops, most 
probably from Gabon.) 
 
-- The RSO from Ndjamena is scheduled to visit Post shortly to 
review our EAP. 
 
---------- 
WHAT NEXT? 
---------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) COMMENT:  Post remains vigilant for any signs of 
further political deterioration.  The Ambassador continues to 
repeat the position of the USG that the CARG is the legitimately 
elected government of the CAR and any extralegal attempt to 
change it will be condemned by the USG and the international 
community.  The Central African Republic has never been the 
paradigm of stability and there has always been a level of 
political uncertainty. This being said, the uptick of anger with 
the government and the pessimism surrounding it is worth noting. 
 Thus, while Post does not/not believe that the government will 
fall any time soon, it is very possible that over the next year, 
popular patience may wear thin and provide the opportunity for 
another figure to emerge. END COMMENT 
COOK