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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 000822 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, PRM/ENA, NSC FOR PHU 
GENEVA FOR RMA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019 
TAGS: PREF PREL PGOV TH
SUBJECT: ENGAGING THE THAI ON THE LAO HMONG IN PETCHABUN 
AND NONG KHAI 
 
BANGKOK 00000822  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and Comment:  Having tolerated a decade-long 
Lao Hmong encampment at Wat Tham Krabok prior to resettlement 
to the U.S. in 2004-2005, which the Royal Thai Government 
thought would close the book on Indochina legacy issues, Thai 
authorities seem determined to handle more recent arrivals of 
Lao Hmong in a way which will discourage future movements of 
the Hmong from Laos, as well as support their improving 
bilateral relations with their Lao neighbors.  The Embassy 
advocates constantly with the Royal Thai Government (RTG) on 
behalf of the Lao Hmong who have been held at Huay Nam Khaw 
camp in Petchabun since July 2007, as well as the 158 Hmong 
who have been held at the Nong Khai Immigration Detention 
Center (IDC) since November 2006. 
 
¶2. (C) Our objectives with the Lao Hmong in Thailand are 
four-fold: 1.) Push the RTG to adopt a transparent screening 
process, meeting UNHCR standards, which would identify (and 
protect from return to Laos) those in the Petchabun group 
with a well-founded fear of persecution;  2.) Ensure that the 
return process currently underway is truly voluntary through 
the establishment of a third-party monitor in Petchabun; (3.) 
Permit resettlement processing for those cases in Nong Khai 
referred to us by UNHCR; and 4.) Improve conditions in the 
immediate term for the Lao Hmong in both locations. At the 
same time, we must keep the issue in perspective within the 
context of our overall relationship with Thailand, one of our 
closest allies in the world and one with whom we have deep, 
decades-long cooperation on a number of high priority issues, 
including a wide array of refugee-related efforts.  A 
measured statement of concern from Washington supporting our 
four objectives, and particularly voicing concern over recent 
incidents of coercion in the return process, might positively 
influence the fate of the 5,050 remaining Lao Hmong in 
Petchabun, and the smaller group in the Nong Khai jail.  End 
Summary and Comment. 
 
Advocating transparency, improving conditions 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The Embassy advocates constantly with the Thai 
government on behalf of the remaining 5,050 displaced Hmong 
in Huay Nam Khaw camp in Petchabun province, remnants of a 
population of over 7,000 who were moved by the RTG into the 
army-run facility in July 2007.  We have made similar efforts 
on behalf of the 158 Hmong who have been held at the Nong 
Khai Immigration Detention Center (IDC) since November 2006. 
The Petchabun Hmong, who have not been interviewed by UNHCR 
for possible refugee status, consist of two groups.  One was 
made up of Hmong who were moved by the Royal Thai Army from a 
nearby Thai Hmong community where they had settled beginning 
around 1992, when UNHCR and the RTG moved to phase out the 
major Lao refugees camps in preparation for the ending of the 
regional Comprehensive Plan of Action.  Others arrived 
directly from Laos during the period 2005-2007, likely drawn 
by the resettlement of 15,000 of their brethren from Wat Tham 
Krabok to the U.S. The Nong Khai group was part of a larger 
population of 400-plus people resident near Bangkok who were 
interviewed by UNHCR and given refugee status.  The RTG 
attempted to deport the Nong Khai group in November 2006, but 
stopped when the international community objected. They have 
languished in an immigration jail since. 
 
¶4. (C) For the Petchabun population, we continue to urge 
greater transparency in the RTG screening to determine those 
who might have a well-founded fear of persecution in Laos. 
To date, not a single one of the 2,500 returnees have been 
"screened in" by the opaque RTG process, which was completed 
in January 2008. The dearth strongly suggests that the 
process is  not rigorous - or even used in practice. We have 
suggested instead a similar method to that in place for the 
Burmese refugees in the established camps.  The RTG screens 
Burmese through interagency Provincial Admissions Boards, an 
asylum mechanism set up with UNHCR assistance, and which 
include a UNHCR observer/advisor. Greater transparency is 
also needed in the RTG's current return program for the 
 
BANGKOK 00000822  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
Petchabun Hmong so  that concerns may be satisfied about the 
voluntariness of movement back return to Laos.  An objective 
third-party monitor would provide that transparency. The 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) would be a 
logical choice, and we are quietly encouraging the RTG's 
consideration of a proposal for a major logistical role (and 
de facto monitoring role) for the organization. We have also 
requested for months a list of the camp population so that we 
may determine if there are any cases of potential interest to 
the U.S.  For the Nong Khai population, we continue to urge 
the RTG to move the population (which includes 90 children) 
out of the detention facility to a less severe environment 
(perhaps to Petchabun), pending RTG agreement to allow 
resettlement countries access for processing. 
 
¶5. (C) In both locations, we have used USG resources to try 
to improve the conditions for the Hmong and smooth some of 
the "rough edges."  At Petchabun, the USG funds the 
activities of Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF), which provides 
food for the detainees, and UNICEF, for basic education for 
the many children.  If the IOM return project is approved by 
the RTG, the USG will likely be the major supporter. At Nong 
Khai, the USG, working through IOM, funded the construction 
of a temporary shelter, which has allowed more space for the 
detained Hmong to move around in during the day, as well as 
an on-site nurse, and educational activities for the 
children. 
 
Thais determined to manage process differently this time 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶6. (C)  Until 2003, Thai authorities tolerated a Lao Hmong 
community of up to 25,000 people near Wat Tham Krabok, most 
of whom who had relocated there from the Lao refugee camps in 
the early 1990's.  Once that population was resettled to the 
U.S., new groups of Lao Hmong appeared in Thailand. Thai 
authorities made clear their intent to manage these arrivals 
differently, focusing on timely return to Laos, not third 
country resettlement.   In our frequent conversations with 
the Thai military regarding the Petchabun population, our 
interlocutors state  that "voluntary" returns to Laos will 
continue.   In our view, there is no way, given the absence 
of third parties, to judge the voluntariness of returns, 
especially since it is clear that there is at least some 
pressure and coercion to "volunteer." The RTG seems to have 
decided, no doubt reflecting fatigue from decades of hosting 
displaced populations from neighboring countries, that it can 
repatriate the Petchabun Hmong if it stays determined and 
resists international pressure.  The RTG frequently cites 
Government of Laos (GOL) views on the Petchabun group in 
explaining its policy, clearly indicating there is no 
interest in allowing the issue to become an irritant in the 
improving bilateral relationship between the two governments. 
 Echoing the GOL position, RTG now insists even those in 
Petchabun "screened in" by the internal RTG vetting process 
must first return to Laos, to be interviewed by GOL officials 
regarding the reasons for departure, before they can be 
resettled to third countries. (Comment:  we could not agree 
to a scenario, of course, which involves sending potential 
asylum seekers back to a country in which they face possible 
persecution in order to apply for U.S. resettlement.) 
 
¶7. (C) The RTG used to tell us that at the end of "voluntary" 
return process currently underway, they would give any U.S.- 
linked cases to us to resettle.  They haven't said that for 
some time (and, in any event, we consistently responded to 
those comments by noting that the USG doesn't accept refugee 
referrals from other countries and any such cases would have 
to be referred by UNHCR).  In a worrying  development, since 
January the RTG has arrested and coerced into return to Laos 
at least three people that MSF and advocacy groups identify 
as former CIA-trained anti-government fighters, a population 
which may indeed have a legitimate fear of persecution in 
Laos.  In the same period, at least  fifteen young men have 
been similarly arrested for minor infractions of camp rules 
and given the option of jail time or return.  MSF has 
reported that several of these arrestees (or their extended 
 
BANGKOK 00000822  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
family members, who are also sent to Laos) are leaders of the 
various factions within the Hmong population resistant to 
voluntary return.  About a dozen more names, including those 
of camp leaders and a former CIA fighter, have been by MSF 
workers on "arrest lists" in the Petchabun camp. This tactic 
of coercing anti-return community leaders and their families 
to return to Laos appears to be a deliberate attempt by the 
Thai army to weaken resistance to the move among the general 
population.  The tactic has been successful: after a series 
of irregular small returns, on March 26th, 452 were returned 
in the largest single movement since June 2008. 
 
U.S. Objectives in Context, Recommendation going forward 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶8. (C)  Our goal is to push hard on our four objectives for 
these Hmong populations while at the same time keeping the 
issue in perspective in the context of our overall 
relationship with Thailand, one of our closest allies in the 
world, and one with whom we have deep, decades-long 
cooperation on a number of high priority issues, including 
multiple refugee-related ones. 
 
¶9. (C) We  do feel, however, that a measured statement of 
concern from the Department spokesperson regarding the recent 
incidents of coercion in the return process may positively 
influence RTG policies regarding the 5,050 remaining Lao 
Hmong in Petchabun.  The RTG policy to return the Lao Hmong 
is a national-level one, promulgated by the National Security 
Council. However, actual implementation is in the hands of 
the Thai army, with little influnece over the process by 
civilian officials in the Ministry of Interior (responsible 
for Burmese refugees) or MFA. While the process would be 
easier to manage if the fate of Petchabun population were not 
in the hands of the military, we do not see any prospect for 
a transfer of control.  A sample text for the statement 
follows. 
 
¶10.  (U)  Proposed Statement on Lao Hmong in Thailand 
 
(START)  The United States Government appreciates Thailand's 
historical generosity in providing temporary refuge for 
vulnerable people fleeing danger and political persecution in 
Indo-China and, more recently, Burma. Although not a 
signatory to the 1951 Convention on Refugees, Thailand has 
generally refrained from the practice of refoulement, or 
returning vulnerable people to places where they might face 
persecution. 
 
We would like to encourage Thailand to continue this 
humanitarian tradition in its treatment of the 5,000 
remaining Lao Hmong held since July 2007 in the army-managed 
camp in Petchabun Province, and the 158 UNHCR-recognized 
Hmong confined since November 2006 in an immigration 
detention center in Nong Khai. 
 
In particular, the U.S. encourages the establishment of a 
transparent screening process, preferably with substantive 
involvement of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), for the Petchabun group. The screening 
process should identify and protect those who face a 
well-founded fear of persecution in Laos.  An important first 
step to increase transparency would be to provide a list of 
the detainees in Petchabun, and their status in the internal 
Royal Thai Government vetting we understand was completed in 
January 2008. 
 
Over the past year or so, over 2,000 Lao Hmong in the 
Petchabun camp have been returned to Laos. Although for the 
most part these returns do not appear to have been forced, we 
have encouraged the presence of a third-party monitor in the 
process to allay lingering concerns regarding voluntariness. 
We are particularly concerned about a new trend seen since 
January, a period which has seen at least 18 Lao Hmong in 
Petchabun arrested for minor infractions of camp rules and 
threatened with jail unless they agreed to return to Laos 
with their families. Many of the arrestees are leaders within 
 
BANGKOK 00000822  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
the Lao Hmong community.  There are indications that the 
arrests and coerced returns are intended to intimidate others 
within the Petchabun camp to return to Laos, to include some 
who may have a well-founded fear of persecution. This trend 
is especially concerning in light of the very limited 
information the international community has on Thailand's 
efforts to screen the large group. 
 
We also encourage a quick, humanitarian solution for the 158 
Lao Hmong being held in the immigration detention center at 
Nong Khai under crowded conditions.  UNHCR has determined 
that these people should not be forcibly returned to Laos. 
This group, which includes over 80 children, should be moved 
to more suitable surroundings pending consideration for 
resettlement by interested third countries. (END STATEMENT) 
 
¶11.  (U)  This cable has been coordinated with Embassy 
Vientiane. 
JOHN