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DE RUEHKB #0326/01 1120341
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 220341Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1082
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 3343
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000326 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC 
DEFENSE FOR OUSD(P) DMELLEBY 
EUCOM PLEASE PASS TO USAREUR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AM AJ RU IR GE NATO MARR
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: DEFMIN SIGNALS TEP INTEREST TO CG 
USAREUR 
 
REF: A. A) BAKU 229 
     ¶B. B) BAKU 266 
     ¶C. C) STATE 31102 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ANNE DERSE, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  On April 17, Commander, USAREUR General 
Carter Ham met with Azerbaijani Minister of Defense 
General-Colonel Safar Abiyev on the eve of the combined 
U.S.-Azerbaijan exercise REGIONAL RESPONSE 09 (RR09).  During 
the meeting Abiyev expressed interest in a Train and Equip 
Program (TEP) for an additional Azerbaijani unit for OEF 
(reftels).  He also provided insights to Gen. Ham on the pace 
of Russian military reforms as well as his country's evolving 
approach to NATO.  He repeated oft-expressed frustrations 
with U.S. support to Armenia and legal restrictions on 
military sales to Azerbaijan, which he said force his army to 
rely on former Soviet equipment and increase Azerbaijan's 
dependence on Russia and its allies for supplies. See action 
request in paragraph 9 below. End Summary. 
 
REGIONAL RESPONSE 09 
 
¶2. (C) Both Gen. Ham and the Minister were enthusiastic about 
the beginning of RR09, a combined exercise for U.S. forces 
from the Utah Army National Guard and Azerbaijani army. 
Abiyev also noted with satisfaction the number of foreign 
officers and attaches who will be on hand to observe (Note: 
the GOAJ  went to great lengths to secure foreign presence at 
the exercise to give it the appearance of a multilateral 
event consistent with the NATO IPAP, rather than a bilateral 
exercise - ref A.  End Note.)  He noted that Russia had even 
been invited to send officers to observe, but had declined, 
so "now they can't say anything." 
 
RUSSIA AND ITS MILITARY 
 
¶3. (C) Abiyev expressed his concerns to Gen. Ham about 
Russia, from whom "you can expect anything," especially after 
the war in Georgia.  He repeated the claims Azerbaijan has 
made since January that Russia had supplied some USD 800 
million in weaponry to Armenia, and continues to deliver 
weapons.  He warned that Russia, like Iran, wants the United 
States and its influence out of the South Caucasus.  Gen. Ham 
remarked that since the invasion of Georgia the U.S. 
mil-to-mil relationship with Russia was frozen, and asked for 
Abiyev's thoughts on the state of the Russian military. 
Abiyev replied that he had met with Russian DefMin Serdyukov 
in late January.  There is a great deal of disagreement 
within the Russian military about the future.  Anyone looking 
at the Russian military should also focus on the other power 
ministries' armed formations, such as MVD (internal troops) 
and MChS (Ministry of Emergency Situations troops). 
Serdyukov told him that the financial crisis had hit the 
Russian military hard, that MOD had effectively lost 30 
percent of his budget "and in a few months, who knows?" 
 
AFGHANISTAN AND NATO PERSPECTIVES 
 
¶4. (C) Abiyev told Gen. Ham and the Ambassador that 
Azerbaijan is willing to do a TEP to train additional forces 
for Afghanistan but said he wished to avoid the outcome of 
the last inconclusive discussions on the possibility of 
establishing a TEP, which resulted in "conditions" that 
Azerbaijan could not meet (Note:  This is an apparent 
reference to a mistaken GOAJ belief they might have to 
conduct combat operations in connection with a TEP. GOAJ has 
stated they wish to conduct only peacekeeping operations in 
Afghanistan, such as the fixed site security they provided at 
Haditha Dam in Iraq, not combat operations -- ref B.  End 
Note).  Ambassador told Abiyev that President Aliyev had told 
her that she should work the details with him and the Foreign 
Minister, and that the FonMin had requested the USG send a 
representative to Baku who can go over the details, a request 
we are currently pursuing with Washington. 
¶5. (C) Gen. Ham asked Abiyev his opinion on the state of 
Azerbaijan's relationship with NATO.  In beginning the 
meeting, Abiyev had described the relationship with NATO as 
one of two key relationships Azerbaijan needs to deepen, the 
other being its bilateral ties with the U.S. Abiyev said that 
 
BAKU 00000326  002 OF 002 
 
 
Azerbaijan is ready to deepen practical cooperation with the 
Alliance but is not interested in publicizing its NATO ties 
as Georgia did, because of the regional reactions that would 
follow.  Azerbaijan's preferred approach is to "talk less, 
and do more." The Minister said that after Georgia and 
Ukraine join NATO, which Azerbaijan favors, Azerbaijan would 
be next in line. 
 
BILATERAL COOPERATION AND FMS 
 
¶6. (C) Abiyev also emphasized the theme of "talking less and 
doing more" as he addressed the bilateral military 
relationship.  His complaint was reducible to frustration 
partly with offers of support over the years that he regards 
as unfulfilled, but mostly with the legal restrictions in the 
United States that prevent Azerbaijan from acquiring the 
sophisticated weaponry it needs.  The United States' lack of 
ability or will to sell equipment to Azerbaijan increases the 
latter's reliance on Russia and other ex-Soviet suppliers of 
equipment, "and this is dangerous."  For all the talk of 
strategic partnership, the Azerbaijani military is operating 
old Soviet equipment and has "not one bullet" from its 
American partner.  Abiyev noted crossly that a wish list of 
equipment that he had provided at the USG's request following 
former Vice-President Cheney's September 2008 visit to Baku 
had gone essentially unanswered. 
¶7. (C) Ambassador, DATT and ODC Chief explained to Abiyev 
that first of all, the wish list the GOAJ provided (which 
included several major systems including rocket artillery 
that could not reasonably be considered defensive in nature), 
would be difficult to fulfill for any FMS client, legal 
strictures such as 907 notwithstanding.  Ambassador added 
that ODC had briefed MOD and the defense staff of the 
Presidential Apparat on the FMS process.  Ambassador and 
Abiyev also agreed that the issue of FMS should be taken up 
at upcoming bilateral defense consultations in Washington. 
¶8. (C) General Ham told Abiyev that he recognized that there 
are areas of less than full agreement in the 
military-to-military relationship, but they should not be 
allowed to overshadow the areas of common interest and the 
good work done to forward them.  "I can disagree with my 
brother, but he's still my brother," he summarized, adding 
that Azerbaijan's decision to host the RR09 exercise was a 
"brave" one and a great step toward deepening cooperation. 
¶9. (C)  Comment and Action Request: The Minister was clearly 
pleased that internal GOAJ hurdles had been overcome so RR 09 
could go forward as planned.  His agreement in principle that 
an Azerbaijani battalion could be trained specifically "for 
Afghanistan," which he said reflected his discussion with 
President Aliyev after ref B demarche, is important, since in 
the past, the Minister has resisted sending more troops 
abroad.  The next step is for a USG expert to come to Baku to 
discuss the basics of a TEP (as proposed ref C) with the 
Defense and Foreign Ministers, as President Aliyev requested. 
Early June bilateral defense consultations in Washington 
would be a good opportunity to follow up at lower levels. 
Please advise when an expert will be available. 
¶10. (U) General Ham did not have the opportunity to clear 
this cable. 
 
DERSE