VZCZCXRO9820
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0921/01 0950712
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 050712Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2532
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0607
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA 0065
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0121

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000921 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PMIL MOPS TU IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ 201: TURKEY'S INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE IN IRAQ 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 395 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 505 
 
Classified By: Acting Counselor for Political-Military Affairs Philip K 
osnett for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: The relationship between the Governments 
of Iraq and Turkey has improved substantially in the last one 
and a half years, though it remains fraught with 
long-standing differences.  Ongoing areas of concern include 
KGK/PKK terrorists in northern Iraq; Kurdish demands to 
control Kirkuk (and, potentially, its hydrocarbon resources); 
Turkish and Iraqi Arab angst over  Kurdish nationalism and 
Turkish apprehension about the future of Iraq's Turkmen 
minority.  The Trilateral Security Dialogue shows some 
promise as a mechanism for intelligence sharing to combat the 
KGK/PKK.  U.S. and Turkish interests in Iraq often but not 
always coincide.  The GoT was a positive, behind-the-scenes 
player in the negotiations that led to the Security Agreement 
between the U.S. and Iraq.  On the other hand, it played an 
unhelpful role in recent Iraqi provincial elections through 
its clandestine financial support of the anti-Kurd al Hadba 
Gathering, and its support seemed to harden Turkmen positions 
during negotiations over the Provincial Elections Law. 
Recent visits of PM Erdogan and President Gul to Iraq and PM 
Maliki and President Talabani to Turkey are witness to the 
warming relationship and their shared interest in limiting 
Erbil's strength.  Likewise oil and natural gas deals signed 
between the KRG and the GoT (to the consternation of the GoI 
central government) and Turkey's burgeoning economic presence 
in a host of other non-oil/gas related areas all emphasize 
the potential rewards of improving relations.  End summary. 
 
---------------------- 
TURKEY AND THE KGK/PKK 
---------------------- 
 
¶2. (S/NF) Since the mid-1990's Turkey has engaged in cross 
border operations (CBOs) into Iraq to battle the Kurdish 
separatist organization PKK (or KGK, as it now calls itself), 
sending as many as 35,000 troops in 1995 and 50,000 in 1997. 
In its most recent major ground CBO in February 2008, Turkey 
sent several thousand soldiers across the border. The 
operation lasted one week and is reported to have resulted in 
the deaths of 240 KGK/PKK fighters.  Between 1400 and 2000 
Turkish troops have been stationed in bases in northern Iraq 
since the 1990s. Turkish artillery and air units regularly 
strike KGK/PKK camps and personnel movements in thinly 
inhabited areas of northern Iraq. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) For years after the fall of Saddam, Kurdish 
authorities refused to take any real steps against the 
KGK/PKK for several reasons: in the short term, invoking the 
wrath of the KGK/PKK could threaten peace and the increasing 
prosperity in northern Iraq and deter foreign investment in 
the region.  Over the long term, a Kurd-on-Kurd confrontation 
would undermine the desire of the Iraqi Kurds for greater 
unity among all Kurdish groups.  (Fighting between Iraqi 
Kurds and the PKK in the nineties resulted in at least 
hundreds of deaths.)  For some time, the threat (and reality) 
of Turkish cross-border  operations (CBOs) coupled with the 
jeopardy posed to economic gains prompted leaders to make 
mildly critical statements against the KGK/PKK and to even 
occasionally take limited steps to interfere with KGK/PKK 
freedom of movement in northern Iraq.  In 2006, Foreign 
Minister Zebari promised his Turkish counterpart that Iraq 
would get tough with the KGK/PKK, but most Iraqi Kurds 
continue to believe that a political solution was the only 
Qcontinue to believe that a political solution was the only 
path to resolving the longstanding problem - most likely in 
the form of a Turkish amnesty for KGK/PKK fighters. 
 
¶4. (C) Following the Coalition occupation of Iraq, the USG 
decision not to attempt to force the PKK out of the 
mountainous Iraq-Turkey border region, along with repeated 
attacks by PKK into Turkey, gave impetus to Turkish 
conspiracy theorists that the U.S. supported the PKK - or, at 
best, passively permitted it to attack Turkey from Iraq.  In 
October 2007 and again in October 2008 KGK/PKK fighters based 
in northern Iraq attacked Turkish border garrisons in Turkey, 
resulting in the deaths of 17 Turkish soldiers in 2007 and 15 
in 2008.  These incidents inflamed the passions of the 
Turkish public.  Fearing a full-on Turkish invasion, the GOI 
and the KRG agreed to stepped-up efforts against the KGK/PKK. 
 
 
---------------------------- 
TRIALTERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE 
---------------------------- 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00000921  002 OF 004 
 
 
¶5. (S//NF) In an effort to reinvigorate GOT-GOI coordination 
against the PKK - and in response to PM Maliki's angst over a 
jump in direct GOT-KRG ties - in November 2008 the GOT, GOI, 
and USG agreed to reinstitute a trilateral security process 
aimed at combating the PKK, kicking off with a 
ministerial-level meeting in Baghdad.  A Working Group of the 
subcommittee meets on a weekly or bi-weekly basis.  The 
second Ministerial-level meeting is scheduled to take place 
on April 11.  In the context of that dialogue, Iraq 
(including the KRG) has taken some tentative steps toward 
cooperating with the GoT in the provision of actionable 
intelligence against the KGK/PKK.  Discussions are now 
focused on establishing a tripartite intelligence-sharing 
office in Erbil, under the aegis of the trilateral security 
committee. 
 
¶6. (S/NF) In 2007, the U.S. began substantial intelligence 
sharing with Turkish authorities and began providing ISR 
support to their artillery attacks and sorties into northern 
Iraq and against the PKK, resulting in a marked improvement 
in relations. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
AN INDEPENDENT KURDISTAN AND THE STATUS OF KIRKUK 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶7. (C) One of Turkey's greatest fears is an independent 
Kurdistan on its south-eastern border.  In a March 2007 
interview, KRG President Masoud Barzani told Turkish NTV that 
Turkey and the world should just get used to an independent 
Kurdistan that, Barzani suggested, encompasses some 40 
million Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria.  Since that 
time, however, Barzani has also made comments stressing the 
KRG's commitment to remaining a part of Iraq.  We assess that 
most senior KRG leaders understand that a unilateral 
declaration of Kurdish independence would almost certainly 
result in an  immediate intervention of troops from Ankara, 
Tehran, and Baghdad as well as an economic strangulation of 
the region.  In March 2009, President Talabani, while in 
Istanbul, dismissed the idea of an independent Kurdistan as 
simply "a dream in poems." 
 
¶8. (C) The threat of the KRG controlling Kirkuk has long 
prompted Turkish leaders to make dramatic statements about 
the status of the City.  They fear that if Kirkuk and its 
vast oil reserves come under the control of Kurdish leaders, 
the likelihood of the KRG severing its ties to the Republic 
of Iraq increases exponentially.  In the years after the fall 
of Saddam, Turkey repeatedly said that Kurdish control of 
Kirkuk is a red-line that would likely result in Turkish 
troops crossing into Iraq.  In recent years, the GoT pushed 
for a delay in the Article 140 process on the status of 
Kirkuk and in 2006, the Turkish Defense Minister warned the 
GoI against "imposing an 
unrealistic future on Kirkuk." 
 
----------- 
THE TURKMEN 
----------- 
 
¶9. (C) The Iraqi Turkmen are a distinct Turkic ethnic group 
living mostly in the cities of Kirkuk, Erbil, Tal Afar, and 
Mosul.  They are one of largest of Iraq's small ethnic 
groups; however, estimates of their numbers vary 
dramatically, from 222,000 to two million.  Turkmen are 
roughly divided between Sunni and Shia.  Some Iraqis dismiss 
Turkish concern for the safety and status of the Turkmen as 
merely cover for GOT involvement in Iraqi politics aimed 
fundamentally at preventing the emergence of an independent 
Kurdistan.   Yet concern for the safety of the Turkmen is not 
without merit.  They have  undergone decades of assimilation 
campaigns in Iraq. 
Qcampaigns in Iraq. 
 
¶10. (S/NF) In the 1970's, all Turkish language schools were 
closed and in the 80's Saddam declared their language 
officially banned.  In the post-Saddam Iraq, the government 
of Turkey has helped fund such political organizations as the 
Iraqi Turkmen Front, which opposes the proposed annexation of 
Kirkuk to the Kurdistan Regional Government and Iraqi 
federalism, to the extent that it provides either Kurdish or 
Arab control over Turkmen-inhabited areas.  Of more concern, 
in the January 2009 provincial elections, the Turks 
clandestinely supported the anti-Kurdish al Hadba Gathering 
political party in Ninewa, and its support seemed to harden 
Turkmen positions during negotiations over the Provincial 
Elections Law.   Both Baghdad and Erbil recognize the GoT's 
exercise of influence in Iraq.  In an April 2007, interview 
with Al-Arabiyah television, Barzani warned Turkey that 
"there are 30 million (sic) Kurds in Turkey.  If they 
 
BAGHDAD 00000921  003 OF 004 
 
 
interfere in Kirkuk over just a couple thousand (sic) 
Turkomans, we will interfere in Diyarbakir and other cities 
in Turkey." 
 
----------------------------- 
ADVOCATE ON SHARED U.S. GOALS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11. (S) Turkey is second only to the United States in the 
influence it has in the KRG and, perhaps, third behind the 
U.S. and Iran in its overall influence in the rest of the 
country.  Turkey has been an occasional advocate on some of 
our shared interests - especially in the final weeks 
preceding our signing a Security Agreement with the GoI in 
November 2008.  During that time, Turkish Special Envoy to 
Iraq Murat Ozcelik engaged in a form of shuttle diplomacy 
between Sunni leader Vice President Tarik al Hashimi, PM 
al-Maliki and Ambassadors Crocker and Satterfield, mostly as 
an advocate for the marginalized Sunnis.  Turkey,s role and 
influence in Iraq is growing and will continue to expand as 
our troop levels decrease. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
HIGH-LEVEL VISITS BETWEEN TURKEY AND IRAQ 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) The exchange of high-level visitors between the two 
countries is also evidence of improving relations.  Prime 
Minister Maliki and President Talabani have each visited 
Turkey twice in the last 18 months.  PM Erdogan visited Iraq 
in July 2008 when he and Maliki signed a strategic 
partnership agreement to cooperate in the fields of regional 
security, fighting KGK/PKK terrorism, controlling the 
borders, and ensuring joint interests in terms of oil and 
water resources, border crossings, trade exchanges, cultural 
activities, and the role of Turkish companies in 
reconstructing Iraq.  To this end, the two countries formed a 
High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council calling for annual 
prime ministerial meetings and quarterly ministerial 
meetings. To date, however, there has not been significant 
follow-up on the Council and no ministerial meetings other 
than the Trilateral Security Ministerial have taken place. 
President Gul visited Iraq March 23-24 during which the GoT 
and GoI signed an Economic Partnership Agreement aimed at 
boosting bilateral trade between the two countries. 
 
¶13. (U) Water issues continue to be a point of friction 
between Iraq and Turkey.  Since 1986, when Turkey completed 
tunnels to divert an estimated one-fifth of the water from 
the Euphrates River into the Ataturk Dam Reservoir, Syria and 
Iraq have complained about Turkish interference with their 
right to water.  In March 2008, the three countries 
established a water commission to develop projects for the 
fair and effective use of trans-border water resources.  Iraq 
participated in the Fifth World Water Forum in Istanbul March 
16 to 22 with a delegation headed by President Talabani. 
Vatan Turkish newspaper reported that Presidents Gul and 
Talabani met in Istanbul during the  forum and Gul said the 
two countries should take advantage of ways to cooperate with 
each other.  He told Talabani "we will share happiness if we 
act rationally; we will share sorrow if we don't act 
accordingly." 
 
¶14. (C) Turkish Deputy Chief of Military Staff (DCHOD) Hasan 
Igsiz visited Iraq on March 4, 2009 and met with Iraqi MoD 
Abdul Qadir, Chief of Staff Babakir Zebari, and CG Odierno, 
following a visit by the Iraqi DCHOD General Nasir Abadi in 
¶2008.  The main issues discussed were further cooperation 
between the Turkish military and the Iraqi Army and 
cooperation against the PKK. 
 
------------------------------- 
Q------------------------------- 
A GROWING ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP 
------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) The last months have been marked by warming relations 
and growing economic opportunities between the GoT and the 
KRG.  Turkish Prime Minister Reep Tayyip Erdogan discussed 
petroleum contracting during his July 2008 visit to Iraq. 
However, as Ambassador Crocker warned Ozcelik (ref b), 
cutting deals directly with the KRG will result in Turkish 
companies being black-listed by the Iraqi central government. 
 
 
¶16. (C) Turkey remains a natural and active trading partner 
with Iraq.  Currently Kartet, a Turkish power company, 
supplies 100% of Iraq's Dahuk province's electricity in 
exchange for heavy fuel oil from the Bayji Oil Refinery. 
Turkey has shown strong interest in Iraq's hydrocarbon 
 
BAGHDAD 00000921  004 OF 004 
 
 
resources and Turkish oil companies are currently active in 
the Kurdistan areas of Iraq.  Iraq exports approximately 20 
percent of its crude oil through the Kirkuk to Ceyhan 
pipeline.  In addition to hydrocarbon resources, Turkish 
contractors have built housing units in Erbil and are 
building a luxury hotel in Erbil as well.  Trade along the 
Iraqi-Turkish border is vital to south eastern Turkey and 
northern Iraq.  Turkish companies are some of the most active 
international companies in Iraq. 
BUTENIS