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OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0887/01 0911052
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011052Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2488
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000887 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2019 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ 201:  CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Robert Ford for reason 1.4 
(d). 
 
(U)  This cable is part of our continuing series of messages 
intended to provide background for policy-makers on Iraq. 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  For more than three years an issue 
hovering in the back of the political debates in Iraq is that 
of amending the Iraqi constitution that had been ratified in 
late 2005.  Contentious issues such as hydrocarbons revenue 
sharing, federalism, and the status of Kirkuk and other 
disputed territories are unresolved.  In 2005 to reconcile 
the immediate need for a constitution and volatile 
ethnic-sectarian political animosities, all the political 
factions agreed to form a special parliamentary committee 
that to draft amendments and start the process for a special 
constitutional amendment referendum that was to occur in 
¶2006.  That special committee has met many times but has not 
yet found a consensus on amendments and of late its work is 
moribund.  Another attempt by the main political parties to 
find compromises on proposed amendments outside the 
parliamentary framework in late 2008 failed.  The way forward 
is unclear: the Sunni Arabs sometimes still call for the 
amendment process to go forward, while the Kurdish parties 
and the Prime Minister and other Shia parties are not 
enthusiastic.  Should the constitutional review process be 
revived to finally tackle the outstanding existential issues, 
this could lead to longer-term stability.  It would do so 
like at the cost of worsened political divisions in the short 
term, especially between Arabs and Kurds over issues like the 
authorities of the central government, the budget allocations 
to the Kurds and Kirkuk.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Impasses over contentious issues such as 
hydrocarbons revenue sharing, federalism, and the status of 
Kirkuk and other disputed territories threatened to derail 
the constitutional drafting process in 2005.  As a pragmatic 
way of reconciling the immediate need for a constitution and 
volatile ethnic-sectarian political animosities, the drafters 
mandated (via Article 142) establishment of a special 
parliamentary committee that would, in two year's time, 
resolve outstanding constitutional issues.  With the most 
controversial issues deferred to a later date, the drafters 
were able to complete the Constitution, which was approved by 
national referendum in October 2005.  The outstanding issues 
are still unresolved. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The 29-member Constitutional Review Committee 
(CRC) was established on November 15, 2006.  Article 142 
stipulated that the CRC complete its work by March 2007, a 
deadline it missed by well over a year.  Parliament has 
extended the CRC's mandate several times.  In the course of 
its deliberations, the CRC published an interim report in May 
2007 and a final report in July 2008.  Both offered proposals 
for a number of uncontroversial amendments, e.g., stipulation 
that Baghdad as the nation's capital can't be annexed to a 
region, clarification on determining priority of regional vs. 
federal law in case of a dispute, and a regulatory framework 
for the to-be-established legislative upper chamber.  The 
most contentious issues -- revenue sharing, federalism, the 
status of Kirkuk, and disputed internal boundaries (DIBs) -- 
were left unresolved. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  If the CRC were able to reach agreement on 
proposed constitutional amendments, these proposals would 
then have to be approved by an absolute majority of the 
parliament (138 members) and accepted by a majority of 
residents in a majority of Iraq's 18 governorates.  There has 
been no movement on the agreed-upon amendment proposals, in 
Qbeen no movement on the agreed-upon amendment proposals, in 
part because Parliament has informally decided that all 
proposed amendments (i.e., including the controversial ones 
that were especially difficult) must be considered as a 
package.  Parliament has extended the CRC's mandate through 
the next legislative term (April 14-June/July 2009), but the 
committee has not met for several months.  According to our 
parliamentary contacts, there are no plans for it to meet. 
The constitutional review process formally continues, but in 
fact appears to be complete without resolution. 
 
¶5.  (C)  The CRC does not appear to have broad GOI support, 
and many believe it is incapable of addressing the difficult 
core constitutional reform issues.  These unresolved issues 
will likely be decided through Executive-driven political 
bargains rather than parliamentary-driven consensual 
procedures. The "Five Committees" initiative undertaken by 
the Prime Minister after the publication of the CRC's final 
report (reftel) reflects a gradual shifting of responsibility 
for constitutional reform from the parliament to the 
Executive.  As a result of heightened Arab-Kurd tensions in 
Khanaqin in August 2008, KRG President Masoud Barzani and 
Prime Minister Maliki initiated the "Five Party Committee 
Talks" (ISCI, Dawa, IIP, KDP and PUK) in an attempt to come 
to an Executive consensus on DIBs/Kirkuk, oil, 
 
BAGHDAD 00000887  002 OF 002 
 
 
federalism/power-sharing, revenue/budget and security. 
 
--------------- 
The Core Issues 
--------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  REVENUE DISTRIBUTION:  The Constitution (Article 
111) stipulates that oil and gas are owned by the people of 
Iraq in all the regions and governorates.  It is silent, 
however, on how the revenues flowing from these natural 
resources are to be distributed, leaving ample room for 
divisive debate.  While all agree that such revenues should 
be shared and in ways that comport with population sizes, 
census numbers are outdated, disputed and highly sensitive. 
The designation of the central government's share off the top 
for national expenditures, before allocations are made to the 
governorates, is another sensitive issue. 
 
¶7.  (C)  KIRKUK:  The status of Kirkuk (Article 140) and 
other internally disputed boundaries (DIBs) is intimately 
related to the question of revenue distribution, federalism, 
disputes over voting rights and the census, and the structure 
of national and regional security forces.  Without having an 
accepted mechanism for equitable distribution of oil and gas 
revenues, Kirkuk, which contains one of Iraq's most 
significant oil fields, and other internal boundary areas, 
become natural flash-points.  Iraq's natural resource 
endowments, when combined with diverging historical claims, a 
history of ethnic cleansing of Kurds and to a lesser extent 
Turkomen and forcible settlement of Arabs under the Saddam 
regime, and a sectarian-divided political and geographical 
landscape, make a political agreement necessary prior to a 
resolution of disputed boundaries through constitutional 
amendments. 
 
¶8.  (C)  FEDERALISM:  Finally, issues of federalism are 
similarly linked to the issue of revenue distribution and 
DIBs, notably including Kirkuk.  The Iraqi leaders still must 
define more clearly the distribution of power within the 
executive branch (between the Prime Minister, President, and 
Council of Ministers), as well as the distribution of power 
between the central, regional and provincial governments. 
What shape federalism will ultimately take in Iraq, whether 
an asymmetrical federal state composed of regions and 
self-sufficient provinces, or a more strongly confederal 
state, is a matter of heated debate. As stated above, this 
debate hinges on questions of revenue distribution, the 
status of unresolved boundary disputes, and a variety of 
other factors: a historical legacy and regional model 
associated with centralized, one-man rule; fears of a 
Shia-governed super-region in the South; and the likely 
existence of yet-to-be discovered oil and gas fields. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  The CRC is in a state of suspended animation. 
Should the constitutional review process be revived to 
finally tackle the outstanding existential issues, this could 
lead to longer-term stability, but likely exacerbate 
political divisions in the short term.  Tensions surrounding 
the recent provincial elections, the publicly aired dispute 
between the Kurdish and Iraqi leadership, the heated rhetoric 
between the Prime Minister's Office and the parliament 
throughout the budgetary approval process, and the continual 
tensions along Iraq's disputed boundaries all suggest the 
need for, and the difficulties associated with, 
constitutional review, a process that is far from complete. 
 
BUTENIS