VZCZCXRO9803
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0066/01 0841629
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 251629Z MAR 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6288
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1728
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5-DDPMA-IN/CAC/DDPMA-E// PRIORITY
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XONP// PRIORITY
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0090
RUCNOSC/ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY IN EUROPE COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000066 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM, OES 
NSA FOR STANAR-JOHNSON, T FOR KATSAPIS, OSD EUR/NATO, 
OSD/NII FOR HALL, DHS FOR DENNING, NSC FOR HATHAWAY, NSC 
FOR DONAHUE, NSC FOR CUMMINGS, WINPAC FOR FRITZMEIER, ISN 
FOR KARTCHNER, 
NSC FOR HAYES 
JCS FOR J5/COL NORWOOD 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2018 
TAGS: EINT FR KCFE KHLS OSCE PARM PREL RS KCIP
SUBJECT: U.S.- RF CYBERSECURITY BILATERAL ON MARGINS OF 
OSCE CYBER WORKSHOP 
 
REF: A. USOSCE 0064 
     ¶B. USOSCE 0065 
 
Classified By: Charge d' Affairs a.i. Hugh Neighbour, 
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  In a bilateral meeting on March 16 before 
the start of the OSCE Workshop on a Comprehensive OSCE 
Approach to Enhancing Cybersecurity (March 17-18, Vienna), 
U.S. and Russian Federation dels met to discuss their 
differing approaches to cybersecurity and to identify common 
ground if possible.  There was little change, if any, between 
U.S. and Russian long-held views on cybersecurity.  The U.S. 
stressed  layered defensive strategies as the most effective 
way to deal with challenges to cybersecurity.  Russia alleged 
that an arms control race was unfolding in cyberspace and 
that constraints on state capabilities were necessary, but 
failed to address concrete U.S. concerns raised regarding 
this approach.  For participants, see para 11.  END SUMMARY. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
U.S. Concerns with Russian Approach 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  U.S. head of del (Markoff) reviewed her guidance, 
explaining that cyber security was high on the Obama 
administration's agenda and that a 60-day review of national 
cyber security policy was currently ongoing.  Markoff gave a 
detailed account of U.S. concerns regarding the RF approach, 
as it was outlined in Sherstyuk's published remarks. She 
underscored the key theme that the U.S. did not think that 
the threats of cyber attack could be usefully addressed by 
traditional  arms control-type constraints.  She noted that 
constraining state capabilities were meaningless when 
governments have no particular monopoly on attack tools and 
attacks could be carried out by proxies.  She noted that 
layered "dynamic defenses" are the best way to handle any 
attack, whatever the source. 
 
¶3. (C) Russia (Krutskikh) gave a long monologue about how he 
thought the U.S. and Russia could work together in the area 
of cyber security.  He said that Russia was willing to 
demonstrate flexibility and "listen to the American 
experience."  Krutskikh also said that the U.S. and Russia 
had not engaged on cyber security since "the impasse began in 
the UN."  Krutskikh said Russia did not expect that the U.S. 
and Russia would "act like two gladiators to amuse the 
world."  He said that "both Russia and the U.S. had a new 
president," and hoped this would portend a change in 
long-standing U.S. policies.  He noted that Russia was not 
pushing the idea of a new international agreement to "create 
a headache for the U.S." and that it was not really a 
"disarmament approach," only that it "sounded" like one, 
asserting that this was a "stereotype."  Krutskikh lastly 
stressed the need for agreement on "terms and definitions." 
Russia and the U.S. needed a "common vocabulary" in order to 
take the next step.  He expressed a sense of hope when he 
heard the U.S. was conducting a 60-day cyber policy review, 
and believed the U.S. and Russia might eventually be able to 
issue a joint statement on working together. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Russia Alleges Arms Race in Cyberspace 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (C)  Russia (Sherstyuk) believed that "an arms race in 
cyberspace" was at hand.  Sherstyuk said that is was the U.S. 
who first recognized that cyber capabilities could be more 
destructive that WMD.  He stressed that Russia considered 
 
USOSCE 00000066  002 OF 003 
 
 
cybersecurity a "political-military" issue.  He also agreed 
that the U.S. and Russia had made little progress in moving 
forward on this issue bilaterally. 
 
¶5.  (C)  The U.S. (Markoff) replied that the U.S. had put 
forth a list of serious, concrete concerns regarding the 
Russian Federation's arms control proposal, but that Russia 
as of yet still had not addressed them.  Markoff welcomed a 
serious response to U.S. concerns.  She stressed that until 
Russia was ready to engage constructively, it would be 
difficult for conversations to go any further on other 
matters related to cyber security.  Markoff also noted that 
it was disappointing that a member of the G8 had not signed 
on to the Council of Europe Convention on Cyber Crime.  She 
explained that the U.S. thought it was odd that Russia 
appeared to be calling for another treaty instrument when 
Russia had every opportunity to amend for four years a 
convention that Russia calls "so flawed."  Markoff sought to 
end on a high note with a hope to find common ground during 
the OSCE workshop over the next two days. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Russia Objects to Cybercrime Convention 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (C)  Russia (Sherstyuk) explained that it specifically 
objected to paragraph 32.b of the Council of Europe 
Convention on Cyber Crime.  Russia (Miroshnikov) said that IT 
crime was wider than cybercrime.  Miroshnikov stated that in 
2008 there were approximately 5500 criminal cases involving 
IT and roughly 75% of those cases were categorized as 
"cybercrime."  He cited specific examples of Russian 
collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Medvedev-Obama Meeting in July? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7.  (C)  In a separate aside on day one of the workshop 
(March 17) Russian Federation head of del (Krutskikh) told 
U.S. head of del (Markoff) that Russian President Medvedev 
will raise their long-standing "information security" 
concerns and proposals with President Obama during their 
"planned July meeting."  Krutskikh indicated that Russia is 
flexible in their approaches to constraining the "information 
arms race" and that options could include "codes of conduct." 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Russians Want Meeting in Washington Before GGE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (C)  In preparation for the UNGA Group of Governmental 
Experts (GGE) on this issue scheduled to have its first 
meeting in Geneva in November 2009, Krutskikh said that the 
Russian Federation proposes a follow-up to conversations had 
on the margins of this workshop in the format of "large 
delegations, with all the generals" in Washington in 
September 2009. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Russia Has Message for OES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9.  (C)  On other issues, Krutskikh wanted to let his 
counterparts in State/OES know that the Russian Federation 
has issued blanket guidance that no technical exchanges on 
any topic, i.e., space, information security, etc. can be 
concluded without first completing the Technology Safeguard 
Agreement (TSA) that had been under negotiation. 
 
USOSCE 00000066  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶10.  (U)  This cable has been cleared by INR/CCT Markoff; 
OSD/NII; and, OSD/P. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Participants included: 
 
U.S. side: 
 
-- Hugh Neighbour, Chief Arms Control Delegate, U.S. Mission 
to the OSCE 
-- State/INR Michele Markoff, Acting Director, Office of 
Cyber Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research and Head 
of Delegation 
-- State/INR Peter Juliak, analyst 
-- State/EB John Rodgers, Director APEC and OECD Affairs, 
Office of International Communications and Information Policy 
-- DHS John Denning, Director of External Affairs, Office of 
Cybersecurity and Communications 
-- DOD Robert Doheny, Program Executive, Defense 
Cybersecurity Implementation and Principal Director, Crisis 
Management and Mission Assurance 
-- DOD Anthony Bargar, Senior Strategy and Policy Advisor, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Information and 
Identity Assurance 
-- DOD Forrest Hare, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, 
Senior Information Operations Officer 
-- State/VCI Toniann Wright, Political Military Affairs 
Officer and notetaker 
 
 
Russian side: 
 
-- Mikhail Ulyanov, Head of Delegation for Military Security 
and Arms Control 
-- Vladislav Sherstyuk, Assistant Secretary of the Security 
Council of the Russian Federation 
-- Andrey Krutskikh, Deputy Director of the Department on New 
Challenges and Threats, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
-- Boris Miroshnikov, Head of the Bureau of Speical Technical 
Activities, Ministry of Interior; Dmitry Votrin, Senior 
Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
-- Sergey Boyko, Expert, Ministry of Defense 
-- Sergey Komov, Minitary Academy of the General Staff of the 
Armed Forces. 
NEIGHBOUR