VZCZCXRO5033
RR RUEHDBU RUEHKW RUEHMA RUEHSK
DE RUEHUNV #0135/01 0901210
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 311210Z MAR 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9231
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1562
RUCNNAR/VIENNA NARCOTICS COLLECTIVE
RUCNCRI/VIENNA CRIME COLLECTIVE
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0038

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 UNVIE VIENNA 000135 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
 
TAGS: PGOV SNAR KCRM UNODC CU GR
SUBJECT: Cuba, Perhaps Germany Contest for UNODC FinGov 
Co-Chairmanship 
 
REF: (A) UNVIE VIENNA 127 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  At the March 11-20 Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 
Cuba announced the candidacy of its Ambassador Norma M. Goicochea 
Estenoz for one of the two co-chairs of the UNODC Finance and 
Governance Working Group (FinGov WG).  The G-77 will not oppose her, 
nor allow for a competing candidate from within their ranks. 
However, speculation still surrounds who will come forward as a 
candidate for the other co-chair position.  Germany, Cuba's main 
adversary during negotiations leading up to the CND, is giving some 
indications that it may be willing to serve as the other co-chair. 
While Goicochea would have a formidable counterweight in the German 
Ambassador, Mission is also concerned that such an arrangement might 
simply reinforce and aggravate the unfortunate "bloc" mentality that 
some G-77 members have tried to foster.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------- 
Cuba Makes its Move, 
and G-77 Goes Along 
-------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) As previously reported (Ref A) Cuban Ambassador to the UN 
in Vienna Norma M. Goicochea Estenoz is seeking to be one of the two 
co-chairs of the FinGov WG.  Few treated this as a good sign, with 
several G-77 delegations privately lamenting the signal this was 
sending to other delegations (especially donor states).  Throughout 
negotiations during the past year on ways to improve the financial 
and administrative situation of the UNODC the Cuban mission has 
consistently taken an aggressive, inflexible and generally combative 
approach to the proceedings.  While the G-77 Group has a common 
position on such issues, and never undercut Cuba on the floor or in 
informal consultations, there are many within the group who seek to 
push the G-77 agenda forward with more tact and a less divisive 
mentality.  Nevertheless, the G-77 Group has made it clear that they 
would not propose another candidate to compete against Goicochea. 
(Note:  The two Co-Chairs are to be jointly nominated by the 
Extended Bureaus of the CND and CCPCJ.  The nominations will then be 
endorsed during the April CCPCJ, and a pro forma CND intercessional 
which would most likely occur during or immediately after the CCPCJ. 
  Thus, the time for a delegation to express support or opposition 
to any candidate would be during the meetings of the Extended 
Bureaus.  End note.) 
 
-------------------------------- 
Goicochea's Reputation in Vienna 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In Vienna, Goicochea has developed the reputation of a 
savvy UN operator.  She is the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) and as such gets generally high marks from member states for 
her ability to navigate competing interests (such as Pakistan-Iran 
nuclear issues).  In the IAEA context, she has generally been an 
unhelpful defender of Iran's positions.  However, in the UNODC 
context, Cuba is a paltry financial contributor, and a vocal and 
impolitic critic of its operations.  She has criticized UN Vienna's 
budgeting process for being unsynchronized with that in New York and 
has complained about enhanced security procedures at the Vienna UN 
compound that she viewed as inconveniencing Ambassadors.  Many are 
concerned that the combative attitude she and her delegation 
demonstrated during previous FinGov negotiations and on the budget 
aspects of the UNODC resolutions, whether in the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs or in the Crime Commission, would translate into a 
co-chair less interested in pragmatic solutions and consensus 
building, and more in conducting a political show. 
 
------------------------------- 
Will Germany Balance Cuba? 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Since Cuba's announcement of Goicochea's candidacy, WEOG 
and donor countries have been attempting to find a candidate that 
will be a substantive and personal counterweight.  Many ambassadors 
have explicitly refused any consideration, citing higher priorities 
like the IAEA, or their upcoming departure from Vienna.  As such, 
mission has yet to identify anyone who expressed clear interest in 
the job.  (Note:  DCM approached his Japanese counterpart, 
Ambassador Yasuyoshi Komizo, who has been deeply engaged in finance 
and governance issues in Vienna, and has UN secretarial experience. 
However, Komizo declined citing other priorities for the coming 
year. End note.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) Germany has been one of the leading proponents of finance 
and governance reform of the UNODC.  German Ambassador Rudiger 
Ludeking has taken a personal interest in the issue, and was deeply 
involved in the final stages of the working group's negotiations. 
On several occasions he engaged in heated and blunt arguments with 
G-77 counselors on the very topic of the terms of the chairmanship 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000135  002 OF 002 
 
 
itself.  Germany has made it clear they have a "bad taste in their 
mouth" after the negotiations, and are not optimistic about the 
future of the WG.  On the other hand, Germany states it is deeply 
committed to making the WG an effective organ, and as such will not 
stand by and watch it "be hijacked by Cuba or the G-77." 
 
¶6.  (SBU) On March 26 our German contact approached Missionoff about 
the possibility of the German Ambassador as co-chair.  Missionoff 
asked if this was a tactical move to thwart the Cuban, or a genuine 
candidacy.  He replied that while his Ambassador is not necessarily 
"keen" to take on the extra work, he is committed to the WG. 
However, he also stated that perhaps it was the only way to 
successfully oppose the Cuban candidate.  "We would put forward my 
Ambassador's name", he explained, "and at the same time oppose the 
Cuban candidacy through the extended bureaus.  He expressed his 
belief that the German candidacy would thus draw opposition from the 
G-77, leading to a rejection of both the German and Cuban 
candidates, and nomination of two less extreme and controversial 
chairs.  Our German interlocutor stressed that no decision had been 
made by his Ambassador, but promised to keep Mission informed. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) A Cuban co-chair, especially in the person of Goicochea, 
who served in New York before coming to Vienna, would reinforce the 
north-south divide in the UNODC.  Her delegation has vowed to reject 
our budget "mantra" in all resolutions, such as "within existing 
resources."  Further, Cuba has shown no restraint in its desire to 
micromanage the UNODC's secretariat.  A Cuban co-chair of the WG 
could turn its agenda in a direction opposed to US interests. 
Possible German co-chairmanship, as a counterweight to Cuba, would 
fan the flames.  The best solution is to have alternative co-chairs 
from less controversial delegations.  Mission will continue to 
explore alternatives, and encourage Germany and all member states to 
approach the FinGov WG as a chance for dialogue and a venue of 
pragmatic consensus building.  However, with many ambassadors 
departing Vienna over the coming year, and others reluctant or 
uninterested in the WG, the pickings may be slim. 
 
Schulte