VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTU #0179/01 0861701
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271701Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6121
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 000179 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2018 
TAGS: PREL PMIL MASS TS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PRESSES DEFMIN FOR GREATER INFORMATION 
SHARING; MORJANE CAUTIONS AGAINST OPPOSITION CONTACTS 
 
REF: A. TUNIS 173 
     ¶B. IIR 6 897 0049 08 (DTG 040813Z JUN 08) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) Meeting with Defense Minister Morjane in preparation 
for the mid-May Joint Military Commission (JMC), the 
Ambassador underscored the importance of a robust information 
exchange and closer cooperation.  In addition to helping 
avoid the problems that led to the recent cancellation of the 
Atlas Drop exercise, better information will allow us to 
offer training and exercises that are tailored to Tunisian 
needs.  Moreover, we need to better understand Tunisia's 
security needs to develop and defend appropriate security 
assistance requests.  Morjane pleaded with the Ambassador not 
to read any negative signals into the GOT's handling of Atlas 
Drop.  With more time, he explained, the answers the US side 
was looking for would have come from the palace, allowing the 
exercise to go forward.  Morjane informed the Ambassador that 
the Presidency and the Foreign Ministry had intended to split 
the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) the USG is providing 
under Peacekeeping Assistance funds equally between the 
Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Interior; he 
did not seem surprised by the Ambassador's response that this 
assistance would be limited to the military.  Shifting gears, 
Morjane, noted the continuing trend of anti-American 
sentiment in the Arab world, as expressed in its popular 
media outlets.  Presumably speaking on instruction, he warned 
the Ambassador that contacts with the opposition can be 
construed as support for them, which ultimately hurts the US 
cause.  He cautioned, "You should not underestimate the 
message that you're giving to those who have always been on 
your side."  The Ambassador made clear that he has contact 
with all legal opposition parties but that this should not be 
interpreted as US support for them.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Laying the Groundwork for a Productive JMC 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) In his hour-long meeting with Defense Minister Morjane 
on March 25, the Ambassador sought to lay the groundwork for 
a productive Joint Military Commission (JMC) in May by noting 
the status of USG deliberations on the FY09 FMF level, 
reviewing preliminary USG planning for the JMC, and 
underscoring the need for better information exchange and 
closer cooperation. Morjane, who was accompanied by 
Captain-Major Mohamed Khammassi, who is responsible for 
bilateral and multilateral relations at the Ministry of 
National Defense (MND), and Colonel-Major Mohamed Ghorbel, 
MND Director of Cooperation and International Relations, was 
receptive.  He welcomed the news of DASD Whelan's planned 
in-country travel on the margins of the JMC, and said the GOT 
would ensure that she has an informative and enjoyable visit. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Training and Exercises:  Better Info Exchange 
To Avoid Another Atlas Drop Imbroglio 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Previewing possible JMC agenda items, the Ambassador 
noted that the US side would want to have an in-depth 
discussion about training and exercises.  Referring to the 
recent problems in the Atlas Drop exercise, which was 
canceled as a result of conditions imposed by the GOT that 
were not acceptable to the US military, the Ambassador 
explained that the USG will seek clear GOT guidance on what 
it wants out of such exercises.  The United States would be 
prepared to tailor exercises according to Tunisian needs and 
desires, he said.  For example, given the Ministry of 
National Defense's focus on civilian works, perhaps we could 
offer a program with the Army Corps of Engineers. 
 
¶4. (C) Morjane pleaded with the Ambassador not to read 
anything negative into Tunisia's late response to US requests 
with respect to Atlas Drop.  "It was a question of timing for 
us," he said, "nothing more."  He acknowledged missing the US 
side's suspense date for a response, and he conceded the 
USG's right to impose a deadline for its internal 
decisionmaking.  He noted, however, that such deadlines do 
not work in Tunisia.  "You know how our system is," he said, 
apparently referring to the GOT's renowned capacity for 
bureaucratic inertia.  He made clear that he had sent the US 
questions "up," presumably to the palace, for approval; by 
the time the approval came back "down," however, it was too 
late.  The Ambassador noted that it was unfortunate that so 
 
much time and so many resources had gone into an exercise 
that never materialized.  (Note:  In a one-on-one pull aside 
after the meeting, the Ambassador spoke even more frankly to 
Morjane about US frustration over the cancellation of Atlas 
Drop.  Morjane asked, again, that the Ambassador understand 
the MND's "special status", clearly referring to the need to 
refer even minor questions to Carthage for decision.  End 
Note.) 
 
---------------------- 
Better Info Also Helps 
Security Cooperation 
---------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The Ambassador offered that DASD Whelan would be 
prepared to give a briefing to GOT counterparts on the 
various pots of money the USG can tap to provide security 
assistance to Tunisia.  He explained these moneys are often 
apportioned in a competitive process in which multiple 
Embassies put forward proposals to meet the security needs of 
their host country governments.  The better our understanding 
of the Tunisian military's needs, he continued, the better 
our ability to defend our assistance requests. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
UAVs Provided Under PKO: 
No-go on Palace/MFA Intent to Give Half to MOI 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶6. (C) Morjane broached the subject of the US $4.1 million 
worth of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) about which 
then-Secretary Rice informed President Ben Ali during her 
September, 2008, visit to Tunisia.  (Note: This assistance is 
being provided under Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account 
funds.  End Note.)  Morjane said that following Rice's 
announcement, the Presidency and the Foreign Ministry, 
without consulting the MND, had decided to split the PKO 
assistance equally between the Ministry of National Defense 
and the Ministry of Interior.  The Ambassador explained that 
the assistance being provided under the PKO account was for 
the military only and could not be shared with the MOI.  He 
said that if the MOI had particular needs, we would be happy 
to consider them.  Morjane did not seem surprised that the 
assistance would be limited to the military; indeed, he 
seemed pleased.  He asked that the Ambassador formally convey 
this message to the Foreign Ministry.  (Note:  The Ambassador 
did so in a March 26 meeting with MFA Chief of Staff Mahmoud 
Khemiri and Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister Mehrez 
Ben Rhouma.  He also undertook to convey this position via 
diplomatic note.  See Ref A.) 
 
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Opposition Contacts Not Welcome 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Midway through the meeting, Morjane became 
philosophical.  He said he had been following with interest 
and admiration the new direction President Obama is taking 
vis-a-vis the Middle East.  He characterized the President's 
decisions as "more realistic" and "respectful."  He 
contrasted this with the resurgence of anti-American 
sentiment and other "backwards thinking" has been taking 
place in popular Arabic media outlets over the past couple of 
years.  He pointed out that such popular sentiment poses 
difficulties for the GOT, which is known for its tolerance, 
openness, and modernity.  Illustrating the point, he referred 
to the June 2008 NATO ship visit to Bizerte, which was met 
with a small protest against the Iraq war.  (Note: The 
protest was organized by the independent opposition 
Progressive Democratic Party, and was covered in al-Mowqif, 
the party's newspaper.  See Ref B.)  "You may think that a 
NATO ship visit is no big deal," he said, clearly implying 
that the opposite was true. 
 
¶8. (C) Morjane went on to chastise the Ambassador for 
"supporting" these very people.  "You should think about who 
your friends are," he continued, "and you should not 
underestimate the message that you're giving to those who 
have always been on your side."  We should be helping one 
another, he concluded.  The Ambassador said he was well aware 
of the sensitivities involved with cooperating with the 
United States, and he said that we are prepared to do our 
part to help mitigate difficulties.  He also clarified that 
he has contact with representatives of all legal political 
parties in Tunisia.  He emphasized that such contacts do not 
constitute "support."  Moreover, he said, he always gives 
Tunisia credit for its accomplishments, whether talking to 
GOT or ruling party officials, or representatives of the 
opposition.  Even so, Morjane insisted, opposition figures 
take advantage of these contacts, which they seek to construe 
as US support. 
 
 
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Comment 
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¶9. (C) Although Morjane tried to couch his comments about 
dealing with the opposition as off-the-cuff, we believe he 
was speaking on instruction.  And though he did not mention 
the opposition Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) by name, he 
was clearly referring to it, and by extension, its founder 
and would-be presidential candidate Nejib Chebbi, against 
whom Ben Ali harbors an intense animus.  This is not the 
first time that the Ambassador has received such a message. 
Other highly placed interlocutors, such as appointed Senator 
Roger Bismuth, have sought to steer the Ambassador away from 
contacts with Chebbi, also likely at the behest of senior RCD 
officials.  It is probable that the Palace chose Morjane to 
convey the message this time, because Morjane is seen as 
someone who can communicate effectively with US counterparts. 
 Of course, the Embassy will continue to have contacts with 
the PDP and other legal opposition parties, in addition to 
the ruling party, but we will seek a lower profile in the 
coming weeks in response to this apparent message. 
 
¶10. (C) On a separate note, we were struck by Morjane's 
admission that the permissions the US side had been seeking 
for the Atlas Drop exercise had to go "up" to the Palace for 
approval.  This should have been a purely technical, military 
call.  It is no surprise things move so slowly in this 
country.  End Comment. 
 
Please visit Embassy Tunis' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/tunis/index.c fm 
Godec