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PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0572/01 0750356
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 160356Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1504
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 8675
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 2973
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 5313
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 6765
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 3517
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000572 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/J, SCA/INS, ISN/MNSA, ISN/RA, AND ISN/NESS 
DOE FOR OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2019 
TAGS: PARM ENRG TRGY NRR PUNE IN JA
SUBJECT: EXTENT OF JAPANESE PEACEFUL USE AGREEMENTS MAY 
LIMIT U.S. NUCLEAR EXPORTS 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James Zumwalt, reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Japanese export control regulations and 
policies regarding nuclear reactor components could 
significantly affect the ability of U.S. industry to export 
nuclear power plants to certain countries, according to 
recent discussions with officials from Japan's Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA).  Since U.S. firms depend on a number of 
Japanese-origin components when constructing nuclear 
reactors, a Japanese requirement that any country receiving 
exported Japanese nuclear power plant components have 
concluded a Peaceful Use Agreement with Japan could limit 
U.S. firms' ability to export to third country markets that 
do not meet the GOJ's requirements.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  In meetings with officials from METI and MOFA during 
the recent visit of DOE DAS for Corporate and Global 
Partnership Development Ed McGinnis and in Post's subsequent 
discussions with METI officials, Japanese interlocutors 
explained the importance of Japan's Peaceful Use Agreements 
(sometimes called 123 Agreements in the U.S.) in the export 
of components for nuclear reactors.  During a meeting with 
METI Director for Nuclear Energy Policy Planning Taizo 
Takahashi, attendees discussed U.S. firms' ability to sell 
nuclear reactors to third countries, given those firms' need 
to include components made in Japan in their reactors. 
Takahashi noted nuclear components, such as reactor vessels, 
are subject to export control restrictions and their export 
from Japan to a third country would require an export license 
from METI.  A contact in METI's Security Export Control 
Policy Division later confirmed this situation is because 
nuclear rectors and components are subject to the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) list control. 
 
¶3.  (C) However, before METI will review nuclear reactor 
components for export, recipient countries have to have 
concluded a Peaceful Use Agreement with Japan.  Given that 
reactors sold by U.S. firms cannot be completed without 
Japanese components, the ability of U.S. firms' to export to 
certain countries may be limited by the extent of Japan's 
Peaceful Use Agreements. 
 
¶4.  (C) Takahashi's staff told Econoff and Energy Attache in 
subsequent conversation that not only would export of 
Japanese components require a Peaceful Use Agreement between 
Japan and the importing country, but that the GOJ also 
requires importing countries to have signed an Additional 
Protocol with the IAEA.  According to METI officials, MOFA 
will not begin negotiations towards signing a Peaceful Use 
Agreement until the partner country has ratified the 
Additional Protocol. 
 
----------------- 
The case of India 
----------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Japan's requirement for a Peaceful Use Agreement has 
important implications for U.S.-India civil nuclear 
cooperation.  Effectively, while the NSG exemption that the 
USG negotiated for India opens the door for foreign firms to 
do business there, the Japanese restrictions could have an 
impact on U.S. firms. 
 
¶6.  (C) In the course of discussions between DAS McGinnis and 
MOFA Director General for Disarmament, Non-proliferation and 
Science Ambassador Toshio Sano, Sano addressed the issue of 
India.  Sano, while not specifically mentioning Peaceful Use 
Agreements, noted "something else" would be required before 
Japan would consider the export of components to India. 
Alluding to the CTBT, he said the existing assurances given 
by India would not be sufficient.  Takahashi confirmed Japan 
would need additional assurances.  He added the NSG exemption 
makes no mention of what would happen if India resumes 
testing, and noted this would be a problem that would halt 
any Japanese cooperation. 
 
--------------- 
The way forward 
--------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) In discussion with Takahashi related to India, he 
 
TOKYO 00000572  002 OF 002 
 
 
noted METI is positive on the subject of cooperation, and 
implied the holdup on progress in cooperation with India is 
MOFA.  (Comment: Such mutual fingerpointing between METI and 
MOFA on sensitive international economic issues is not 
unusual. End comment.)  Takahashi stated METI is trying to 
change public opinion on the subject of India nuclear 
cooperation, and is working to make it clear any relationship 
is aimed at strengthening non-proliferation goals, rather 
than supporting business.  He noted the USG could assist by 
communicating to MOFA the importance of engaging with India 
to support non-proliferation. 
 
¶8.  (C) Because of the implications for the U.S. nuclear 
industry, Post will continue working with METI and MOFA to 
further clarify the details of the laws and regulations 
relating to the export of nuclear plants and components. 
 
¶9.  (U)  This cable was cleared with DAS McGinnis subsequent 
to his return to the U.S. 
ZUMWALT