VZCZCXRO3962
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #0638/01 0891428
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301428Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1287
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0196
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4817
RUEHUNV/UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 4020

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000638 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2019 
TAGS: PREL MOPS KBTS RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: IEDS KILL ONE, WOUND SEVERAL; TENSIONS 
RISE 
 
REF: A. 09 TBILISI 096 
     ¶B. 08 TBILISI 2176 
     ¶C. 09 TBILISI 484 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  On March 29, two roadside IEDs killed one 
and wounded six Georgian police officers outside the village 
of Dvani, in undisputed Georgian territory just outside the 
South Ossetian administrative boundary.  This was the first 
fatal incident along the South Ossetian and Abkhaz 
administrative lines since the January 16 sniper attack in 
Knolevi (ref A) and follows several weeks without serious 
incidents.  Even during this period, however, tension has 
remained high along the boundary, with local villagers 
subjected to the sound of regular shooting and explosions, 
especially at night.  Even before March 29, military 
movements north of both boundaries were raising concerns. 
The planned April 9 protests have also caused worry, as 
locals fear police forces will be drawn away from the 
boundaries to cover the protests, and malicious forces will 
move into the vacuum.  The Georgian government is concerned 
that this might be the first in a series of new provocations 
and has sought the international community's assistance in 
pushing for the establishment of the incident response 
mechanism agreed to in Geneva.  End summary. 
 
IED INCIDENT 
 
¶2. (SBU) The following account is based primarily on the 
OSCE's findings.  On March 29 at about 0845 on a secondary 
road near Dvani (southwest of Tskhinvali, in undisputed 
Georgian territory outside South Ossetia) leading from the 
main road to a Georgian checkpoint, a MON-50 (Claymore-type) 
anti-personnel mine exploded as a Georgian Internal Affairs 
Ministry pickup drove past.  Five people were wounded, 
including one who later died in the hospital.  Several 
minutes later, a second vehicle arrived safely to provide 
assistance.  Fifteen to twenty minutes after the explosion, a 
Hyundai SUV carrying the local chief of police arrived, at 
which time a second IED detonated, wounding the chief of 
police and one other passenger.  The Internal Affairs 
Ministry determined the first device was triggered by a 
tripwire; thus any car going past could have triggered it. 
The Internal Affairs Ministry and the OSCE determined the 
second device was triggered by remote control; the Internal 
Affairs Ministry, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) and the 
OSCE all determined it was targeted at those who responded to 
the initial blast.  At a briefing for the diplomatic 
community, Shota Utiashvili, Internal Affairs Ministry 
spokesman also announced that two other unexploded devices 
were found at the site: a booby-trapped grenade and a jumping 
mine, which could have served either as the initial attack, 
on either a car or a pedestrian, or the secondary attack on 
the respondents. 
 
¶3. (C) Dvani is across the administrative boundary from 
Muguti, where South Ossetian de facto authorities alleged 
Georgian forces mounted mortar and gun attacks on March 24 
and 25-26.  Georgian police officers and local villagers in 
the Dvani area confirmed to the OSCE that they heard firing 
and explosions on the Ossetian side at the times of the 
alleged attacks, but could not confirm any attacks being 
launched from the Georgian side, and the OSCE could not 
access the Ossetian side to assess the situation.  On March 
27, however, a South Ossetian contact told the OSCE that the 
Q27, however, a South Ossetian contact told the OSCE that the 
allegations were "propaganda" on the part of the de facto 
authorities.  One OSCE monitor therefore downplayed the 
likelihood that the March 29 incident was a response to the 
alleged Georgian attacks, although he could not rule it out. 
The March 29 incident occurred very close to the location of 
a November 10, 2008 IED incident, which killed two Georgian 
police officers and wounded three (ref B). 
 
GENERAL TENSION 
 
¶4. (SBU) Although this incident marks the first fatality 
along the South Ossetian and Abkhaz boundaries since January 
16, the situation has remained tense in both areas. 
Villagers report hearing firing, especially at night, on a 
regular basis, and sometimes explosions as well.  In many 
cases, the sounds are never fully explained.  In other cases 
monitors have been able to identify the source of the sound 
and determine it did not have an overtly malicious intent -- 
but the impact on the villagers is the same.  On March 26, 
for example, OSCE monitors in Dvani received reports from 
 
TBILISI 00000638  002 OF 002 
 
 
local police of "intermittent, intense assault rifle fire and 
machine gun fire" from Muguti -- this was the same day the 
South Ossetians alleged a Georgian attack.  Other police 
downplayed the sounds, however, calling them "not more 
intense than usual."  Also on March 26, OSCE monitors 
received reports in Odzisi of "several explosions" from 
across the administrative boundary, which Russian and 
Ossetian forces subsequently explained as explosive ordnance 
disposal operations.  On March 28, UNOMIG monitors received 
reports near the boundary of "30 shots from an automatic 
gun," an "explosion of a grenade," and "four-five signal 
rockets," and 20-30 more shots from an automatic gun. 
 
¶5. (C) One OSCE monitor told EmbOff on March 27 that he and 
his colleagues had perceived a general increase in tension 
over the past few weeks.  In addition to the regular sound of 
shooting, he mentioned more frequent military movements on 
the South Ossetian side of the boundary as a key factor. 
Russian forces have explained many of these to international 
monitors, in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as associated 
with force rotations, but they nevertheless have apparently 
served to reinforce to local villagers the continuing 
presence of troops and military hardware.  The OSCE monitor 
also said the planned April 9 protests were worrying people 
outside South Ossetia; they are concerned that Interior 
Ministry forces will be drawn away from the area to provide 
security during the protests, and malicious forces will then 
seek to exploit the relative lack of law enforcement to cross 
the boundary and cause trouble. 
 
INCIDENT PREVENTION MECHANISM NEEDED 
 
¶6. (SBU) In a briefing for the diplomatic corps on March 30, 
Deputy Foreign Minister Nalbandov and Internal Affairs 
Ministry spokesman Utiashvili provided details on the March 
29 incident, placing the blame squarely on Russia as the 
occupying power and noted an MFA official statement about the 
incident that included language to this effect.  They also 
expressed the concern that, after several weeks of no serious 
incidents, this one may be the first in a series of 
deliberate provocations designed to increase tension and 
obstruct any diplomatic efforts to improve the security 
situation.  They expressed their appreciation for public 
statements condemning the attack made by the EUMM and the 
OSCE.  They also emphasized the useful role an incident 
prevention mechanism could play in this kind of situation -- 
indeed in preventing such a situation -- and noted that, of 
the participants in the Geneva process, the EU, OSCE, UN, 
United States and Georgia have all expressed a commitment to 
and taken steps to implement the mechanism, while Russia has 
not (ref C). 
TEFFT