VZCZCXRO2361
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #0625/01 0861452
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271452Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1276
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0193
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4814
RUEHUNV/UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 4017

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000625 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2019 
TAGS: PREL MOPS UNSC UNOMIG KBTS RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: TIME TO MOBILIZE ON NEW UN MISSION 
 
REF: A. USUN 266 
     ¶B. TBILISI 484 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and comment.  UN Special Representative Johan 
Verbeke offered the U.S., French and German ambassadors 
additional details on his ideas for a new UN mission in 
Georgia, as well as a readout of recent trips to Washington, 
London, Moscow and Prague.  He urged western countries to 
weigh in as soon as possible, because he is preparing his 
report now, which will inform the Secretary General's May 15 
report to the UNSC (required by UNSCR 1866).  He expressed 
concern about Russian willingness to accept key elements of 
any reasonable plan, and urged western countries to prepare 
to apply pressure to Russia directly.  The Ambassador noted 
that Verbeke's ideas provided a good security regime, but 
insufficient human rights protection -- and a human rights 
flare-up was just as likely as a security incident to ignite 
a broader crisis.  We agree, however, that now is the time to 
coordinate with our friends and take the initiative to shape 
a productive proposal.  End summary and comment. 
 
VERBEKE'S THOUGHTS 
 
¶2. (C) On March 25, Verbeke briefed from a revised non-paper 
from the Peacekeeping Office in New York, a copy of which we 
received March 27 (see paragraph 4).  He expanded on ideas 
already summarized in an earlier non-paper distributed in New 
York (ref A).  Verbeke urged the western countries to offer 
feedback as soon as possible, because he is in the process of 
preparing a report to the Secretary General (SYG) that will 
form the basis of the SYG's own report to the UNSC, due May 
¶15.  Verbeke expected to finalize his own report by mid-April. 
 
¶3. (C) The additional details on his ideas include the 
following. 
 
-- Regarding the two zones mentioned in the earlier 
non-paper, the first would be between two and a half and six 
kilometers wide on either side of the Abkhaz administrative 
boundary line (ABL).  Although he had first supported the 
narrower version, his military experts informed him that a 
wider boundary would be required because certain weapons of 
concern have considerably more than a five-kilometer range 
and could cover the 2.5 kilometers on both sides of the ABL. 
Although Verbeke would therefore support a wider zone, he 
understands that the width would have to be negotiated -- and 
two and a half kilometers would be the minimum to be 
effective.  (The revised non-paper does not include a range, 
but settles on 6 kilometers.)  The second zone, a "confidence 
zone," would be between six and eight kilometers wide, which 
would reach Zugdidi and Gali, but not the military bases in 
Senaki or Ochamchire.  In addition, there would be a 
restricted naval zone extending 12 kilometers into the Black 
Sea and 8-12 kilometers on either side of the ABL. 
 
-- The inner zone would limit the sides to no armed forces, 
no heavy equipment such as tanks, artillery or anti-aircraft 
guns, and only a specified number of armored personnel 
carriers (APCs), and the latter would not be allowed to carry 
any weapons.  The outer zone would also exclude tanks, 
artillery and anti-aircraft guns, but allow guns up to 80 mm 
in caliber.  There would also be restrictions on air 
movements over the zones, including for reconnaissance (see 
paragraph 6). 
 
-- Rules of notification would have to be established for all 
Q-- Rules of notification would have to be established for all 
parties.  This would presumably also apply to Senaki and 
Ochamchire. 
 
-- Some kind of accommodation would have to be reached for 
what Verbeke called "border guards" and law enforcement 
officials, who would provide security along the ABL and 
inside the zones and ensure secure and free movement of 
people across the ABL.  He proposed that such officials 
should not be allowed to carry heavy weapons. 
 
-- UN monitors would continue to monitor the inner zone 
actively, as they do now.  There would also need to be a 
provision for monitoring the Kodori Gorge, although perhaps 
not as frequently as along the ABL. 
 
-- One question Verbeke posed is whether the ABL should 
extend as far as the Russian border.  He was inclined to 
oppose such a move, although he was still pondering the 
issue.  He said doing so might make it easier to link the 
 
TBILISI 00000625  002 OF 003 
 
 
Kodori Gorge to the rest of the UN mandate's territory, but 
it could also solidify a sense of the ABL as an established 
border and give Russia the sense that it can completely seal 
Georgia off from its Abkhaz territory. 
 
-- Although some have raised the idea, Verbeke did not think 
that the EU and UN monitoring missions would merge, but would 
retain independent roles. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Th afternoon of March 27, Verbeke provided post 
with a copy of the revised non-paper (entitled "NON-PAPER: 
elements for a security regime and UN role," provided 
electronically to EUR/CARC).  It provides additional details 
on the above proposals, including concrete limits on troop 
levels, but reflects the same basic approach.  Verbeke 
informed the Ambassador that copies of the revised non-paper 
were provided to USUN, and the SYG himself was currently in 
Moscow and would provide Russia with a copy. 
 
RUSSIA'S RESPONSE 
 
¶5. (C) Verbeke said that he had discussed some of these ideas 
in Moscow with Andrei Kelin of the MFA and MOD personnel and 
received the following responses.  In general terms, the 
Russians said they accepted the principle of symmetry, but 
Verbeke noted their specific positions seemed at odds with 
that statement.  Verbeke did not raise the issue of 
monitoring the human rights situation or of ensuring freedom 
of movement across the ABL. 
 
-- Russia accepts the idea of zones on the south side of the 
ABL, and in fact proposes extending the outer zone to 24 
kilometers, which would include Senaki base, but does not see 
the need for any zones at all on the north side of the ABL. 
 
-- Russia does not see the need for monitors on the north 
side of the boundary. 
 
AMBASSADOR'S CONCERNS 
 
¶6. (C) The Ambassador raised a few points and questions in 
response.  First, he said it is at least as important to 
monitor the human rights situation as the security situation; 
a new crisis could erupt just as easily as the result of 
sudden or increased human rights violations as from a 
security incident.  The Georgian government has also 
expressed the importance of this element of a mission, and UN 
executive police could fulfill this function.  Verbeke 
answered that neither the Russians nor the Abkhaz will accept 
the idea; the Abkhaz are willing to accept a continuation of 
the civilian UN police mission with 20 staff, but not 
executive police.  It will therefore be necessary to push the 
Russians on this point.  German Ambassador Patricia Flor was 
not sure whether Berlin would be willing to make this effort. 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador asked whether the proposed restrictions 
on aircraft would apply to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). 
He also noted that there had been proposals in the past for 
the UN itself to run reconnaissance UAVs in an effort to 
improve its monitoring of the situation, and that they could 
perhaps extend the UN's insight into areas even beyond the 
security zones, such as the Senaki and Ochamchire bases.  At 
the time of the meeting Verbeke had not considered the issue, 
but the revised non-paper includes a prohibition on all 
reconnaissance flights, including by UAVs, for both zones, 
although it does not address the possibility of UN UAVs. 
 
GENEVA IN APRIL? 
 
¶8. (C) Regarding the Geneva process, Verbeke said Kelin 
suggested Russia might be willing to accept the next round of 
meetings toward the end of April.  Georgian interlocutors, 
Qmeetings toward the end of April.  Georgian interlocutors, 
however, told Verbeke they did not believe Russia would 
cooperate with the incident prevention mechanism agreed to in 
February (ref B).  In broader terms, Verbeke thought the UN 
in Geneva will eventually take over the process itself from 
the EU. 
 
COMMENT: CARPE DIEM 
 
¶9. (C) On the whole we agree with Verbeke's strong proposals 
on the security side.  We are somewhat concerned that he has 
not put sufficient emphasis on the protection of human 
rights.  Under his "guiding principles," for example, he 
includes as a key objective "addressing the needs of the 
population," but does not offer much specificity on what 
those needs are, nor how substantial and urgent they are. 
 
TBILISI 00000625  003 OF 003 
 
 
Under the "UN Role," he mentions the continuation of a UN 
Human Rights office and the "facilitation of provision of 
humanitarian assistance," but these steps strike us as 
insufficient.  The Georgians, who plan to share their own 
thoughts on a mandate within the next few days, have likewise 
expressed concern that Verbeke's non-paper does not even 
mention IDPs. 
 
¶10. (C) On the tactical side, however, Verbeke is absolutely 
correct that the sooner we (meaning the west) clarify our 
position and push Russia on the crucial elements of a new 
mandate, the harder it will be for Russia to take the 
initiative and get the conversation going down the wrong 
path.  We also agree with Verbeke that countries will need to 
weigh in bilaterally with Russia on those crucial elements -- 
not least because Verbeke himself may not be our strongest 
advocate in Moscow.  Finally, providing input to Verbeke in 
the next few weeks will go a long way toward ensuring that 
the SYG's report to the SYG -- which will presumably play an 
important role in the final negotiations in New York -- is as 
strong and as specific as possible. 
TEFFT