R 171210Z MAR 09
FM AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2726
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 
AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 
AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 
AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

UNCLAS ST PETERSBURG 000028 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: RS PGOV
SUBJECT: UNITED RUSSIA WINS THROUGHOUT NORTHWEST RUSSIA 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Numerous elections were held in Northwest 
Russia on March 1st at the oblast, city, and local levels.  With 
turnout low, United Russia won everywhere resoundingly with only 
minor setbacks.  The Communists and Liberal Democrats had 
relatively poor showings, and other opposition groups were 
similarly marginalized.  The elections have demonstrated the 
efficacy of the Kremlin's and United Russia's powerful electoral 
machine, which makes it increasingly difficult for other parties 
to compete.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) United Russia (YR) won the Arkhangelsk Oblast legislative 
elections with a 38% turnout.  United Russia will hold 39 of the 
62 legislative seats (62%, almost a constitutional majority).  A 
Just Russia (SR) came the second with nine seats, and the less 
successful Communists (KPRF) and Liberal Democrats (LDPR) 
captured six and two seats respectively.  The remaining six 
seats were won by independent candidates in single mandate 
districts. 
 
¶3. (U) Nenets Autonomous District (NAO) was the sole dark spot 
in the region for United Russia.  Although YR did win the 
region, it failed to garner more than half the vote (winning 
just over 42%) - its lowest figure nationwide.  However, the way 
the seats are distributed in the district gives an advantage to 
the winning party, and thus YR will have an absolute majority in 
the 11-member Assembly with six seats.  Of the remaining five 
seats, the Communists and Liberal Democrats each won two and A 
Just Russia the remaining one.  Recent changes in the NAO 
election laws had eliminated single mandate district seats, so 
the Assembly seats were filled proportionately in accordance 
with the party ballot vote.  Turnout in NAO was 49%, which was 
dramatically lower than the previous regional election turnout 
of 60%. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The first round of the mayoral election in Murmansk was 
inconclusive and required a runoff.  Incumbent Mayor Mikhail 
Savchenko won 31% of the vote, and in second place was ex-Vice 
Governor Sergey Subbotin with 24%.  Both candidates are members 
of YR, and the local party apparatus officially supported the 
incumbent Savchenko.  However, Oblast Governor Yuriy Yevdokimov, 
also of YR, appeared to support his protegee Subbotin, and 
criticized his party's pro-Savchenko campaign.  The March 15th 
runoff election, with 40 % turnout, resulted in a victory for 
Subbotin who received 61% of the vote.  United Russia doesn't 
seem to be taking this loss lightly, however.  Sergey Volodin, a 
federal leader of United Russia, blames Governor Yevdokimov for 
the party's election loss, and Volodin has spoken of sanctions 
against Yevdokimov as well as of possible legal measures that 
will be taken to cancel the election results. 
 
¶5. (U) In St. Petersburg, local council elections were held in 
108 of the 111 municipal units.  United Russia swept the field 
with 1,145 winning candidates (75% of the total).   A Just 
Russia won 107, the Communists 27, and the Liberal Democrats 
just 13.  195 seats were won by technically non-partisan 
candidates - of these, six are members of Yabloko.  Around a 
thousand candidates (more than 20% of those who wanted to run) 
were unable to register for the election and so did not appear 
on the ballot.  Among those were hundreds of SR and CPR 
candidates, half of all Yabloko candidates, and a number of 
independent candidates who represented opposition movements and 
local interest groups.  In contrast, almost all of United 
Russia's candidates were successfully registered, with their 
registration failure rate below 1%. 
 
¶6. (SBU) A leading St. Petersburg electoral analyst opined to us 
that these elections in NW Russia confirmed already existing 
electoral trends.  According to him, the Kremlin is now able to 
set certain election outcome plans for the regions, and the 
regions can usually carry out those plans.  He also believes 
that election results depend largely on the extent of YR 
administrative control over the electoral process.  For example, 
the results in Arkhangelsk Oblast (a clean sweep for YR) were 
more or less predictable.  On the other hand, the poor 
performance of United Russia in NAO showed that a different sort 
of mindset was also in play.  Our interlocutor said he had heard 
the Kremlin initially expected United Russia to win 60% of the 
votes in NAO.  But, shortly before election day, that target was 
dropped to avoid possible discontent amongst the residents of 
the okrug who would find such a high figure for UR unbelievable 
given YR's general unpopularity there.  So, it seemed Moscow 
chose to tolerate a lower percentage of the vote in order to 
make the results more credible to voters.  The entire process 
was indicative of YR's complete control over the electoral 
process. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Our interlocutor also thought the relatively bad 
results for the Communists and the Liberal Democrats not 
unexpected.  He believes the KPRF had already discredited itself 
among many of its voters, while the LDPR's social base has 
always been rather narrow in NW Russia as well as in the rest of 
the country.  Zhirinovskiy's party seems to have lost the 
backing of YR power brokers, and it is ill-equipped to counter 
this situation.  The LDPR was initially prevented from even 
participating in the NAO elections, and Zhirinovskiy personally 
had to intervene at the federal level in order for his party to 
be allowed to compete.  Zhirinovskiy severely criticized the 
election process, which was unusual for him, which  was 
apparently done out of frustration with his party's poor 
showing.  Our interlocutor suggested that there might have been 
a significant amount of vote tampering against LDPR, and that it 
was even possible that some LDPR votes were counted as A Just 
Russia votes.  If this is true, then our contact believes 
Zhirinovskiy's party's long term prospects are not very bright. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Commenting on A Just Russia's performance, our 
interlocutor said the party had been inconsistent in its 
campaigning.  SR actively campaigned in Arkhangelsk Oblast, 
although its campaign there was focused on a few popular local 
figures rather than on any ideological content.  But, in NAO SR 
did not campaign at all, and many voters probably learned about 
its participation in the election only when they saw the party's 
name on the ballot in the polling booth. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Our contact also thought that Northwest oblasts are 
significantly different from the typical Russian oblast in terms 
of relations between United Russia and the governors.  Whereas 
in most oblasts the governors and regional branches of United 
Russia act in concert, in a number of Northwest oblasts the 
governors seem to behave differently from the way their local YR 
branches would like them to.  Murmansk was a perfect example of 
this type of tension, as Governor Yevdokimov and the oblast's YR 
apparatus supported competing candidates in the mayoral election. 
 
¶10. (SBU) In St. Petersburg itself, our interlocutor sees three 
major forces which all worked against opposition candidates and 
ensured United Russia's sweeping victory.  First, the city 
government worked hard to ensure a YR victory.  Second, members 
of the City Legislative Assembly (of whom a majority are also 
members of United Russia) were also interested in having 
"cooperative" (read: YR majority) municipal councils elected. 
Third, local building and utility conglomerates 
("Zhilkomservis") were reluctant to see opposition candidates 
seated on the municipal councils, apparently fearing those 
candidates would attempt to strengthen the councils' position 
vis-a-vis the conglomerates.  Our contact also thought that 
widespread election fraud had been committed which cemented YR's 
decisive municipal victory.  However, the sheer extent and 
brazenness of the fraud has led to a number of fraud 
accusations, which are currently working their way through the 
St. Petersburg legal system.  Our interlocutor believes the 
accusations will shortly be forgotten and lost in legal limbo 
while the election results will stand. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Comment.  The March 1st elections in Northwest Russia 
showed that, by manipulating the levers of power, United Russia 
is able to easily defeat opponents in regional and municipal 
elections.  When the administrative machinery fails or is 
divided in its loyalties, as happened in Murmansk, YR's 
electoral prospects are more doubtful even if the party's 
overall dominance is not.  United Russia's electoral machinery 
is still working out its kinks, as the significant number of 
fraud accusations in St. Petersburg showed.   Nevertheless, the 
most likely prognosis is continued YR domination of politics at 
all levels throughout the region, for the foreseeable future. 
End Comment. 
 
GWALTNEY