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P 161504Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1213
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRAGUE 000147 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2019 
TAGS: PREL PARR EZ KCOR MARR MCAPP
SUBJECT: DEFENSE PROCUREMENT IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC: SHADY 
DEALS AND BIG DOLLARS 
 
Classified By: Charge d,affaires Mary Thompson-Jones for reasons 1.4 (b 
) & (d). 
 
1.(C/NF) Summary: Czech Defense Ministry (MOD) procurement is 
plagued by lack of transparency and remains an arena for 
shady business deals. Successive governments seem to have 
viewed MOD contracts as a way to reward themselves and their 
political supporters with lucrative business deals, cheap 
asset sales, and kick-backs. The latest controversial 
contract for the light-armored vehicles suggests that 
politicians appear able to manipulate the procurement process 
by utilizing single source tenders, requiring the use of 
preferred intermediaries, and paying higher prices than other 
countries for similar items. Similarly, the ongoing case of 
the barter/sale through EADS of redundant L-159 aircraft for 
Casa C-295 transport aircraft may be yet another attempt to 
circumvent an open, competitive tender. As in the notorious 
2004 Gripen fighter aircraft procurement, the Czech 
government has shown little political will to investigate 
possible high-level corruption. The large Pandur contract and 
the upcoming tender for new light armored vehicles will be 
two key tests of the MOD's ability to successfully conduct 
large procurements. Czech officials have taken some tentative 
steps toward cleaning up the procurement system. However, 
much more transparency is needed within the Czech MOD to 
prevent politicians and defense officials from manipulating 
the defense procurement process for personal and political 
gain. End Summary. 
 
Long History of Shady Defense Deals 
 
2.(C/NF) Since the Velvet Revolution in 1989, the Defense 
Ministry has had a long history of shady defense deals. Most 
of the scandals have centered on cheap sales of redundant 
military equipment and military bases to "preferred 
companies," over-payment on contracts, and procurements from 
questionable companies. 
 
-- In 1993, the Czech Ministry of Defense purchased in a 
single source contract parachutes from a company closely 
connected to the government that had never produced 
parachutes. One Czech soldier died using these parachutes. 
Czech police investigated the purchase, but filed no charges. 
 
-- In 1995, the Czech Army signed a contract for a new 
information system. Although the American computer firm 
Unisys won the initial competition, the then-Minister of 
Defense Vilem Holan (KDU-CSL) nullified the tender. EDS 
Digital won the new tender, but Unisys challenged the 
results. Some politicians alleged that EDS-Digital paid a 50 
million CZK (approximately  USD 2.5 million) bribe to secure 
the contract. These allegations were never investigated or 
proven. 
 
-- Eight former Czech military officers were charged with 
fraudulently awarding 482 billion CZK (approximately USD 241 
million) in contracts for renovating eight military airports 
between 1997 and 1999. However, the Prague Municipal Court 
dismissed the case due to the expiration of the statue of 
limitations. 
 
-- In 2003, the Czech Company Trade Fides received a contract 
to protect the army,s ammunition dumps in exchange for 2.7 
billion CZK (USD 135 million). In January 2008, Czech Police 
arrested Miroslav Bena, the MOD,s Director of 
Infrastructure, for accepting a one million CZK bribe 
(approximately USD 50,000)for awarding this contract to Trade 
Fides. The case still has not gone to trial. 
 
Defense Budget: A Lucrative Arena for Manipulation 
 
3.(SBU) With defense spending being the second largest budget 
item after social spending, the MOD is a 
potentially-lucrative arena for political manipulation.  In 
2008, the total defense budget was 54.2 billion CZK (around 
USD 2.7 billion), or 4.9 percent of the total government 
budget. In 2009, the defense budget will be 55.8 billion 
crowns (approximately USD 2.79 billion) out of total 
expenditures of 1,152 billion crowns (around USD 576 
billion), or 4.8 percent of government spending. On average, 
the MOD spends around 27.7 percent of its budget on 
construction and procurement. 
 
Dingo 2s: High Prices and Shady Intermediaries 
 
 
PRAGUE 00000147  002 OF 004 
 
 
4.(C/NF) The Czech MOD's 2008 purchases of IVECO light 
multirole vehicles (LMV) and Dingo 2 armored vehicles 
epitomizes the MOD's flawed procurement system. The MOD 
initially purchased four Dingo 2s without a public tender to 
replace or supplement U.S.-provided Humvees in Afghanistan, 
and then purchased approximately another 15 Dingo 2s and 15 
IVECO LMVs, again through a sole-source purchase. Major 
General Palenik, the current Director of Military 
Intelligence (VZ) and the former commander of the Czech 
Special Forces Military Police and former commander of Czech 
Special Forces in Afghanistan, supported the purchase of the 
Dingo 2s. However, some general staff officers have 
complained that some MOD civilian officials forced them to 
take the Dingo 2s. Press reports also indicate a high degree 
of dissatisfaction with the performance of the Dingo 2s in 
Afghanistan. 
 
5.(C) Officially, the MOD purchased the Dingo 2s under a sole 
source contract using VZ funds and purchase authority, due to 
the "urgent need" for Czech troops to have these vehicles in 
Afghanistan. However, given the long planning process 
required for both the Czech military's Logar and Helmand 
missions, the MOD could easily have used a competitive tender 
process. In September 2008, First Deputy Minister of Defense 
Martin Bartak faced an anonymous criminal complaint for abuse 
of power for his role in the Dingo purchase. When asked about 
the complaint soon after it was filed, Bartak said he was not 
aware of it. 
 
6.(C) The Dingo 2 transaction is not unique. According to 
Transparency International (TI), between 2002 and 2004, over 
90 percent of Czech defense procurements were done on a sole 
source basis. After TI released its report, the MOD removed 
most procurement data from its website. 
 
7.(C) By November 2008, the Czech army had received the new 
batch of Dingo 2s. Czech politicians and journalists have 
raised serious concerns about the price for these vehicles. 
The MOD reportedly paid approximately USD 2 million for each 
vehicle. Other countries paid much less for the base vehicle. 
The Czech Press reported that the Norwegians paid USD 385,000 
for each of their 72 vehicles, and the Belgians paid USD 
220,000 for each of their 440 Dingo 2s. Military experts in 
Prague say that the greater volume of vehicles the Norwegians 
and Belgians purchased does not explain the eight to ten 
times difference in price. 
 
8.(C) The difference in prices was never explained. 
Journalists in Prague who follow military procurements 
speculate that Bartak probably personally benefited from this 
sale. One well-connected source involved in the defense 
industry told the Embassy that MPI, the Czech intermediary 
for the Dingo 2 purchase, paid 247,249,168 CZK (around USD 
12.35 million) for the vehicles and then sold them for 
499,867,390 CZK (approximately  USD 24.9 million) to the MOD. 
After subtracting the 19% VAT, MPI made a profit of 
172,807,467 CZK (around USD 8.6 million), or 35%, on the 
vehicles.  MOD watchers therefore speculate that some of the 
"excess profit" may have gone to Bartak and other officials. 
However, one observer commented that, if he benefited from 
the deal, Bartak would be too smart to leave any trace of his 
involvement. Whereever the reportedly large profits ended up, 
the lack of transparency fuels speculation about who 
benefitted from this deal. 
 
Two Key Tests: Pandurs and New Light Armored Vehicles 
 
9.(C/NF) The MOD faces two key tests of its ability to 
conduct large, competitive tenders: execution of modified 
Pandur II contract and the purchase of light armored 
vehicles. The Pandur contract has been controversial, even 
during the tender process.  However, the contract drew 
additional scrutiny upon award, since the contract was signed 
by former Defense Minister Karel Kuehnl in his final days in 
office in June 2006. In the original contract, the Czechs 
agreed to purchase 199 eight-wheeled Pandur II armored 
personnel carriers produced by Steyr, a General Dynamics 
European Land Systems subsidiary, through Defendia CZ, for 
23.6 billion crowns (approximately USD 1.2 billion). 
Nevertheless, the contract stood up to legal challenges in 
court from Patria, which had lost out in the original tender. 
 
10.(C/NF)In November 2007, the Czech MOD claimed that the 
Pandur vehicles did not meet "the required specifications" 
and declared the contract null and void. The Czech MOD, 
 
PRAGUE 00000147  003 OF 004 
 
 
however, continued to negotiate a "modification" to the 
contract with General Dynamics/Steyr, appearing to have an 
interest in the delivery of a reduced quantity of Pandurs and 
in avoiding litigation. During these negotiations, a General 
Dynamics/Steyr representative alleged in a private 
conversation with an Embassy officer that Bartak, who headed 
the negotiations for the Czechs, engineered an opportunity 
for Marek Dalik, a personal friend of Prime Minister 
Topolanek, to solicit a bribe from Steyr. However, U.S. 
Embassy Prague has no means to substantiate this allegation. 
In March 2008, the Czech MOD and General Dynamics signed an 
MOU for delivery of 107 vehicles, and a year later, on March 
13, 2009, Steyer and the MOD signed a contract to deliver the 
vehicles. 
 
11.(C) The Czech MOD is now planning to conduct a tender for 
an additional 108 light-armored vehicles this summer. Western 
defense companies fear that the tender may be "pre-cooked" in 
light of the earlier Dingo 2 deals. The original "emergency 
purchase" was only for four Dingo 2s. When the MOD purchased 
the additional Dingo 2s, it rationalized the decision to 
outsiders with the argument that the Czech Armed Forces need 
to stick with the Dingo 2 because they already had a number 
in service and did not want to increase their training costs, 
inventories of spare parts, and other associated costs. This 
tender will be a major test of the MOD's ability to conduct 
open tenders. 
 
Well-Connected Intermediaries Stifle Competition 
 
12.(C) The Dingo 2 and IVECO deals also raise serious 
concerns about the use of well-connected intermediaries to 
stifle competition.  Under Czech law, all arms sales require 
a license or the use of a Czech broker. Since the licensing 
process is arduous and time-consuming, most arms sales are 
done with the use of a Czech broker, primarily Omnipol and 
MPI. As the Deputy Minister of Defense for Economic Affairs 
from 1993-1998, the current Finance Minister, Miroslav 
Kalousek, inserted the requirement to utilize intermediaries 
into the defense procurement law. Omnipol's former chairman, 
Richard Hava, is rumored to have close connections with 
Finance Minister Kalousek and Jaroslav Kopriva, the current 
Deputy Defense Minister for Armaments. MPI also appears to be 
well connected. Its Director Michael Smrz reportedly has 
close connections with Bartak and Jan Vidim, the Chairman of 
the Defense Committee in the lower house of the Czech 
parliament. With these strong connections within the 
government, one official of a Western defense company said 
that his company will only compete for contracts if they are 
too low for MPI or Omnipol to be interested.  The Czech 
Parliament is currently debating a new defense procurement 
law. However, there is little chance that this requirement to 
obtain a license or use an intermediary will change in the 
near term. 
 
High-Priced Underwear, Black Funds, and the General Staff 
 
13.(SBU) The one place where the Czechs have actually sought 
to investigate and prosecute is the Czech General Staff's use 
of the so-called "black funds" for personal gain. In November 
2008, the Czech anti-corruption police revealed that the 
former Chief of the Czech General Staff, General Pavel 
Stefka, and other members of the General Staff spent 17.5 
million CZK (approximately USD 875,000) on questionable 
trips, entertainment, and mountain bikes. The funds were even 
used to purchase underwear at 700 CZK (around USD 35) each 
with "Forces Development Section of the General Staff" 
written on the front. Twenty officers were discharged from 
the army and charged with misuse of government funds in 
connection with this scandal. The scandal even forced Major 
General Ivo Zboril --the former Chief of the General Staff 
Forces Development Section, who had been recently promoted 
and appointed to the position of Head of the Military Office 
of the President -- to retire early. In this case, Defense 
Minister Parkanova personally dismissed the officers involved 
and those with knowledge of this scandal. The case is 
currently with the Prague Prosecutor,s Office, while the 
defendants review their indictments. 
 
Gripens: An Investigation Shelved 
 
14.(SBU) The most notorious case involving defense 
procurement in the Czech Republic remains the government's 
decision to lease Gripen fighters. The Czech government first 
planned to purchase 24 Gripen fighters in 2002 for 60.2 
 
PRAGUE 00000147  004 OF 004 
 
 
billion CZK (approximately $3 billion), but decided to delay 
the purchase due to that year,s devastating floods. In 2004, 
the Czechs decided to lease 14 Gripens for a period of ten 
years for 20 billion CZK (around USD 1 billion). OMNIPOL, one 
of the companies involved in the controversial Dingo 2/IVECO 
deal, served as the intermediary. There is widespread 
speculation in the press and among military observers that 
Saab/BAE paid around USD 60 million in bribes to secure the 
lease. In 2005, Senator Michal Zantovsky (of the then-Civic 
Democratic Alliance), currently the Czech Ambassador to 
Israel, reported to the Czech police that his party was 
offered 10 million CZK (around USD 500,000) in return for his 
vote in favor of the deal. The Czech police investigated, but 
shelved the case in late 2008 due to a lack of evidence. 
Unlike the Czechs, British and Swedish authorities are 
continuing their investigations, and Czech authorities are 
reportedly cooperating with them. 
 
L-159s and EADS/CASA 
 
15.(C) The Czech MOD has been trying to dispose of a number 
of redundant L-159 aircraft via a barter/sales deal with the 
Spanish aircraft maker CASA. The Czech press has reported 
that the MOD plans to swap five L-159s for one CASA C295M 
transport aircraft and the outright purchase of an additional 
three C-295Ms for 3.5 billion CZK (around $175 million). In 
April 2008, Bartak signed a memorandum of understanding for 
this barter/sale. (Note: Due to U.S. avionics in the 
aircraft, any transfer of the L-159s requires U.S. approval. 
End Note) The MOD reportedly plans to again use the 
well-connected intermediary Omnipol in this deal. Some 
observers and competitors like Alenia, the Italian aerospace 
company, believe that the barter deal is yet another way in 
which the MOD is avoiding an open, transparent competition 
for badly-needed military transport aircraft (Note:  The 
3.5bn CZK cost associated with this deal is reportedly 
approximately the same sum that Alenia was seeking for the 
purchase of four Alenia C-27J aircraft, considered by many to 
be a more suitable and capable 
aircraft). 
 
A Possible Move Toward Greater Transparency 
 
16.(SBU) In 2007, Minister of Defense Parkanova gave the 
Director of the Division of Assets, Jiri Kral, responsibility 
for implementing a revamped electronic tender system, or 
SEPO. SEPO will seek to reduce the ability of defense 
ministry personnel or other individuals to manipulate 
tenders. The system allows for companies to bid to supply 
goods or services to the Czech military. The Ministry plans 
to post on the SEPO website tenders for goods between 5,000 
CZK (around USD 250) and 2 million CZK (approximately USD 
100,000) and for services between 15,000 (around USD 7500) 
and 6 million CZK (USD 300,000). The system will also bind 
vendors to their prices. Kral hoped that approximately 25 
percent of defense procurements will eventually use this 
system. The system is working, but the number of procurements 
on the site is quite low and most large contracts that 
involve weapons systems cannot use this system. 
 
17.(C) Comment: In 2007, Defense Minister Parkanova (KDU-CSL) 
said that she would work to root out corruption in the 
Defense Ministry. As a former justice minister, she could 
have been well-positioned to undertake such an effort. 
However, her political position was never strong, and she was 
unable to establish good control over the MOD. Indeed, it 
appears that it is First Deputy Minister Martin Bartak (ODS) 
who really runs the ministry. 
 
18.(C) Bartak figures prominently in many of the alleged 
current procurement scandals at the MOD. Although Embassy 
Prague is unable to confirm any of the allegations against 
Bartak, the circumstantial evidence is considerable. Even 
with a possible change in government in 2010, defense 
procurement will likely remain murky. A new "Bartak" will 
undoubtedly emerge to take advantage of the flawed 
procurement process and a political culture that tolerates 
under-the-table deals. As we pursue closer defense 
cooperation with the Czech Republic, we must take into 
account these concerns and seek ways to structure 
procurements and contracts to increase transparency, minimize 
corruption, and eliminate potentially lucrative  conflicts of 
interest. 
Thompson-Jones