O 101120Z MAR 09
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7870
INFO AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 
CIA WASHDC
NSC WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL

S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000047 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/10/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS EAID PK
SUBJECT: NWFP: SWAT UPDATE; ANP HEDGING ON SUPPORT FOR ZARDARI? 
 
REF: A) ISLAMABAD 501  B) PESHAWAR 42 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate 
Peshawar, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (S/NF) While the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) 
government has rejected militant calls for withdrawal of the 
army from Swat, plans to send the Nizam-i-Adl (Shari'a) 
Regulation to President Zardari again and a prisoner release 
underscore the provincial government's determination to hang 
onto this deal despite militant violence and intimidation 
(reftels).  The Awami National Party (ANP) is criticizing 
Zardari in some of the harshest terms we have yet heard in the 
wake of the Supreme Court's decision against the Sharif 
brothers.  How that translates into the level of support that 
Zardari can count on from his ANP partners is difficult to 
discern but bears watching particularly as ANP as well as the 
military are now pressing Zardari to sign the Shari'a regulation 
by March 15.  Zardari refused to sign the Shari'a regulation 
last time around and told Ambassador March 8 that he will not 
sign.  However, as his confrontation with Nawaz deepens, it is 
not only a distraction from the western border but could provide 
ANP and the military with leverage to pressure Zardari to sign 
the Shari'a regulation in return for support against Nawaz.  End 
Summary. 
 
Three Key Militant Demands 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) On March 9, ANP deputy leader Afrasiab Khattak briefed 
Principal Officer on his March 7 visit to Swat.  Tehrik-I 
Taliban (TTP) representative "commander Mahmood" reiterated 
three key demands to government and Tehrik-i Nifaz-i Shariat-i 
Muhammadi (TNSM) participants at a joint meeting: implementation 
of the Nizam-i-Adl (Shari'a) Regulation; army withdrawal from 
Swat; and release of prisoners. 
 
Shari'a Draft for Signature -- Again 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Chief Minister Hoti, Khattak said, was sending a slightly 
updated draft of the Nizam-i-Adl Regulation to Governor Ghani 
shortly.  The Shari'a draft, he continued, should reach 
President Zardari for signature later in the week.  PO noted 
Zardari's previous refusal to sign and asked if Khattak expected 
that to change.  "Yes," Khattak replied succinctly. 
 
No Army Withdrawal 
------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) Army withdrawal from Swat, Khattak said, was a 
non-starter -- a point that was conveyed to TTP.  However, the 
army would pull back and consolidate its forces at four or five 
bases, Khattak clarified, once other security forces -- Frontier 
Corps, Frontier Constabulary, and police -- were in Swat in 
sufficient numbers.  The provincial government was aiming to 
roughly double the number of police assigned to Swat and bring 
police strength up to approximately 3,000.  The government was 
planning, he said, to rotate out police officers who had served 
in Swat during the recent months of violence because of the 
impact on morale.  Dismantling militant check posts, Khattak 
observed, remains a problem, but the government was hoping to 
have police patrolling in areas south of Mingora soon. 
 
 
Twelve Prisoners Released 
------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Khattak confirmed weekend press reports that twelve 
prisoners in Swat had been released -- ten adults and two "boys" 
(age NFI).  Khattak insisted that those released had been 
thoroughly vetted by the military and were not "hard-core" 
militants.  The military had developed three categories of 
prisoners:  "black," "gray", and "white."  Each prisoner's case 
would be reviewed individually before there would be any 
decision for release. 
 
¶6. (C) There were "hundreds" of people in custody, Khattak 
explained, including a number of "young boys" who are 
vulnerable.  The government, he added, wanted to focus on 
bringing to justice militants who were guilty of "serious" 
offenses.  (Note:  The total number of prisoners in 
government/military custody is unclear.  Inspector General NWFP 
Police Malik Naveed recently told post that the government had 
1700 prisoners in Swat but did not have adequate facilities or 
resources to cope with such a large number over the long run. 
Naveed expressed concern about those involved in only minor 
offenses who were likely to be released but who had no economic 
prospects.) 
 
Zardari-Sharif Confrontation 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Turning to the Zardari-Sharif confrontation, Khattak 
observed that Zardari is "shrewd but not wise," an "accidental" 
leader who could and should have ruled by consensus.  Zardari, 
he said, "will be removed."  The president is "isolated" because 
he has chosen to surround himself with "non-political people" 
like Interior Advisor Rehman Malik and is making unpopular 
decisions such as his nomination of Farooq Naek as Chairman of 
the Senate.  Allies like MQM are not supporting him. 
 
¶8. (C) Khattak relayed a press conference scheme that Zardari 
had proposed where he, flanked by ANP's Asfandyar Wali Khan and 
JUI's Fazlur Rehman, would announce his intention to block the 
Supreme Court's decision.  Nawaz won't go for those sort of 
proposals, Khattak said flatly.  "He [Nawaz] has no trust in 
Zardari's words" and does not want to be beholden through any 
solution similar to the National Reconciliation Ordnance. 
Khattak did not anticipate large turnouts or any serious 
violence in the NWFP for the Long March. 
 
FATA -- The Root of the Problem 
------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Khattak 
said, particularly the Waziristans remain the root of security 
troubles in the NWFP.  Zardari is focused on his "political 
survival," and the national civilian government, he remarked, 
does not have enough energy to remove militant sanctuaries in 
the FATA and introduce reform.  Khattak advocated UN Security 
Council action (NFI) to bring pressure "from the outside." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (S/NF) The provincial government seems determined to hang 
onto its deal in Swat.  Khattak's UNSC proposal strikes us as 
further evidence of the lack of coherence between the national 
and provincial levels as well as reinforcing discontent with PPP 
ally Zardari.  ANP is criticizing Zardari in some of the 
harshest terms we have yet heard in the wake of the Supreme 
Court's decision against the Sharif brothers.  How that 
translates into the level of support that Zardari can count on 
from his ANP partners is difficult to discern but bears watching 
particularly as ANP as well as the military are now pressing 
Zardari to sign the Shari'a regulation by March 15.  Zardari 
refused to sign the Shari'a regulation last time around and told 
Ambassador March 8 that he will not sign.  However, as his 
confrontation with Nawaz deepens, it is not only a distraction 
from the western border but could provide ANP and the military 
with leverage to pressure Zardari to sign the Shari'a regulation 
in return for support against Nawaz. 
 
 
TRACY