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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5758
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 6966
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 7095
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 3107
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3005

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000373 
 
SIPDIS 
 
THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2019 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC OPCW CBW
SUBJECT: BW/CW ALLIED CONSULTATIONS, PARIS, MARCH 4-5, 
WRAP-UP 
 
REF: STATE 019847 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen Allegrone 
for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
-------- 
Summary 
-------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The Close Allies (U.S., UK, France, Germany) met 
in Paris on March 4-5 to discuss issues related to chemical 
and biological weapons nonproliferation/arms control.  The 
meeting focused on priorities, strategy and tactics on 
near-term issues, longer-term goals for the BWC and CWC, 
including relevant nonproliferation objectives, as well as 
to continue a more extended discussion on future OPCW 
challenges.  Allies previewed key issues that likely will 
require further coordination and discussion prior to the 
OPCW Executive Council (EC-56) meeting on April 20-24 and 
held a smaller group meeting to begin discussions on the 
political, technical and security concerns surrounding 
chemical incapacitants.  Although Allies discussed specific 
near-term issues that will require close coordination, the 
overall tone and common interest of the group remains 
forward-looking, focusing on how to shape these regimes to 
ensure their viability in the future. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The U.S. was represented by State/ISN/CB Office 
Director Robert Mikulak; the UK by Chris Rampling, Deputy 
Head of the Counter-proliferation Department, FCO; Germany 
by Alexander Olbrich, Director BW/CW Division, MFA; and the 
French by Jacques Raharinaivo, newly-arrived Deputy 
Director of Multilateral Affairs, Disarmament and 
Conventional Arms Control, MFA.  Germany will host the next 
meeting of four in Berlin in late September 2009; 
Washington is to host in Spring 2010. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Dels agreed on the success of the BWC 
intersessional process to date.  Careful preparation is 
required for 2009 in order to keep a balance between 
showcasing assistance already being provided to States 
Parties and the kind of assistance available, and steering 
the NAM towards making their own presentations and offers 
of assistance.  U.S. Rep Mikulak urged using the World 
Health Organization's International Health Regulations to 
structure the discussions, inasmuch as IHR implementation 
requirements dovetail with the 2009 topics.  UK, France and 
Germany are already thinking about the 2011 Review 
Conference.  All three pointed to the need to consider soon 
how to handle the verification and compliance issue at that 
time, noting that some in the EU hope for a shift in the 
U.S. position.  They have also recently been demarched by 
Russia on resuming work on verification and compliance; 
Russia apparently has demarched others as well.  On BWC 
confidence-building measures (CBMs), the four agreed to 
begin an informal review of CBMs, including how to increase 
participation.  Germany will serve as a focal point and 
plans to hold a CBM workshop in 2010.  On universality, the 
four agreed to redouble their efforts.  Discussion on the 
Bioterrorism Experts Group (BTEX) meeting centered on the 
March 12-13 Tokyo workshop where lessons learned from 
national exercises will be reviewed; the U.S. suggested the 
need for regular policy-level oversight meetings and 
longer-term planning to reinvigorate G-8 bio-discussions. 
The U.S. and Germany briefed on their efforts to promote a 
voluntary screening framework for commercial gene 
synthesis. 
 
¶4. (C) On CW-related topics, dels discussed selection of a 
new OPCW Director-General (DG), with the UK and Germany 
each indicating that it would have a candidate.  All agreed 
an early coordination process is necessary in order to put 
forth a solid Western candidate.  Dels also discussed 
chemical weapons destruction progress, but finessed the 
issue of how to handle those cases where a Party is unable 
to meet the 2012 destruction deadline.  The four also 
talked through the possible scenarios that might unfold 
around the submission of the Iraqi CWC declaration (e.g., 
Iran).  At U.S. request, a smaller group initiated 
discussion of policy regarding chemical incapacitants for 
law enforcement purposes.  As usual, U.S. and UK views on 
CW-related issues were better developed, but overall the 
four are clearly on the same sheet of music. 
 
------------------------------ 
BWC:  Outcome of 2008 Meeting 
------------------------------ 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) All agreed on the success of the 2008 meetings of 
Experts and States Parties, although France warned that 
what lies ahead will not be so "calm."  The 2008 
discussions demonstrated progress on the issues addressed 
-- biosafety, biosecurity, and professional responsibility 
-- since they were last considered, in 2003 and 2005 
respectively.  A common approach in line with WHO standards 
and OECD recommendations on biosafety/biosecurity was 
emerging.  NGOs and outside groups have enriched the 
process, U.S. Rep observed.  German Expert Beck welcomed 
agreement on acceptable standards for biosafety and 
biosecurity, but cautioned that emergence of additional 
standards, i.e. the CEN bio-risk standard, could 
unnecessarily complicate implementing the WHO and OECD 
standards.  Some states might shy away from implementation, 
claiming "it's too much for us."  Mikulak averred that the 
three sets of standards are compatible and all will be 
used. 
 
---------------------------------- 
BWC:  Preparing for 2009 Meetings 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) While still developing their approaches to the 
2009 meetings, all agreed demonstrating assistance already 
provided or on offer was critical.  UK Expert Miller said 
the UK will address examples of UK initiatives to assist 
developing countries in capacity-building projects across 
the human, animal and plant arenas, as well as initiatives 
by academia and possibly industry.  They may present Global 
Partnership initiatives in the bio area as well.  U.S. Rep 
prefaced his remarks with a disclaimer that while the new 
administration has not yet reviewed existing policies, he 
sensed high interest in bio issues.  He drew on guidance to 
outline U.S. thinking on the 2009 meetings, emphasizing 
that the U.S. was looking to frame the discussion in the 
context of the WHO International Health Regulations (IHR) 
which have the 2009 Work Program topics as legally binding 
WHO requirements.  U.S. Deloff Gromoll observed that this 
approach will contribute to a collective approach in 
contrast to the more traditional North vs. South approach 
of developing countries.  She also outlined desirable 
outcomes from the 2009 meetings and some ideas on 
structuring the Experts Meeting.  Beck said Germany will 
focus on regional models of cooperation, including EU 
networks, reporting mechanisms, and organizational 
aspects.  It will also address national approaches, 
building on its 2004 presentations, highlight cooperation 
and what Germany has to offer, and speak to the importance 
of WHO and OECD lab networks.  France's main goal will be 
to ensure a real Western voice during the debates, having 
in mind that the NAM will insist on assistance and 
denigrate export controls.  Listing offers for 
international assistance is a good idea, French Rep said, 
arguing for being concrete and consistent when discussing 
assistance, and ensuring follow up.  Finally, he noted, 
assistance should look more technical and less political. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
BWC:  2011 RevCon and Russian Demarches 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) UK and France have begun planning for the 2011 
Review Conference (RevCon).  UK priorities are 
universality, national implementation, scientific 
developments and how to address them, CBMs, the role of the 
ISU, biosecurity, biosafety, and the process itself.  Beck 
said that issues raised at the 2006 RevCon that are not 
part of the current intersessional process also need to be 
addressed, such as CBMs and scientific and technological 
developments.  In addition, he reported there is increasing 
pressure to return to compliance measures.  France reported 
on a Russian demarche on the future of the BWC, which 
leaves them puzzled in part because of references to the 
Group of Verification Experts (VEREX) (which met in 
1992-1994).  UK and Germany received nonpapers; France 
received a verbal demarche.  Demarche is focused 
cryptically on VEREX, the Protocol, and verification and 
compliance.  German Rep Olbrich noted statements by others 
in support of verification and compliance during 2008 
meetings; there is continuing interest in the Bundestag. 
The four should prepare to react and find common ground on 
this issue, however, it is too early to start discussions 
with the U.S. now.  U.S. Deloff Gromoll reported that the 
Russian demarches probably went to others as well but not 
the U.S.  The UK agreed that it was not the time to raise 
 
these issues, but expressed concern that Russia may get 
some "element of purchase" from those that don't fully 
understand the U.S. position.  Rampling also noted that 
there is some pressure from within the UK Parliament to 
discuss verification.  In addition, in a recent EU meeting 
some hoped that with a new Administration "maybe the U.S. 
will shift" its views on BWC verification and the 
Protocol.  Germany suggested these issues be discussed 
among the four at the next meeting; U.S. said that it was 
focused on the 2009 meetings and had yet to start preparing 
for 2011. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
BWC:  Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) Beck introduced papers cataloguing national and 
NGO positions on CBMs.  He summed up that about 1/3 of the 
States Parties support review of CBMs, noting that this 
group included the EU, some non-EU WEOG states, and a 
number of Latin American states (not all proponents for 
CBMs actually provide CBM declarations).  Beck is prepared 
to draft a strawman of agreed Close Allies approaches; 
Germany intends to host a CBM Workshop in Berlin in 2010. 
The 1991 CBM revisions were made to cast a broader net, and 
go beyond bio-defense programs, but they hadn't succeeded. 
As a way to increase returns, Dels agreed to identify 
States that have submitted CBMs before, but not recently 
and consider approaching them. 
 
--------------------------------- 
BWC:  Universality Efforts Needed 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Universality will be a priority for Chairman 
Grinius in 2009.  Dels agreed of the 31 countries outside 
the BWC, the 18 African States should be the current 
priority.  The U.S. continues to push Israel, Egypt and 
Syria to join; Mauritania, Haiti and Liberia remain 
difficult. 
 
----------------------- 
Laboratory Biosecurity 
----------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) U.S. Rep outlined the January 9 Executive Order 
"Strengthening Laboratory Biosecurity in the U.S" and noted 
that recommendations to the President are due in early 
July.  This could also impact U.S.-funded research in 
Europe.  French Expert Daoust-Maleval noted the importance 
of following ISO standards and for staff to have security 
clearances; those working with especially dangerous 
pathogens in France do have such clearances.  Beck shared 
that the Head of the Robert Koch Institute is the project 
manager for an EU Joint Action (with the WHO) to engage a 
country (either Oman or Iran) on WHO biosafety and 
biosecurity standards; this same approach will soon be used 
in South Asia.  He also noted that policy follow-up to the 
2006 EU "Green Paper" was nearing public release.  There 
will be three papers emerging from this work, one on public 
health and law enforcement, another (an Action Plan) on 
policy and bridging the security and health gaps and the 
last on personnel reliability.  There is consideration 
about having security clearances for certain transport 
workers.  This is being drafted by European Commission 
staff and will need to be debated within EC security and 
health channels.  Miller noted that Foot and Mouth Disease 
(FMD) outbreaks have led to a change in their legislation, 
a modification of the Terrorism Act, which now also covers 
animals and plants. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Bioterrorism Experts Group (BTEX) 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Dels exchanged information on plans for a March 
12-13 expert session in Tokyo to share information on 
national exercises.  French Rep from the PM's office will 
present information on a recent exercise held by France on 
smallpox.  Three EU workshops have been held, according to 
Beck, containing various scenarios; it is now being turned 
into an EU White Paper entitled "Bridging Public Health and 
Law Enforcement."  Mikulak, intent on understanding the 
root causes creating an ineffective BTEX process, urged 
Allied consultations on the future of BTEX.  The recent 
forensic epidemiology exercise in Berlin gave the process 
some vitality, however, we need to focus on how best to 
 
attract more interest from the Italian, Japanese and 
Russian governments.  He recommended returning to 
regularized policy meetings, possibly twice a year and on 
the margins of the Non-proliferation Directors Group (NPDG) 
meetings.  It would be useful if BTEX covered a broader 
range of topics to include lab biosecurity and forensic 
epidemiology.  Rampling agreed that regular policy meetings 
are a good idea but cautioned that they need to be 
well-prepared to avoid a stalemate that could bring any 
technical work to a halt.  Mikulak suggested several 
possible goals for the policy discussion could usefully 
do:  develop common objectives for G-8 Summit Statements; 
plan topics for the next years discussion and for the 
workshops; coordinate more effectively between the health 
and security communities; and/or share best practices on 
lab security and personnel reliability.  French and German 
dels did not react to the U.S. ideas. 
 
------------------------- 
Commercial DNA Synthesis 
------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Mikulak informed others of emerging U.S. policy 
on voluntary screening of commercial orders for gene 
synthesis.  Modern technology has enabled chemical 
synthesis of gene-length DNA sequences.  This industry 
ships assembled double-stranded DNA based on sequence 
information that is uploaded via an online web site.  Both 
government and industry are concerned about the risk of 
processing orders for harmful DNA sequences.  Industry 
supports screening orders as part of good business 
practices.  While the risks that denovo synthesis 
techniques will be used to successfully develop a potential 
bioweapon are currently small, the capability is present 
and will only become more available as time progresses. 
Uniform screening criteria and a database of sequences to 
screen against is necessary. However, many related 
questions arise: who establishes one, who pays for it, who 
ensures accuracy, what constitutes a good match; what 
agents will be contained in the database (Australia Group 
or U.S. Select Agent lists).  Industry is very competitive 
and anything that slows down the process might be 
unwelcome. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Beck noted that a consortium of German companies 
advocates voluntary screening.  U.S. companies follow 
similar voluntary practices.  A consistent approach is 
needed across the board.  In Germany, 40 percent of short 
DNA sequences ("Oligos") are not naturally-occurring 
sequences; 8 percent of the longer sequences are not 
naturally-occurring.  Beck expressed concern that no one 
can predict what the security consequences might be of 
novel DNA sequences.  Overseeing this growing industry 
might be something the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) should look into. 
Mikulak noted interest in getting away from a list-based 
approach to regulating pathogens, however, the science 
isn't far enough along yet to predict risks directly from 
sequences. 
 
¶14. (SBU) UK experts said they were working to identify 
relevant companies.  A UK company is thinking of using the 
benefits of screening as a marketing tool to show they have 
exceeded industry standards.  UK Commerce Rep Rodrigues 
said that critical mass was needed for this to work -- 
either all need to use screening methods or none would. 
 
---------------- 
Australia Group 
---------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Raharinaivo noted the limited participation in 
the October 2008 intersessional meeting, and although 
France had no strong views on the subject, he asked whether 
such meetings should continue.  Rampling agreed with the 
general utility of the October meeting and noted that there 
will be a follow-up technical meeting in London in April 
2009, hosted by the Australian Embassy.  Olbrich had no 
strong views but agreed such meetings have value, and 
suggested holding technical meetings on the margins of the 
Plenary.  Mikulak expressed satisfaction with the October 
meeting and welcomed the planned April meeting.  He noted 
that technical meetings of experts work quite well in other 
regimes and suggested considering a continuation of such 
meetings. 
 
¶16. (SBU) On AG outreach activities, Olbrich favored talks 
 
with the Russians at the technical level regarding export 
controls, but not discussions on the political level. 
Mikulak agreed and further noted that the reasons for not 
supporting Russian membership are clear and haven't 
changed, but the U.S. would welcome a discussion with 
Russia on their export control system.  Raharinaivo stated 
that in addition to Russia, there were other countries that 
have expressed an interest in joining the AG, noting that 
there is not a systematic outreach approach by current AG 
members to solicit new members.  Mikulak said that outreach 
to China, Taiwan and India are important, and possibly 
Chile and South Africa.  French Rep agreed that they also 
view outreach to China as essential. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Raharinaivo announced that the 2009 AG Plenary 
meeting will be held 21-25 September in Paris, however, the 
exact location has yet to be determined.  He noted that 
France is considering presenting lessons learned from 
screening of visa applications for proliferation concerns. 
France is reviewing its screening procedures of graduate 
research students and would welcome any sharing of 
experience by others.  The UK Rep said the UK is working to 
figure out how to keep up with what subjects are considered 
sensitive when screening graduate research students.  All 
four delegations agreed that sharing each country's visa 
screening experiences would be useful.  Olbrich also 
foreshadowed an initiative on end use controls similar to 
the initiative introduced and adopted by consensus for the 
Missile Technology Control Regime.  He also noted that 
there is not a streamlined approach within the European 
Union. 
 
--------------- 
CW Destruction 
--------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) French OPCW Deputy Representative Mari opened the 
discussion by asking the group which arguments are likely 
to arise in the coming months from NGOs, parliaments, and 
other interested parties, and what we can and cannot say on 
the subject of CW destruction.  Mikulak distributed a 
recent press article quoting Valery Kapashin (Russian 
Federal Department for the Safe Storage and Disposal of CW) 
that Russia will likely see a 3 to 15 percent budget cut 
for chemical demilitarization due to internal issues and 
the global financial crisis.  If Russia does not meet its 
45 percent destruction deadline later this year, this could 
impact overarching destruction deadline discussions in the 
Executive Council.  UK Deloffs noted Russian statements in 
The Hague have moved from firm assurances that the 
deadlines will be met to statements about financial and 
economic issues that will impact destruction efforts.  UK 
Experts briefly went over the status of specific sites in 
Russia, and the possibility that Russia will not meet the 
already extended 45% deadline.  UK experts further added 
that there has been no recent visibility into India's 
progress and whether or not India will meet or slightly 
miss their April 29, 2009 completion deadline.  He further 
noted that he doubts swift progress by Libya and mentioned 
the many unknowns surrounding Iraq's destruction timeline. 
Mikulak added that Japan likely will not complete 
destruction of its abandoned chemical weapons (ACW) in 
China by the 2012 deadline. 
 
¶19. (C) Meeting participants agreed that if other countries 
miss destruction deadlines, regardless of by how much, 
States Parties may find it difficult to continue the 
current hard line on meeting the 2012 destruction deadline 
and may need to explore alternative ways to move forward. 
Mikulak said that discussion of how to address the 2012 
destruction question is premature and should be avoided. 
Olbrich stated that if the U.S. was the only country to 
miss the deadline, Iran might take the issue to the UN 
Security Council, however as Russia and others will also 
miss the deadline, the playing field is changed.  U.S. OPCW 
Deputy Representative added that discussions on Iraq's 
destruction timeline will likely shift the dialogue to a 
broader view of destruction since Iraq will be the first 
country that most likely will not be bound to complete 
destruction by the 2012 deadline.  She added that a country 
should not be condemned for missing a deadline by a few 
weeks, but rather States Parties should keep in mind the 
bigger picture that possessor states are committed to 
meeting CWC obligations. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Mikulak said that the United States has made no 
secret of its inability to make the 2012 destruction 
 
deadline, and noted the upcoming EC visits to Umatilla, 
Oregon and Pueblo, Colorado.  EC visit participants will 
see firsthand the construction progress made at Pueblo, one 
of the two facilities that will be operating after 2012, 
and the continued progress of the incineration sites by the 
visit to Umatilla.  The U.S. is hopeful that 90 percent of 
the U.S. stockpile will be completed by the 2012 deadline. 
The remaining 10 percent is at the two non-incineration 
sites, Pueblo and Blue Grass.  It was for this reason that 
Pueblo was chosen as one of the two sites for the EC 
visit.  He further added that the U.S. has increased the 
funding for these two sites substantially to accelerate 
destruction efforts. 
 
¶21. (SBU) French Deputy OPCW Rep Mari asked if countries 
should begin looking at legal solutions for missing the 
deadline, but the U.S. Rep quickly noted that discussions 
are premature.  Rampling suggested that Close Allies begin 
thinking about the implications of missing the 2012 
deadline for efficacy of the regime.  The aim would be to 
allow the OPCW to continue without a great disruption when 
the deadlines are missed.  He urged participants to be in 
lockstep regarding future nonproliferation objectives to 
move the OPCW past a focus on destruction.  Raharinaivo 
added that Iran will need to be fended off to avoid an 
imbalance in destruction conversations.  He added that the 
worst case scenario would be for Iran to convince more 
countries that missing the deadlines equates to a lack of 
commitment to the Convention by possessor states.  UK OPCW 
PermRep Parker observed that there will be destruction 
after 2012, and there will be later deadlines for Iraq and 
any other new member states possessing CW.  That reality 
and missed deadlines will make it "less easy for 
absolutists." 
 
----- 
IRAQ 
----- 
 
¶22. (SBU) Olbrich noted that after Iraq submits its initial 
declaration there would be questions of the appropriate 
deadline and assistance.  Mikulak stated that UNSCOM had an 
extensive inventory of the historical program, and had 
destroyed Iraq's weapons and production facilities but not 
to OPCW standards.  He noted the U.S. has encouraged Iraq 
to make a presentation at the upcoming destruction 
informals in April, but said there appear to be significant 
gaps between the experts in Baghdad and both the Foreign 
Ministry and the Iraqi Embassy in The Hague.  He raised the 
question of inspections and the Technical Secretariat's 
preparations to be ready to inspect sites when it is safe 
to do so.  UK OPCW Rep Parker added that the TS would rely 
on the UN rules and procedures on security.  The U.S. and 
UK noted that they would be making brief presentations 
during the destruction informals about their supplementary 
declarations regarding the disposition of chemical weapons 
found in Iraq up until entry into force (EIF) of the 
Convention for Iraq (February 12, 2009). 
 
¶23. (SBU) German Expert Beck inquired whether any 
destruction of chemical weapons would have to be done in 
the open air, and whether there would be one or two 
destruction sites.  That level of detail is not yet known, 
replied the experts, as a detailed destruction plan will 
require considerable further analysis.  On Iraq's deadline, 
the U.S. Rep pointed to Article IV, paragraph 8 as the 
relevant one for states entering after the original 
destruction deadline. The group agreed that, while under 
that paragraph the deadline is set by the Executive 
Council, it would be advisable to have the decision taken 
before the 2009 Conference of States Parties (November 
30-December 4). 
 
¶24. (SBU) Mikulak stated that while the discussion on Iraq 
has tended to focus on the past, it is important to look 
forward.  He said the U.S. plans (see reftel, para 23) to 
encourage the DG to develop a "program for Iraq," including 
how the TS and States Parties can assist Iraq in 
implementation of the Convention and deriving the benefits 
of OPCW's assistance and training.  Rampling stated that 
this was a good idea; the Iraqis appear inexperienced, 
posing both risks and opportunities.  The more positive 
encouragement and guidance the Iraqis receive, the better, 
he said.  French Dep Rep Mari noted Iran's warm welcome to 
Iraq at the last EC, with specific reference to the victims 
issue.  UK Deloff Harrison asked about prospects for Iraq 
to become a member of the Executive Council.  U.S. OPCW Dep 
 
Rep Beik noted that the Iraqi Ambassador had inquired about 
EC membership and how the regional groups worked; he 
appeared quite interested in pursuing an EC seat as soon as 
possible (2010). 
 
----- 
IRAN 
----- 
 
¶25. (SBU) Raharinaivo cited the growing obstructionism of 
Iran at the OPCW and asked what could be done to mitigate 
it.  German OPCW Perm Rep Burkart stated that during the 
last EC, Iran's behavior was less problematic, perhaps due 
to the clash at the Conference of the States Parties (CSP) 
in December.  The NAM had also let Iran know that it had 
gone too far.  U.S. and UK Del Reps agreed that while Iran 
had been more cooperative in EC-55, it was likely an 
exception to the general trend; the Iranian delegate who 
had caused the impasse in December was due to transfer, but 
uncertainty remains on who might replace him.  UK Dep Rep 
suggested Close Allies encourage others to emphasize that 
consensus means compromise and not a veto for Iran.  French 
Dep Rep noted that the Iranians could become difficult on 
procedures for the Director-General selection process, but 
that they will not attack Russia over potential deadline 
delays in the same way as they do the U.S. 
 
¶26. (SBU) Mikulak relayed that questions on Iran's chemical 
weapons programs had been raised with the Government of 
Iran in the past, but not recently.  He suggested that 
Close Allies might consider pursuing such questions 
bilaterally.  Rampling replied that the UK also had such a 
dialogue, but also had not pursued it in recent years.  He 
added that the broader context needs to be maintained -- 
the nuclear dialogue need not be brought into the CW 
dialogue in The Hague; all agreed. 
 
¶27. (C) During a sidebar discussion, Mikulak and Rampling 
discussed working jointly on an approach and questions to 
raise about CWC concerns with Iran.  The UK could possibly 
deliver such questions in what used to be a 
nonproliferation forum where such issues were discussed. 
Separately, UK MOD Rep Harrison recommended that the four 
meet in advance of the April destruction informals to 
discuss our recovered chemical weapons activities in Iraq. 
Based on the German questions on 122mm rockets and the 
locations of Iraqi CW, Harrison believes that a short 
presentation would answer questions and help minimize 
discussion during the actual informals.  Both the U.S. and 
the UK agreed that such a presentation should not discuss 
the legal rationale for the recovery operations, but rather 
an overview of what was recovered and how destruction took 
place. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Election of OPCW Director General 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶28. (SBU) French Rep Raharinaivo stressed the importance of 
choosing a Director-General based on merit, and achieving 
consensus.  Allies agreed, with the German Rep Olbrich 
adding that the Preparatory Commission's agreement that the 
top position should alternate between the developed and the 
developing world should be respected.  He announced Germany 
will have a candidate; the name has not yet been approved 
by the Chancellor.  UK OPCW Perm Rep Parker (who came to 
Paris for only a few hours for this part of the meeting) 
noted that the UK would also sponsor a candidate.  On the 
PrepCom understanding, Parker noted that other States 
Parties may not regard the agreement as binding.  Mikulak 
stated that the U.S. supported the PrepCom agreement, and 
while not popular, it might prove a useful bargaining chip 
later.  He noted that it is useful to have more than one 
Western candidate to avoid North-South polarization in the 
early stages.  However, by late summer, WEOG and 
like-minded states would need to coalesce around the 
strongest candidate, with hope that the others would bow 
out gracefully to avoid splitting Western support.  Parker 
said the key question, in his view, was how to manage a 
number of candidates, and the need at some point to narrow 
the list of Western candidates.  He suggested a 
privately-agreed deadline among like-minded states for 
nominating candidates (perhaps early June) to allow for 
reviewing the prospects of the various Western candidates 
before the Executive Council session in July.  Raharinaivo 
agreed that the smooth withdrawal of weaker candidates 
would be important. 
 
 
¶29. (SBU) On procedures for vetting the candidates, Parker 
told the group that he had advised EC Chairperson Tomova to 
consult only on procedures leading up to candidates 
presenting themselves at the July EC, and not be dragged 
into efforts to predetermine the later stages.  He warned 
that some countries want to shift the weight of the 
decision to the Conference, where the Non-Aligned Movement 
may have greater numbers for a vote.  U.S. Dep Rep noted 
that Mexican Ambassador Lomonaco, the new EC Chair in May, 
plans to pursue extensive bilateral consultations and to 
bring the EC to consensus in October.  Rampling noted for 
the EU members present that the "Brussels dimension" would 
need to be managed, and added that there would not be an EU 
candidate, given several states' interest in the position, 
reportedly including Romania and Italy.  The group agreed 
that discussions amongst Close Allies in The Hague would be 
useful before the April and July Executive Council 
meetings.  Burkart offered to host such a meeting in April; 
France offered the same for late June. 
 
----------------------------- 
Future Evolution of the OPCW 
------------------------------ 
 
¶30. (SBU) Rampling said the UK wanted to follow up on the 
discussion from last June regarding the future of the 
OPCW, noting that its recent paper looks forward to 2020. 
The UK believes the Chemical Weapons Convention will look 
significantly different in the future.  He suggested that 
the Close Allies should share at the September meeting in 
Berlin what each wants to get out of the Executive 
Council meetings over the next two to three years in 
order to formulate goals for the 2011 Review Conference. 
Olbrich agreed this is a good idea and that there is a 
need to eventually shift the discussion from destruction 
to proliferation.  Mikulak agreed, noting the need to 
consider broader evolutionary issues for the OPCW. 
Raharinaivo agreed and noted the importance of thinking 
in terms of nonproliferation and how verification can be 
improved. 
 
¶31. (SBU) Rampling said the main issue for consideration 
is how the CWC will continue to be considered relevant in 
a post-destruction era.  Mikulak agreed and offered that 
not only will nonproliferation be an important issue to 
consider but also what are the security needs and 
interests of other States Parties related to the subject 
matter if the Convention.  He suggested that in addition 
to nonproliferation, safety and security of chemical 
enterprises will be important.  He mentioned recent U.S. 
discussions with the Algerians where they expressed 
interest in these concepts and the prospect that Algeria 
may host a conference mid-year.  He also noted the NAM 
statement at the Executive Council Meeting in February 
2009 mentioned preventing terrorists from acquiring CW 
and this may be a demonstration of the evolution of NAM 
thinking. 
 
¶32. (SBU) German Expert Beck stated that biology and 
chemistry are beginning to converge; knowledge about bio- 
targets for humans, plants and animals would be used to 
develop new chemical agents, and possibly lead to changes 
in what is on the CWC schedules and which chemicals are 
of concern.  French Dep Rep Mari suggested this might be 
useful for the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) to 
consider.  She noted the utility of including the 
scientific community, NGOs and academics in the meetings 
of the BWC and this approach may be useful in CWC fora as 
well. 
 
¶33. (SBU) Mari stated there is a need to consider what to 
do about Article XI (Economic and Technological 
Development) without impacting the Australia Group.  In 
her capacity as facilitator of the Open-Ended Working 
Group on Terrorism she noted the trend of safety and 
security under Article X (Assistance and Protection 
against Chemical Weapons) but reminded that the mandate 
is very broad and welcomed ideas for the Working Group. 
 
¶34. (SBU) Raharinaivo noted the importance of CWC 
universality despite the fact that there are now 186 
Parties.  The French recently demarched Angola and the 
Dominican Republic and will contact The Bahamas soon. 
Angola responded that accession is not currently a 
priority; Dominican Republic answered that this is an 
"ongoing" process.  Mikulak informed that The Bahamas 
 
recently had two workshops and it seems they will accede 
in the near future.  He also noted that the Dominican 
Republic has passed accession paperwork through their 
Parliament but a demarche may be helpful to push it 
through their Executive Branch.  He reiterated that Egypt 
and Israel have agreed to "technical goodwill visits," 
which are intended to be a forum to discuss in practical 
measures how the Convention works.  Mari noted the OPCW 
DG's concern about lack of responses from Egypt, Israel 
and Syria for the planned workshop in Turkey in mid- 
April; the EU is considering a demarche to the three 
targeted non-member states (Egypt, Syria and Israel) to 
emphasize the need for their political-level involvement. 
Rampling emphasized how imperative it is to keep chemical 
and biological issues on the Middle East security agenda; 
these issues "nedd to be tackled strategically." 
 
------------------------ 
Chemical Incapacitants 
------------------------ 
 
¶35. (C) In a separate smaller session, the Allies began 
discussing political, technical and security concerns 
with the potential use of chemical incapacitants, 
including the implications within the CWC and other broad 
national interests.  Mikulak noted Allies' desire to 
address this issue before the Second Review Conference, 
but stressed the need to properly prepare the groundwork 
first before such a sensitive issue could be brought 
forward; such a discussion would have been 
counterproductive and potentially problematic as it would 
have caused a distraction from the work already underway. 
He also highlighted the need to be careful with 
terminology.  Many critics of the U.S. have conflated the 
incapacitant and riot control agent issues with the term 
"non-lethal," which is problematic because it commingles 
two issues with very different policy contexts.  The use 
of fentanyls by Russia in 2002 brings in another dynamic, 
further necessitating the need for making clear where we 
have legitimate concerns. 
 
¶36. (C) The UK introduced a nonpaper on "Law Enforcement 
Chemicals and The Chemical Weapons Convention" and 
provided a brief outline of its main points.  Rampling 
agreed with the U.S. that the Second RevCon was not the 
right forum to begin discussing incapacitants and that 
"non-lethals" encompasses items outside of the scope of 
the issue.  He distinguished RCAs from incapacitants by 
stating that RCAs have short-term disabling effects, 
whereas incapacitant often require a medical antidote to 
end the effects.  He went on to state that no country has 
come out and called the 2002 use of fentanyls by the 
Russians a violation of the CWC.  He raised several 
issues:  States Parties may covertly develop 
incapacitating chemicals (or "other law enforcement 
chemicals" (LEC) as preferred by the UK) under the guise 
of law enforcement; there has been no discussion to date 
on what falls under law enforcement; we do not know what 
countries think about the issue and if countries have 
positions on what the next steps are; and we do not know 
how states may use these incapacitants nationally or 
internationally.  He also offered a few options for the 
group's consideration:  1) voluntary reporting could be 
considered; 2) storage limits could be established; 3) 
prohibitions on the use with certain projectiles or 
munitions could be established; and the Scientific 
Advisory Board (SAB) could explore the technical issues 
associated with these agents. 
 
¶37. (C) Olbrich welcomed this first discussion and will 
relay the discussions to his MOD colleagues.  He noted 
with satisfaction that with the exception of the Swiss 
proposal, incapacitants did not enter the RevCon debate 
nor did they appear in the final report text.  He 
referenced a Canadian paper that was tabled in the WEOG 
before the RevCon, but pulled shortly thereafter. 
Olbrich said he did not know if Canada still supported 
its previous proposal.  He asked participants what their 
positions are on the Swiss proposals.  His opinion was 
that the terms are good but the conclusions may not be 
supported by all.  During the February SAB meeting, the 
German Rep said that one of the drafters of the Swiss 
proposal is still interested in moving forward with 
discussions on the proposal.  France said that it has not 
done any research into the incapacitant issue to date, 
but would begin an internal dialogue and review existing 
documents on the subject. 
 
 
¶38. (C) Mikulak reiterated that DoD is not developing or 
using chemical incapacitants and further that the U.S. 
holds that incapacitants are covered under the General 
Purpose Criterion in the CWC.  UK MOD Deloff Harrison 
stated that the UK has begun engaging the NGO community 
on this subject to educate them on what the issues are 
from a government perspective.  They believe the NGO 
community is more sympathetic to the associated issues 
than they were before the RevCon when several questions 
came in through parliament on the subject. 
 
¶39. (C) Germany stated that we should look at what our 
knowledge is on the subject and what our internal legal 
analyses are.  Olbrich offered a half-day follow-on 
session after the next Allied meeting to provide national 
assessments.  Mikulak added that the quad allies need to 
understand the underlying security issues as well as 
political issues.  He suggested that the four look at 
foreign activities on incapacitants and provide a threat 
assessment in September; others agreed. 
 
-------------- 
Participants 
-------------- 
 
¶40. (U) French Delegation:  Jacques Raharinaivo, Deputy 
Director for Multilateral Affairs, Disarmament and 
Conventional Arms Control, MFA; Marie-Gaelle Robles, MFA 
BWC Desk Officer; Annie Mari, Deputy Perm Rep to OPCW; 
Frank Tecourt, MFA CWC Desk Officer, Isabelle Daoust- 
Maleval and Stephanie de la Peschardiere, MOD Department 
for Strategic Affairs; Stephanie Dare-Doyen, 
Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety Institute; and Mathieu 
Pampin, Health Safety and Security Agency. 
 
German Delegation:  Werner Burkart, PermRep to OPCW; 
Alexander Olbrich, Director, BW/CW Division, MFA; Holger 
Ruthe, Deputy Director, BW/CW Division; Volker Beck, BW 
Expert, MFA; and Juliane Thummel, BW/CW Division, MFA. 
 
UK Delegation:  Chris Rampling, Deputy Head (WMD), 
Counter-Proliferation Deparment, FCO; Amb. Lyn Parker, 
PermRep to OPCW; Steve Crossman, Head of CBW Section, 
MFA; Karen Wolstenholme, Deputy PermRep to OPCW; James 
Harrison, Deputy Head, Counter Proliferation and Security 
Cooperation, MoD; Lorna Miller, Senior Biological 
Adviser, MoD; Clive Rowland, Chemical Arms Control, MoD; 
John Foggo, Head, CWC National Authority, Dept. of Energy 
and Climate Change; and Karl Rodrigues, CWC National 
Authority. 
 
U.S. Delegation:  Dr. Robert Mikulak, Director, Office of 
Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction, State; 
Janet Beik, Deputy PermRep to OPCW; Jennie Gromoll, 
Deputy Director, Office of Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Threat Reduction, State; Katharine Crittenberger, 
Deputy Director, Biological Weapons, Bureau of Verification, 
Compliance, and Implementation; Stephanie Mirabello, Biological 
Weapons, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation; 
Johnathan Beckett, Deputy Director, Chemical Affairs, Bureau of 
Verification, Compliance, and Implementation; and Sarah Rodjom, 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
 
¶41. (SBU) This cable was drafted by the U.S. Delegation and has 
been cleared by U.S. Representative Robert Mikulak. 
 
 
PEKALA