R 181703Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4745
INFO ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L OUAGADOUGOU 000187 
 
 
DEPT FOR AF/W DORSEY LOCKHART 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM UV
SUBJECT: DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS IN BURKINA FASO IN 2010 AND BEYOND 
 
Classified by Charge d'Affairs Samuel C. Laeuchli for reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In the next three to five years, Burkina Faso's 
fledgling democracy has the potential to make significant progress. 
Priority areas include: merging and strengthening the numerous weak 
and fragmented opposition parties; increasing the capacity of 
political parties to conduct campaigns through training and access to 
resources; improving the education of the electorate; and enhancing 
freedom of the media.  While the government and political parties 
must make many of these improvements on their own, opposition parties 
and the media would also benefit from enhanced training.  While any 
short-term improvements will not significantly impact the 2010 
presidential elections, they will be key for the elections in 2015. 
All advancements will be for naught, however, if President Blaise 
Compaore decides to change the constitution and run for re-election 
in 2015.  At this point, only Compaore knows what he will do.  End 
Summary. 
 
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Burkina's weak and fragmented opposition 
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¶2. (C) There are currently no less than 130 different, active, 
political parties in Burkina Faso.  Political leaders agree that the 
numerous parties are a serious impediment to increasing the power and 
influence of any individual opposition group.  Further exacerbating 
the problem is the fact that much of the "opposition" actually 
supports the President and his policies although they are not 
officially aligned with the ruling party, the Congress for Democracy 
and Progress (CDP).  The Alliance for Democracy and 
Federation/African Democratic Rally (ADF/RDA) is the second largest 
party in Burkina after the CDP.  While the ADF/RDA considers itself 
to be the major opposition party, it supports the President 99 
percent of the time and is included in Compaore's government.  Of the 
38 opposition members elected to the National Assembly in 2007, 25 
are known to be closely aligned with President Compaore and/or the 
ruling CDP, leaving only 13 true opposition members. 
 
¶3. (U) The large number of parties means that public resources for 
campaign finance and for establishing party offices throughout the 
country are potentially very limited.  However, in order to qualify 
for public campaign financing, parties must have earned at least five 
percent of the votes in the last election.  Therefore, only the CDP 
and ADF/RDA now qualify for public funding.  While the National 
Independent Commission for Elections (CENI) and National Assembly are 
considering lowering this requirement to three percent, such a change 
would still only allow five parties to receive funding.  Currently, 
the CDP has a stronghold on all areas of politics within Burkina Faso 
because it benefits from significant government funding and it 
benefited from pre-Compaore political infrastructures, making it the 
only party with active political leadership in each of the country's 
45 provinces. 
 
¶4. (C) In recent years, several opposition groups have combined their 
efforts, forming coalitions to prepare for elections.  Of these 
groups, the most promising for the future is the left-leaning 
Sankarist coalition.  This group of parties supports the 
socialist-era principles of the former Burkinabe President, Thomas 
Sankara.  Among the Sankarist parties, the most prominent is the 
Union for Rebirth/Sankarists Movement (UNIR/MS) party.  Benewende 
Sankara, UNIR/MS leader and former presidential candidate, told 
Poloff that, pending discussions at their March, 2009 planning 
conference, the Sankarists will select a common candidate for the 
2010 Presidential elections.  Unfortunately, coalition groups in 
Burkina Faso have historically had a short lifespan, eventually 
returning to the same fragmented parties that existed before they 
were merged. 
 
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Burkina's uneducated electorate 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Another fundamental problem that must be addressed in the 
coming years is that of literacy and civic education for the general 
population.  Mahama Sawadogo, the leader of the CDP in the National 
Assembly, was particularly concerned about the impact of education on 
democracy in Burkina Faso.  In 2007, the World Bank estimated that 
over 70 percent of Burkina's population was illiterate.  Sawadogo 
personally estimated that this number was even higher -- closer to 90 
percent.  He commented that due to literacy problems, the electorate 
is often manipulated, particularly in rural areas, which has led to 
election fraud.  Sankara, of UNIR/MS, told Poloff that the general 
population does not even understand the purpose of voting, and those 
that do vote do not understand the harm of participating in fraud, 
such as accepting payment for their votes.  The problems worsen when 
cultural norms permit men and local chiefs to dictate their spouses' 
and villages' votes.  In previous elections, opposition groups have 
accused the CDP of buying votes and tampering with ballot boxes by 
manipulating these societal weaknesses.  In a similar vein, Sankara 
believed that improving voter education will increase the 
transparency of the elections and will enable parties to campaign 
according to their platforms rather than personal relationships or 
bribes. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
In Preparation for 2010 Presidential elections 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6. (C) In order to make progress, ADF/RDA and UNIR/MS members agreed 
that opposition parties will need: (1) to greatly alter their 
strategies for developing coalitions and seeking support from the 
public; (2) training; and (3) resources they can use to create 
political bases throughout the country.  The government and political 
opposition groups must work together to improve campaign practices 
and to allow opposition groups to have access to public funding.  The 
overwhelming influence and resources accessible to the CDP are 
additional obstacles the opposition must overcome.  According to 
Sawadogo, comparing the CDP to opposition parties is "like comparing 
David and Goliath."  While opposition and CDP members did not 
specifically comment on the 2010 presidential candidates to Poloff, 
they implied that President Compaore is widely expected to run, and 
to win with a sweeping majority. 
 
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Prospects for 2015 elections 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) In 2015, Compaore could decide to run again by amending the 
constitution, or he could step aside and groom one his supporters 
and/or advisors to run as the CDP candidate (with support from 
smaller allied parties).  In 2000, President Compaore and the CDP 
altered Burkina Faso's constitution limiting the presidential mandate 
to two terms of five years.  In 2005, following a petition from 
UNIR/MS leader Benewende Sankara, the constitutional court ruled that 
the 2000 amendment was not retroactive, thereby legitimizing 
Compaore's candidacy in 2005 and allowing him to run again in 2010 
despite the fact that he has been in office since 1987.  Compaore won 
the 2005 elections with an overwhelming majority of the votes.  The 
remaining votes were divided between thirteen other candidates, who 
each received between five and less than point five percent of the 
votes. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment: While the outcome of the 2010 Presidential election 
is not entirely a 'fait accompli,' significant democratic development 
is not a short-term proposition.  The real focus for Burkina's 
opposition will be the 2015 elections.  With political will from the 
sitting government, the ruling party and opposition leaders, and 
input from the international donor community, Burkina Faso can make 
significant progress between now and 2015 by training politicians, 
the media, and the public in democratic values and basic education. 
Opposition leaders must also commit to work together, at time 
relinquishing their leadership roles to form solid and sustainable 
coalition groups. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment cont'd: Ultimately, the major factor for the 2015 
elections will be whether Compaore decides to run.  Within the 
national government, he faces few obstacles to changing the 
constitution.  While he seems to care deeply about international 
opinions, Compaore's (or his supporters') desire to remain in power 
could outweigh any concerns about his image in the international 
community.  U.S. initiatives such as the National Democratic 
Institute Project to strengthen the capacity of political parties 
(scheduled to start this year) and future projects to train the media 
will influence the progress of democracy in the face of these 
challenges.  Ultimately, the litmus test for Burkina's democracy will 
be on the road to 2015 and not in 2010. 
 
LAEUCHLI