VZCZCXRO7953
PP RUEHPA RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNK #0202/01 0711818
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121818Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8225
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0531
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0453
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0516
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2058
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0863
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0091
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0972

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000202 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2012 
TAGS: PREL PGOV USAU LY MR
SUBJECT: QADHAFI LEAVES MAURITANIA WORSE THAN HE FOUND IT 
 
REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 195 
     ¶B. NOUAKCHOTT 191 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and 
d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Libyan leader Qadhafi's visit to Mauritania 
saw the President of the African Union pursue a mediation 
policy in direct opposition to the pro-democracy position of 
the international community he was ostensibly recommending. 
Qadhafi embraced the junta's plan for return to civilian (if 
not democratic) rule via June elections even has he chided 
Mauritania for being duped by western influence into trying a 
democratic experiment that was "inappropriate" for an Arab 
culture.  The opposition forces -- both the President's FNDD 
movement and Ahmed Ould Daddah's RFD party -- have again 
found common ground against the military's agenda although 
Ould Daddah continues to oppose the return of President 
Abdallahi even as a transition authority.  The regime will 
use Qadhafi's visit as evidence of international support 
while opposition forces -- who have said Qadhafi is no longer 
acceptable as a mediator -- will ask the international 
community to distance themselves from Qadhafi's statements. 
End Summary 
 
-------- 
48 Hours 
-------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Charge met March 12 with FNDD "Foreign Minister" 
Mohamed Ould Maouloud soon after Qadhafi had flown out of 
Nouakchott.  Despite the swirl of activity of the past 
several days, Maouloud was relaxed and dismissed Qadhafi's 
mediation as an unfortunate distraction that the 
International Consultative Group on Mauritania (ICG-M) should 
have anticipated before giving the inherently undemocratic 
Libyan leader a mandate to same Mauritanian democracy 
(Comment: The French Charge suggested essentially the same 
thing to Charge saying "the February 20 meeting gave Qadhafi 
the mandate because everyone is tired of Mauritania -- nobody 
expected success).  Maouloud recounted Qadhafi's undemocratic 
statements reported in REFTELs but told Charge, "we had hoped 
this was just his negotiating style and that he was being 
equally tough on everyone else."  Maouloud said any hope of 
legitimate mediation was gone when Qadhafi called FNDD, RFD, 
and regime leaders together March 9 for a two hour meeting. 
Qadhafi ran into his litany that the democratic system is a 
method of western control over Africa imposing a system that 
is inappropriate for Africa.  He noted that most of Africa's 
leaders came to power through force which is the natural 
state of things.  Now that Aziz has taken power, it is 
logical that he should keep it -- so FNDD calls for the 
return of President Abdallahi are "unrealistic."  Qadhafi 
called for acceptance of the June 6 elections which he 
presumed would lead to the election of Aziz as a civilian 
leader adding "Aziz won't rule alone -- there will be space 
for you."  The FNDD delegation (including Ould Maouloud, 
President of the National Assembly Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, 
and President of the Social and Economic Council Ahmed Ould 
Sidi Baba) dismissed the Guides approach saying they would 
not even start talks until the June 6 elections were 
scrapped.  They argued that the only acceptable solution had 
to pass through the return of the elected President.  Ahmed 
Ould Daddah also declared himself against the June elections 
or any elections organized by the regime, but stressed 
elections organized by of government of national unity 
without Abdallahi's return were the best route.  Regime 
representatives told Qadhafi "we agree exactly with your 
position" while telling Ould Maouloud, "the time for dialogue 
is over -- that's what you did in Libya.  This is the 
conclusion of that dialogue."  The closed doors meeting was 
followed by Qadhafi's public speech when he told Mauritanians 
to forget the past and look to the future after the June 6 
elections.  The FNDD delegation walked out with this public 
declaration in support of the junta's political plan. 
 
¶3.  (C) Qadhafi's envoy Medhani asked the FNDD leadership to 
meet with Qadhafi one more time the morning of March 12 but 
the FNDD refused saying there was nothing more to talk about. 
 National Assembly President Ould Boulkheir was, however, 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000202  002 OF 003 
 
 
authorized to meet as a "protocol requirement."  According to 
Ould Maouloud, Ould Boulkheir told Qadhafi that he was no 
longer acceptable as a mediator.  Qadhafi reportedly tried 
unsuccessfully to leave the door open for future engagement 
suggesting the FNDD had misinterpreted his statements.  After 
still being rebuffed, Qadhafi made an unambiguous statement 
in support of the June 6 elections suggesting "the AU 
sanctions dossier is now closed because the military have 
committed to a return to civilian role." 
 
¶4.  (C) Ould Maouloud told Charge that President Abdallahi 
would be reaching out to the international community over the 
next week to reject Qadhafi's anti-democratic "mediation." 
Ould Maouloud was particularly interested in getting the AU's 
Commissioner Jean Ping to distance the AU from Qadhafi.  The 
March 17 meeting of the African Union's Peace and Security 
Council under the chairmanship of Burkina Faso is seen as key 
in restating the AU's opposition to the coup. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Ahmed Ould Daddah -- the "French Guy" 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Following the FNDD's walkout, Ould Maouloud said he 
had met at length with Ahmed Ould Daddah to try to build a 
unified front against the regime.  Ould Maouloud pushed hard 
to get Ould Daddah to support the FNDD position saying the 
President would: (a) create a government of national unity 
that would include Ould Daddah's people, (b) would 
immediately move towards early elections, and (c) would yield 
all executive power to the Prime Minister assuming an 
essentially symbolic role that nonetheless re-established 
constitutional legitimacy.  Ould Maouloud argued this offered 
Ould Daddah the best chance of free and fair elections that 
might see him fulfill his dream of being elected -- something 
both of them knew would not happen under elections organized 
by the regime.  When Ould Daddah persisted in saying he would 
not accept Abdallahi's return -- no matter how short and 
symbolic that return might be -- Ould Maouloud pushed on "Why 
not?"  Ould Daddah replied "because the international 
community doesn't want Abdallahi back." 
¶6.  (C) Consistent with the FNDD's very skeptical view of 
French influence, Ould Maouloud told Charge that by saying 
the "international community" Ould Daddah really meant "the 
French."  Ould Maouloud said he is still convinced that the 
French (at least the French security services) had supported 
the coup probably out of concern over Abdallahi's Islamist 
tendencies.  The theory continues that the French assumed the 
coup would be fast and unopposed leading to a military regime 
that would meet French security and commercial interests. 
Ould Maouloud suggested that now the French are against 
Abdallahi's return because "they are afraid they will be 
punished for their support of the coup" by a new government 
that will be increasingly pro-American.  Ould Maouloud 
believes Ould Daddah is being spurred on by the French to 
oppose Abdallahi's return to ensure they don't loose 
influence.  Charge responded that, contrary to what might be 
assumed, there is no French - American competition for 
influence in Mauritania.  Despite Mission efforts before the 
coup, there is virtually no American commercial interest in 
Mauritania's oil and minerals -- a fact the French are well 
aware of. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The colorful twists Qadhafi added to the political 
process were not unexpected but they leave the situation even 
more muddled.  The regime will now certainly claim to have 
the support of the "international community's representative" 
while anti-coup forces need to reconstruct an international 
position of condemnation.  While some international partners 
are likely to distance themselves from Qadhafi, not all will 
-- leading to an even more fractured international stance. 
The FNDD and Ould Daddah are again of common cause against 
the coup, but the underlying personalities (and, possibly, 
Ould Daddah's belief he can come out on top) continue to 
prevent a united front that can effectively counter the coup. 
 European diplomatic partners from France and Spain were 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000202  003 OF 003 
 
 
clearly upset with Qadhafi's mediation -- with the French 
Charge noting "he missed a historic moment as head of the 
UNSC and AU to show he could be a responsible world leader." 
The EC Representative was sure the European Commission would 
be quick to state that what Qadhafi did was not reflect the 
views of the international partners.  The assumption remains 
that Aziz will go forward with his election plans and, in all 
likelihood, win those empty elections. 
HANKINS