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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101145Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8209
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0529
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0451
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0513
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2056
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0860
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0089
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0967

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000195 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV USAU LY MR
SUBJECT: QADHAFI WILL SETTLE FOR A JOINT DECLARATION ON 
MAURITANIA MEDIATION 
 
REF: NOUAKCHOTT 191 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and 
d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Negative review of Libya meeting:  Charge met evening 
of March 9 with President Abdallahi's Chief of Staff Ahmed 
Kaber Ould Hammoudi at Hammoudi's request.  Hammoudi provided 
much the same readout on the Libya visit as provided by FNDD 
rotating President Abeidna in REFTEL (Hammoudi seemed unaware 
Abeidna had already briefed the Charge).  Hammoudi confirmed 
that in two personal meetings with President Abdallahi, 
Qadhafi had pushed hard to get the President to resign -- at 
one point giving Abdallahi a pre-written resignation letter 
for him to sign.  Qadhafi's theme was that democracy and 
political parties were inappropriate for the African context 
and that progress and security demanded strong long-term 
leaders.  While no written plan was offered, Qadhafi wanted 
essentially what Aziz wants -- both Abdallahi and Aziz resign 
with the President of the Senate managing a short-term 
"government of consensus" leading to elections in which Aziz 
could be a candidate.  Abdallahi told Qadhafi "no deal" 
adding that he was determined that any solution to the crisis 
has to end with the coup "failing" if there is any hope to 
get Mauritania out of the cycle of recurrent military 
takeovers.  Hammoudi said the President left Tripoli with 
confirmation of what he feared -- he can expect nothing 
useful from Qadhafi because "he doesn't care about democracy 
and he doesn't care about legitimacy." 
 
¶2.  (C) Still Playing Nice With Qadhafi:  Hammoudi told 
Charge that as long as Qadhafi does not openly come out with 
a formal plan along the lines they heard in Libya, the 
President and FNDD will not openly criticize him.  He related 
that the African Union's Jean Ping had voiced his frustration 
with Qadhafi during his meeting with Abdallahi.  Ping -- who 
saw a tough year ahead working with Qadhafi -- said Qadhafi 
was clearly not sticking to the policy line set by the 
African Union as a whole.  Ping reportedly told Abdallahi he 
was prepared to publicly distance himself from Qadhafi if the 
Guide tries to force a deal that is unacceptable. 
 
¶3.  (C) Qadhafi doesn't want to leave Nouakchott empty 
handed:  Hammoudi said the FNDD and President's staff have 
remained in close contact with Qadhafi's staff since 
Qadhafi's colorful arrival in Nouakchott March 9.  Abdallahi 
had declined a request that he come from Lemden to Nouakchott 
to meet Qadhafi at the airport saying, "I won't stand next to 
Aziz like we are two equals."  Abdallahi invited Qadhafi 
instead to Lemden -- with the Libyans saying "we'll consider 
it."  The FNDD has also decided to boycott Qadhafi's 
scheduled speech to the joint houses of parliament since FNDD 
co-leader and President of the National Assembly Messaoud 
Ould Boulkheir -- who had met just days earlier with Qadhafi 
-- was not advised of Qadhafi's desire to meet parliament. 
Hammoudi said Qadhafi sees he will not be able to wrap up a 
deal while in Nouakchott so is trying to put together a 
face-saving "joint declaration" about his initiative.  The 
informal draft received by the FNDD includes: 
 
(a) A recognition that the three parties to the crisis -- the 
FNDD, the High State Council, and "opposition forces" (note 
-- meaning Ahmed Ould Daddah's RFD but not saying so 
implicitly) engage to reach a solution to the political 
crisis. 
(b) A statement by the three parties welcoming the mediation 
efforts of Qadhafi who "has been asked by the international 
community to find a solution." 
(c) A commitment to find a solution "that restores 
constitutional order and constitutional institutions." 
(d) A commitment to end media campaigns that attack or 
denigrate the other parties. 
(e) A commitment to release the FNDD detainees 
 
Hammoudi noted the formal commitment to release FNDD 
detainees (notably Prime Minister Waghef) is obviously 
attractive but indicated the FNDD would insist on at least 
three changes: (a) adding President Abdallahi as a 4th party 
independent of the FNDD, (b) a commitment to allow all 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000195  002 OF 002 
 
 
parties access to public media, and (c) having the military 
abandon its plans leading to new elections in June.  In 
discussing with Charge Qadhafi's apparent view that he has a 
personal mandate to mediate a deal, Hammoudi thought they 
would also want to stipulate that they welcome Qadhafi's 
mediation "with Jean Ping on behalf of and consistent with 
the decisions of the African Union."  Hammoudi does not 
expect Qadhafi to accept these changes and assumes Qadhafi 
will leave without a declaration. 
 
¶4.  (C) Expecting More Problems:  Hammoudi said they had 
learned from an un-named Libyan that, seeing he would not be 
able to get an easy concession from President Abdallahi, 
Qadhafi had told his staff to "come up with a solution that 
doesn't include Abdallahi."  While Hammoudi did not say so 
directly, it appears that Abdallahi's insistence to identify 
himself as a party distinct from the FNDD reflects concern 
Qadhafi will now look to suborn individual FNDD leaders to 
try to get them to sign a deal without the President. 
 
¶5.  (C) Comment -- What If?  Hammoudi was caught off guard 
when asked what the President would do if they got the main 
things they have asked for -- Aziz drops the plans for 
elections June 6 and the FNDD leaders are released from 
prison.  Charge noted the President had previously been 
adamant that he would never accept Aziz as a party to any 
negotiations on a political resolution.  It did not appear 
that Hammoudi had seriously considered the possibility 
Qadhafi might be able to deliver on their demands and; 
therefore, doesn't really have a strategy for what next.  As 
in most contacts with the FNDD leadership, we have found 
little thinking about how they might actually accept to be 
able to close an acceptable deal.  They avoid discussions, 
for instance, of who might be an acceptable Prime Minister 
for a significantly strengthened and independent transition 
government.  NDI, which has been working closely with the 
FNDD parties, unions and civil society groups that have been 
pulled together as the National Coordination for Democracy 
tends to be dominated by the parties leaving little room for 
their non-political partners and closing off some important 
"what next?" discussions.  FNDD rotating President Abeidna 
has told Charge he has been trying to get his colleagues to 
build a closing and transition strategy (believing, like 
Charge, that if the opportunity for an acceptable deal comes 
it will come quickly and may be fleeting).  So far, his more 
politically experienced FNDD colleagues have told Abeidna -- 
"it's too early for that."  The FNDD is a very diverse group. 
 It could be the older politicians know they will have a 
tough time sticking together and suppressing individual 
political ambitions if success really seems attainable. 
HANKINS