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FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
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RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0557
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0962

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NOUAKCHOTT 000191 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM USAU LY MR
SUBJECT: FNDD READOUT ON QADHAFI'S MEDIATION 
 
REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 00189 
     ¶B. NOUAKCHOTT 00187 
     ¶C. NOUAKCHOTT 00188 
 
Classified By: Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reas 
ons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  On the day of President Abdallahi's return 
from Libya and the eve of Qadhafi's visit to Mauritania, 
rotating FNDD President Abdel Koudouss Abeidna remains 
skeptical about the success of a Libyan mediation and 
believes only targeted sanctions will precipitate a solution 
to the crisis.  President Abdallahi told Qadhafi he will not 
resign but is willing to discuss any other options. 
Nevertheless, Qadhafi, although aware that Abdallahi has more 
popular support than the Libyans originally thought, 
expressed it would be difficult to make the military step 
down and said the president had to be willing to give 
something up.  Qadhafi was reportedly chided by the African 
Union's Ping for not sticking to AU policy on Mauritania. 
Abeidna also talked about the regional and international 
impact of the Israeli's expulsion from Mauritania and the 
regime's closeness to Iran.  He wondered why the Europeans 
are not more concerned about the security implications of 
Iran's involvement in Mauritania.  Finally, he stated that 
the FNDD plans to reach out to Uganda to accelerate Security 
Council sanctions.  FNDD also plans to use Mauritania's 
alliance with Iran to ask members of the Arab League -- 
including Morocco -- to be more supportive of the AU.  End 
summary. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
THE PRESIDENT RETURNED TO LEMDEN UNPROTECTED 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  Abdel Koudouss Abeidna, in a March 8 meeting with 
Charge and PolOff, confirmed that President Abdallahi 
returned from Libya that same day and had traveled directly 
from the airport to his native village of Lemden.  Abeidna 
explained that the FNDD feels the president is safer in 
Lemden and advised him to remain there.  As a result, 
President Abdallahi will not greet Qadhafi upon his arrival 
on March 9.  Nevertheless, some FNDD members want to host a 
reception for the guide.  Note:  Charge told Abeidna he 
intends to attend Qadhafi's meet and greet at the airport if 
invited and any receptions hosted by Qadhafi.  Nevertheless, 
he will decline any invitations to state dinners organized by 
General Aziz in Qadhafi's honor.  End note. 
 
¶3.  (C)  In response to Charge's question on Libyan security 
arrangements for President Abdallahi's trip, Abeidna stated 
that the Libyans had offered someone to accompany the 
President to and from Libya.  Nevertheless, the President and 
his entourage were surprised when they were put in separate 
planes from the Libyans, which made them somehow nervous. 
Abeidna also said that a military officer had facilitated the 
trip from Lemden to the airport but no expediters had been 
provided for the President's return to Lemden. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
ABDALLAHI SATISFIED WITH SHOW OF SUPPORT 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Abeidna repeatedly stressed the President's 
satisfaction with the populace's show of support at his 
arrival to Nouakchott from Lemden on March 6 (see ref A). 
According to Abeidna, the Libyans were impressed and realized 
for the first time that Abdallahi has a considerable number 
of supporters. Abeidna stated that the president's visit had 
changed the Libyan mind-set since they had been consistently 
told by the regime that Abdallahi was finished and had no 
real support. 
 
-------------------------------- 
ABDALLAHI'S MEETING WITH QADHAFI 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000191  002 OF 005 
 
 
¶5.  (C)  Abeidna said the President had found in Tripoli 
pretty much what they had expected -- which wasn't very much. 
 Qadhafi was not sticking to the guidance laid down by the 
African Union and was in fact dismissive of democracy. The 
meeting may have had some impact on Qadhafi, and seemed to 
have had a significant impact on Qadhafi's diplomatic 
advisors who were impressed and surprised by the scale of 
support for Abdallahi.  Abeidna, stressing that this was 
close hold within the inner circles of the FNDD, said, "If 
Qadhafi comes up with something useful, we are of course 
prepared to work with him.  If he gives us more of the same, 
the President will play him along, but yield nothing, since 
breaking him will push him in with the military." 
 
¶6.  (C)  Abeidna said that, in his meetings with Abdallahi, 
Qadhafi had generally stuck to listening to the president's 
position but had then gone off the AU script by suggesting 
that democracy was not and appropriate system for Mauritania 
and just a reflection of Western manipulation and stating 
that as the military were effectively in power it would be 
difficult to evict them, and that the president should be 
ready to give something up. 
¶7.  (C)  President Abdallahi, according to Abeidna, told 
Qadhafi he will we was "prepared to do just about anything 
except resign since that act would "hand over the presidency 
and the country to Aziz on a silver platter."  Other than 
that, he is open to any discussions.  Throughout the meeting, 
Abeidna stressed President Abdallahi's refusal to resign and 
said that if they want to reach an agreement, Qadhafi will 
have to get rid of the military. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Abeidna said the Libyans regurgitated General Aziz's 
plan to step down in order to run for office and transfer the 
country to the president of the senate.  Their approach was 
very much "ni... ni..." (neither Aziz, nor Abdallahi).  The 
president's response was that he did not need Qadhafi to 
follow that plan. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Abeidna revealed Jean Ping arrived the second day of 
the meetings, supposedly following U.S. advice.  AU Peace and 
Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra told Abeidna that 
Qadhafi had said he did not care about the international 
community and "would solve the Mauritanian problem his way." 
Ping said he told Qadhafi he should not think as a Libyan 
leader anymore but as an AU leader.  Abeidna said Ping was 
"going crazy" over Qadhafi's tenure as AU President. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
DEMOCRACY'S TRIUMPH NOT IN QADHAFI'S INTEREST 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  Abeidna claims that Qadhafi is both impressed by 
and afraid of the FNDD.  An FNDD victory would change the 
mind-set of politicians in North Africa and could represent a 
threat to Qadhafi in his own country.  He noted, "This is the 
first time he has seen North Africans really fighting for 
democracy -- even against European sentiment."  Nevertheless, 
Abeidna expects Qadhafi's visit to Nouakchott to go smoothly 
but suspects that "Qadahfi will play tricks before leaving." 
 
-------------------- 
QADHAFI MAY NOT COME 
-------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  Abeidna suggested that Qadhafi may cancel his trip 
to Nouakchott if he does not reach an agreement with at least 
one of the parties.  According to Abeidna, Qadhafi would not 
risk coming and having to leave empty handed. (Comment -- all 
indications his arrival is still on for the afternoon of the 
9th.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
BRING ON THE SANCTIONS! (AND LET THEM EAT CAKE) 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶12.  (C)  Abeidna kept coming back to the subject of 
sanctions.  He said Ping and Lamamra told him sanctions were 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000191  003 OF 005 
 
 
taking time as the AU was having problems with the Spanish. 
The Europeans believe that individual sanctions should bring 
increased humanitarian aid.  According to Abeidna, this would 
not really be sanctions but more "like taking from one hand 
to put in the other."  He stated that if the international 
community, and particularly the EU, distributes food, it will 
be giving General Aziz more time.  Abeidna believes that the 
more there are shortages, the quicker the regime will fall. 
Charge stated that the U.S. did not want people to suffer and 
would not use humanitarian aid as a political instrument. 
Abeidna answered that the FNDD, even though accused by 
General Aziz of the contrary, did not want Mauritanians to 
starve but stated that they don't want General Aziz to use 
international community food for his own benefit.  "If aid 
goes through the UN that's fine," said Abeidna, as the FNDD 
"would not want General Aziz to say the U.S. has recognized 
him." 
 
¶13.  (C)  For the FNDD, targeted sanctions are the only 
measure that would trigger a quick resolution to the crisis. 
According to Abeidna, the moment sanctions are declared "they 
will be like roaches looking for a hideout."  He suggested 
sanctions against Mohamed Hmayenne Bouamatou, cement mogul 
Sahraoui Salek (NFI) and Mauritania's main sugar and flour 
importer Bahaye Ould Ghadda. 
 
¶14.  (C)  Charge told Abeidna that sanctions against someone 
like Bouamatou would be relatively easy to adopt since his 
pro-coup actions were quite visible -- whereas it is harder 
to make the case against other financiers.  The U.S. would 
needed concrete evidence about the others' linkages to the 
regime.  Abeidna stated he could ask the FNDD to provide 
evidence of their support to the coup, which they have 
financed directly and indirectly.  Charge stated proof about 
alien smuggling and drug trafficking would be extremely 
useful.  Abeidna said state evidence exists but it is in the 
government's hands and could only be retrieved if Abdallahi 
came back to power.  Abeidna accused former President 
Haidallah and Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall of involvement in 
drug trafficking.  He said he feared that if these 
allegations were true, what happened in Guinea-Bissau could 
happen in Mauritania. 
 
------------------- 
THE JUNTA HAS MONEY 
------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C)  According to Abeidna, the junta has the money to 
organize elections.  He implied that they were behaving as if 
Qadhafi had given them a big check.  He also said that 
Qadhafi probably paid to obtain the regime's permission to 
travel with weapons.  Charge explained this was not unusual 
for the Libyans who always had unreasonable demands when 
traveling and ruffled feathers by the time they left.  "I 
wonder how much longer the regime can go on, even if Qadhafi 
pays for the month's bills," Abeidna said. 
 
------------------------------ 
ALIGNING WITH THE AXIS OF EVIL 
------------------------------ 
 
¶16.  (C)  Abeidna explained that Morocco's decision to sever 
ties with Iran March 6 was a clear message to Mauritanians 
that if they wanted to be part of the Axis of Evil, they 
would have to do so without Morocco's support.  "Moroccans 
sent us the message that we are on our own."  Mauritania's 
closeness to Iran puts them in opposition to Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt, countries that have traditionally supported 
Mauritania. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
JUNTA IRKED BY ABEIDNA'S MOROCCO VISIT 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (C)  Abeidna's recent visit to Morocco had annoyed the 
HSC, who had accused Abeidna of "screwing up the junta's 
relations with Morocco."  The HSC is particularly irked 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000191  004 OF 005 
 
 
because they have no idea what Abeidna did in Morocco and 
they think he went there to open a mediation with the 
Moroccans.  These rumors were sparked by two articles in 
Moroccan newspapers. "If I was allowed to do that -- he means 
to meet with high-level government representatives -- that 
must mean Moroccans are not with them." 
 
---------------------------------------- 
WHY ARE THE EUROPEANS BEHAVING THIS WAY? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶18.  (C)  Abeidna expressed great frustration with the 
Europeans.  In his view, the Spanish, Germans and French have 
shown "unconditional love" for General Aziz despite his 
mistakes, his government's unimpressive results and his 
alignment with Iran.  In Abeidna's view, if the Europeans 
were so concerned about security they would be paying 
attention to Mauritania's newfound relationship with Iran. 
Abeidna said Iran could bring missiles to the country and 
pointed out the distance between Banc d'Arguin that he 
suggested "could target Miami."  Abeidna also wondered 
whether the Europeans desired to have a Shia stronghold so 
close to home.  "They are not weighing the risks," said 
Abeidna.  Abeidna also intimated that Iran could reach out to 
AQIM to get rid of Westerners and that they would be able to 
provide serious funding for terrorist activities and to 
support an adversarial regime. 
 
¶19.  (C)  Abeidna asked Charge to clarify the Spanish 
position.  Charge responded that the Spanish had seen results 
in the fight against illegal immigration and were benefiting 
from that cooperation.  They also valued Mauritanian fish and 
desired to curtail the drug trade so they favored security 
over democracy. 
 
¶20.  (C)  Abeidna confessed his disappointment with the 
Europeans and particularly with the German Ambassador.  "I 
told the German 'You keep blowing in our ear about the 
importance of democracy, but when we strive to preserve it 
you turn your back.'" he said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
WORK ON UGANDA, THE EUROPEANS AND THE ARAB LEAGUE 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶21.  (C)  Abeidna, following advice from Ping, is convinced 
that Uganda, one of the African Security Council members, is 
key in accelerating UN Security Council sanctions.  The FNDD 
has not reached out to Ugandans yet but plans to do so. 
Abeidna asked whether the U.S. could encourage the Ugandans 
to forward a Mauritania resolution in the Security Council 
or, perhaps, facilitate a video-conference between the FNDD 
and Ugandan officials as previously offered with Tanzania. 
 
¶22.  (C)  Abeidna believes that China and Russia will accept 
a Security Council resolution calling for sanctions -- 
particularly if introduced by the Africans -- as they had 
expressed displeasure with the junta.  As for Libya, he's 
convinced that they would themselves introduce a resolution 
if asked by the U.S.  Charge expressed skepticism on that 
point. 
 
¶23.  (C)  According to Abeidna, Ping has expressed 
disappointment at the Arab League for not supporting the AU. 
Now that Mauritania is getting closer to Iran, Abeidna thinks 
that FNDD could work on Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait to 
persuade them to be more supportive. 
 
------------------------------ 
REACTIONS TO ISRAELI EXPULSION 
------------------------------ 
 
¶24.  (C)  Abeidna asked Charge about European reactions to 
the Israeli Ambassador's departure (see ref B).  He then 
stated the Spanish were mediating between the Israelis and 
the military.  He related that the German Ambassador had 
previously told him, "If the Israelis are thrown out, Angela 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000191  005 OF 005 
 
 
Merkel will call me personally."  Abeidna was clearly hopeful 
that the regime's decision to force the Israelis out would 
toughen the European stance against the regime -- both in 
support of Israel and because the decision suggests 
Mauritania falling into bed with the Iranians. 
 
¶25.  (C)  Of the expulsion of the Israeli Ambassador, Abeidna 
said the regime "had sold it" to the Iranians and Libyans in 
exchange for support and hoped to use it against the FNDD. 
General Aziz thought that the people would go to the palace 
to congratulate him  but that has not happened (Comment -- 
given the hoopla over Qadhafi's arrival, the populist boost 
Aziz might have expected over the Israeli departure has 
largely been lost).  "Aziz has put us in big big trouble," 
stated Abeidna.  He wondered why the regime would want to be 
cast as an Iran/Syria/Hamas supporter.  "When confronted with 
dissension, they'd rather 'align with the devil' than seek a 
decent exit," he said. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶26.  (C) In the ups and downs of Mauritanian politics, 
Abeidna is more encouraged this week than he was last week. 
While doubting the utility of the Qadhafi initiative, the 
Tripoli trip offered Abdallahi the chance to demonstrate to 
Aziz and the outside world that there is some real public 
support behind him.  The Israeli expulsion is seen as playing 
into the FNDD's favor by turning of some of the Europeans who 
are soft on the coup and casting the regime as tending 
towards the extremist branch of the Muslim world.  The 
Qadhafi initiative forces everyone to play along, but it 
seems unlikely he will make any real headway. 
HANKINS