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P 041526Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8183
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0510
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0432
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0494
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2037
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0841
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RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0948

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000175 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV USAU LY MR
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ABDALLAHI'S CAMP INCREASINGLY WORRIED 
 
REF: NOUAKCHOTT 170 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and 
d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Multiple FNDD contacts are markedly discouraged 
following the February 20 meeting if in International 
Consultative Group on Mauritania and Muammar Qadhafi's entry 
into the political mix.  Qadhafi is not trusted to hold the 
AU's hard line against the coup but the FNDD recognizes 
rejecting Qadhafi's advances will paint them as the problem. 
The broad European outreach conducted by the FNDD prior to 
the February 20 convinces Abdallahi's supporters that French 
intelligence services poisoned the European well after being 
duped by Aziz that Abdallahi represented a latent terrorist 
threat.  The see some limited success in turning European 
views around -- but it is a slow process.  FNDD leaders see 
Aziz continually under pressure and expect him to lash out 
with further arrests of Abdallahi supporters if not more 
violent tactics of repression. 
 
¶2.  (C) Charge met March 2 with FNDD leader and President of 
the National Assembly Messaoud Ould Boulkheir.  At their 
request, Charge also met on March 3 with rotating FNDD 
President Abdel Koudouss Abeidna and ADIL (President 
Abdallahi's Party) President Ahmed Ould Sidi Baba.  All three 
voiced concern about the international state of play 
concerning Mauritania. 
 
--------------------- 
The Qadhafi Conundrum 
--------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Ould Boulkheir, who left for Tripoli on Tuesday for 
what will be his third encounter with Qadhafi, told Charge is 
was deeply concerned that Qadhafi was incapable of playing an 
appropriate AU mediation role because he will run with his 
own agenda -- not that of the African Union.  He lamented 
that the African Union had allowed a military autocrat who 
had come to power through force to assume the leadership of 
the Union.  "We don't really expect one military coup leader 
to exert any real pressure on a fellow military coup leader." 
 He added that, "Up until now, we have benefited most from 
the strong positions taken by the United States and the 
African Union.  We fear that with Qadhafi in control, the 
African Union position would be eroded leaving us with just 
you."  Abeidna told Charge that both he and Ould Boulkheir 
had strongly urged Abdallahi not to go to Tripoli for several 
reasons: (a) they fear Qadhafi will want to take advantage of 
his unique historical moment as the Presidency of both the 
African Union and UN Security Council to force through a 
"solution" inconsistent with the African Union's position and 
unacceptable for Mauritanian democracy; (b) they fear that, 
once out of Mauritania, Aziz will copy the template of the 
2005 coup against Taya by preventing the president from 
coming back (likely with Qadhafi's connivance); and, (c) they 
fear Qadhafi will exclude everyone from his meeting with 
Abdallahi and then either distort what the president says to 
claim their is a "deal" or paint the president as the primary 
obstacle to democracy.  Abeidna lamented that Qadhafi's 
legitimacy as the President of the African Union poses a real 
dilemma, "If we don't cooperate, we are seen as the problem. 
But if we do play along, we are almost certain to be faced 
with an unacceptable proposal."  Abeidna said he had declined 
instructions to go to Tripoli as head of the FNDD delegation 
saying, "I'm not enough of the diplomat.  As soon as Qadhafi 
said something stupid, I would have mouthed off."  Abeidna 
cited FNDD "intelligence" from within Aziz' staff to say he 
was greatly concerned that Aziz and Qadhafi had reached a 
deal on how to deal with Abdallahi.  The "Head of State" 
honors bestowed Aziz on arrival in Tripoli as well as 
Tripoli's acceptance of a new Mauritanian Ambassador were 
cited as evidence of Qadhafi's overt support for the regime. 
He suggested Qadhafi had provided Aziz the cash he needed to 
meet the Mauritanian federal payroll on the 22nd of February. 
 Aziz, it was said, refused any of his staff to sit in on the 
meeting with Qadhafi but, afterward told them, "We're good. 
Continue planning for the election." 
 
¶4.  (C) Abeidna told Charge the FNDD was trying to put up as 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000175  002 OF 003 
 
 
many conditions as possible to make Abdallahi's Tripoli trip 
fall through -- demanding a diplomatic passport showing him 
as "President" instead of "Former President;" demanding that 
he be received with head of state honors.  In discussing with 
Charge the risk that Qadhafi would go off the African Union's 
script, he decided to also demand that a senior African Union 
official -- ideally Lamamra -- join in any Tripoli meetings 
between Qadhafi and Abdallahi (he asked that the U.S. share 
FNDD concerns about Qadhafi's motives and recommend Lamamra 
try to get in the meetings).  Abeidna finally said, "I told 
the President he should only go if the U.S. says it's okay." 
Charge said that while he doubted the President's physical 
safety would be at risk under Libyan care and doubted Qadhafi 
would play along with the President returning to Mauritania, 
we certainly couldn't exclude the possibility Qadhafi would 
distort the meeting or try to force an unacceptable agreement. 
 
----------- 
Them French 
----------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Sidi Baba lamented, "We are dealing with four French 
republics:  the republics of the Presidency, of the Foreign 
Ministry, of the Cooperation Ministry, and of the security 
services"  In the European diplomatic contacts leading up to 
the February 20 Paris meeting, Sidi Baba said, "we were 
amazed how prevalent the thought had sunk in among the 
Europeans that Sidi was somehow the next Osama Bin Laden." 
He said Aziz had effectively laid that seed with the French 
intelligence services who had, in turn, spread the idea among 
the other Europeans.  Time and again, Sidi Baba said 
discussions with European diplomats did not focus on any 
democratic blockage that may have preceded the coup but on 
whether Abdallahi was soft on terrorism.  The FNDD emissaries 
repeated heard concerns from the serious -- that Abdallahi 
had released terrorists from custody -- to the banal -- that 
he had built a mosque on the presidential grounds.  On the 
release of terrorists, Sidi Baba said that when Abdallahi 
decided to build his parliamentary block, he told the 
leadership, "The judiciary is releasing terrorists and drug 
traffickers.  I can't stop them because they are an 
independent branch, so I need a strong parliamentary block 
that can put in legislation to prevent judiciary laxity."  On 
the mosque, Sidi Baba said, "That was Aziz' idea.  He told 
the President he had to have a mosque on the grounds because 
it was to difficult to organize security for trips to the 
central mosque."  Sidi Baba added that when the President 
allowed an Islamic party to be established, "only the United 
States understood the rationale of allowing a political voice 
for moderate Islam.  The Europeans all saw it as an Islamic 
takeover." 
 
¶6.  (C) Abeidna, who had recently returned from a diplomatic 
mission to Morocco said he had also found a distorted 
understanding among European ambassadors who tended to 
understand that an Abdallahi return somehow equated inroads 
for Islamic radicalization.  He credited previous U.S. 
briefing efforts with Mauritania-watchers in Rabat as having 
started to turn opinions -- something he felt he was 
successfully able to build upon.  Abeidna also saw a change 
in Moroccan views which had previously been relatively overt 
in their support for Aziz.  The head of the Moroccan 
intelligence service told him Morocco did not support Aziz 
saying, "Have you seen us send and senior ministers down, 
have we done anything to support him?  No."  Abeidna, noting 
again that the Moroccans had noted previous U.S. 
interventions, told Charge, "Either they became disillusioned 
with Aziz, or they backed away from him when they saw the 
international community wasn't going to roll over on the 
coup." 
 
------------------------ 
The Scorpion Will Strike 
------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C) Abeidna and Sidi Baba both predicted that an 
increasingly frustrated Aziz will strike back.  Abeidna 
noted, "A cornered scorpion will strike as its last act even 
as it knows it is dead."  Abeidna said they had expected FNDD 
member Boidel Ould Houmeid to be arrested last week and had 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000175  003 OF 003 
 
 
therefore included him on the delegation to Tripoli telling 
the Libyans no FNDD members would travel if any were 
restrained.  Abeidna and Sidi Baba both believed Aziz was 
planning to have them arrested along with the leadership of 
the Tawwasol Islamic party.  Again citing FNDD 
"intelligence," Abeidna said Aziz had told his staff that if 
the FNDD persistent, he would attack them personally. 
Abeidna said one staffer asked, "You mean you want them to 
disappear?"  Aziz reportedly declined to respond. 
HANKINS