VZCZCXRO3648
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0193/01 0780942
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 190942Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9718
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1391
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000193 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS:  UN'S DOWNER REMAINS REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC 
 
REF: NICOSIA-EUR/SE EMAIL OF 3/13/09 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  UN Special Adviser Alexander Downer remains 
reasonably optimistic the Cypriot leaders can make a notional 
deal by late 2009 or early 2010, although he acknowledges the 
sides' substantive differences have yet to narrow much.  In a 
March 12 tour d'horizon with the Ambassador, Downer outlined 
his new public message, evaluated progress achieved in the 
governance and property chapters, and charted out future 
discussions.  He ventured that breakthroughs on CBMs were 
forthcoming, cautioned that UNFICYP's continued presence on 
Cyprus was not a given, and previewed his reporting plan for 
the Security Council.  Downer also stumped for greater 
international support for T/C leader Talat in order to help 
Talat's electoral chances, lambasted EU contributions toward 
his mission, and bemoaned UN prohibitions over him using the 
north's Ercan Airport.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Downer's Current Message: Get On With the Bloody Thing 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶2.  (C) UN Special Adviser Alexander Downer on March 12 paid 
a 90-minute call on the Ambassador, raising numerous 
sensitive areas of the ongoing Cyprus negotiations.  Downer 
stressed he was sharing the information only with the U.S. 
and UK.  Please protect, as Downer is extremely sensitive to 
having leaks circle back to him, and likely would stop 
providing us with detail if he believed we were sharing his 
briefings outside USG channels. 
 
¶3.  (C) He began by outlining his public message regarding 
the talks.  In a recent visit to a Turkish Cypriot 
university, he had urged students and faculty "not to blame 
others for your problems, don't look to us (the UN) to solve 
them, and take responsibility for your own country."  The UN 
had been on Cyprus for 45 years, he explained, but would not 
be here forever.  Downer did not believe his message would 
trouble T/Cs, who enjoyed the Turkish Army's protection.  But 
it would disturb Greek Cypriots, who, along with Greece, paid 
a third of UNIFCYP's costs and wanted the troops to remain. 
"That arrangement really doesn't fit well with me," Downer 
offered. (Note:  In a day-later briefing to the diplomatic 
corps, the UN envoy repeated his admonition over the UN's 
non-permanence on Cyprus, adding that, were the blue helmets 
to leave, the G/Cs would be forced to negotiate with the 
Turkish Army -- to them, an unpalatable prospect.) 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Latest on Property ) Still a Tough Nut 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Downer turned next to leaders Demetris Christofias 
and Mehmet Ali Talat's discussions on property, which had 
ended with the sides still far apart.  Turkish Cypriots had 
agreed that all residents enjoyed a right to property, but 
insisted this right could not be allowed to dilute 
bi-zonality, which was enshrined in thirty years of UN 
resolutions and work.  There also existed great differences 
over the basis for compensation for lost land.  Greek 
Cypriots had wanted compensation based current value -- an 
impossibility, Downer observed, given the likely worth of USD 
20-30 billion.  Nor was there agreement on the G/C demand 
that legal persons (the Church, mainly) have the same rights 
on property as natural persons.  A UN-contracted expert was 
currently poring through European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) cases, looking for applicable precedents. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
But Some Recent Progress on Governance 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Although the leaders had ended discussions on 
governance, the UN and the sides' experts remained engaged, 
Downer informed.  His staff was pushing two proposals to 
break the impasse on the federal executive model (G/Cs want a 
strong executive composed of a president and VP elected on a 
joint ticket, while T/Cs favor a weak executive based on the 
Swiss model, featuring a rotating presidential council.)  The 
UN's first option, which looked similar to the Greek Cypriot 
proposal, was a compromise arrangement that entailed 20 
percent of each community's voters casting ballots in the 
other's election.  The system was designed to answer a T/C 
criticism of the G/C joint-ticket plan:  that, because G/Cs 
were far more numerous, they could in effect elect both their 
community's representative and the T/C's.  Downer thought 
that Greek Cypriots likely would support the UN compromise 
 
NICOSIA 00000193  002 OF 003 
 
 
but that T/Cs would not, claiming it would hurt 
nationalist/right-wing parties like UBP (as the 20 percent 
from one community would certainly vote against the other's 
nationalist force), who would therefore campaign against a 
referendum to legitimize this arrangement. 
 
¶6.  (C) The UN's alternate plan envisaged a South Africa-type 
structure with the bi-communal senate (with equal members 
from each community) picking the chief executive.  The upper 
house election of the president was a feature of the current 
T/C proposal, but the UN compromise would create a far 
stronger executive -- the president, not the senate, would 
choose the cabinet, for example -- and thus be more 
acceptable to Greek Cypriots.  Downer thought the G/Cs could 
live with it. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Optimistic First Pass Through Issues Will Finish Soon 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Downer believed the leaders would finish their first 
pass through the core Cyprus Problem chapters by early May. 
Privately, Christofias and Talat had agreed to conclude EU 
matters and economic issues before T/C "parliamentary" 
elections on April 19.  Shortly thereafter, they would tackle 
the final two issues, territory and security/guarantees.  On 
the former, the 2004 Annan Plan must be the leaders' base 
point for talks, while on the latter, the leaders likely 
would make the quickest possible reading, since their 
positions were so distant and because this chapter would 
involve other parties (the guarantor powers) not currently at 
the table. 
 
¶8.  (C) By late spring, they and the UN would begin "Phase 
II" -- a study of areas of medium convergence that still 
required bridging solutions.  Downer did not expect major 
format/framework changes in Phase II.  &The  Great Game, 
begins with Phase III,8 he predicted, when Christofias and 
Talat would engage in real give-and-take in an attempt to 
reach a deal. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Helping Talat's Electoral Chances 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Talk of "TRNC parliamentary" elections and the need 
to help Talat's CTP party chances has peppered the leaders' 
and negotiators' meetings lately, Downer noted.  A March 17 
meeting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
chambers of commerce, at which Talat and Christofias would 
speak, was part of the unofficial plan to aid CTP. 
Confidence-building elements represented another element. 
Downer admitted he had not been focused on CBMs, but now 
realized they could spur movement on core issues by improving 
the atmosphere.  He and deputy Taye-Brook Zerihoun had been 
pressing G/C chief negotiator George Iacovou, trying to get 
the G/Cs to relent on their opposition to CBMs over fears 
they spawned "creeping TRNC recognition."  Six-hundred 
thousand dollars in UNDP-channeled, USAID seed money was 
available to help spur momentum, he added. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Limnitis Crossing ) A Deal Looks Closer: 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Topping the UN to-do list was the proposal for a 
buffer zone crossing at Limnitis in northwest Cyprus.  The 
major remaining pothole -- a Turkish Cypriot demand that the 
UN escort fuel trucks from Limnitis to the T/C military 
enclave at Kokkina -- remained "toxic" to G/Cs.  But perhaps 
the G/Cs could supply electricity to Kokkina, obviating the 
need for fuel convoys?  (Note:  this was actually the 
Embassy's idea, raised earlier in a meeting with UNFICYP 
officials).  Downer had pitched the compromise first to T/C 
chief negotiator Ozdil Nami, who seemed receptive.  Iacovou 
unofficially called the proposal a "good idea," but never 
formally responded with the G/Cs' position. 
 
¶11.  (C) Despite Downer's "pre-cooking," the leaders, who had 
discussed Limnitis at their March 11 meeting, did not debate 
the UN compromise in detail (in separate out-briefs with 
Downer after the leaders' lengthy one-on-one, Christofias 
claimed he had raised the compromise but got no substantive 
response from Talat, while Talat told Downer that Christofias 
had offered nothing new.)  Downer had mentioned it again 
with Talat on March 12, pushing him to accept the deal and 
another CBM regarding ambulances and announce them at the 
March 17 joint chamber event; the T/C leader promised to 
consult with the Turkish Army (Note:  it does not appear 
 
NICOSIA 00000193  003 OF 003 
 
 
Talat mentioned the CBMs at the chambers meeting).  Downer 
also had pitched the idea to Turkish MFA U/S Ertugrul Apakan, 
who seemed lukewarm to it.  Before switching topics, he 
requested the Ambassador to urge Ambassador Jeffrey in Ankara 
to lobby Apakan further on this Limnitis proposal.  (Note: 
we understand from our UK colleagues that Iacovou shot the 
compromise down and that CBMs remain stuck.  Ambassador will 
meet T/C negotiator Nami on March 19 to discuss CBMs.) 
 
--------------------------------- 
Ongoing UN Peacekeeping Role TBD? 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) UN patience on Cyprus was wearing thin, Downer 
alleged, arguing that "this effort should be last roll of the 
dice."  That said, and despite G/C insistence for a "Cypriot 
solution," UN help was still vital to deliver a solution.  If 
the current process failed, however, Downer believed the UN 
ought to re-assess its presence here.  "There are too many 
other competing needs, while here there's no suffering," he 
analyzed.  UNFICYP's status should definitely be in play as a 
tool to spur movement or counter intransigence, especially 
Greek Cypriot.  The international community should use the 
next rollover renewal (in June) to "inject a bit of 
uncertainty" on the force's future, Downer concluded. 
 
------------------------- 
Report to UNSC Could Slip 
------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) The Good Offices Mission's report to the Security 
Council would be verbal, not written, Downer promised.  This 
tack would eliminate or reduce unproductive battling over 
language.  Its timing was still in question, however.  Downer 
preferred late April (his daughter's upcoming wedding is one 
reason.)  But he feared the actual date could slip until 
early May. 
 
------------------------------------ 
EU Role in Cyprus Process a Disaster 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶14.  (C) Venting, Downer blasted Brussels' CyProb role.  "I 
thought the UN bureaucracy was bad," he chuckled, "but the 
EU, especially the Commission, is f-ing awful."  After two 
months of delays in securing an EU technical expert, Brussels 
officials had identified one -- a Dane named Sorensen, 
currently in Serbia -- only to change their minds, leaving 
the Cyprus discussions on EU matters to begin (and, as of 
March 18, end for this phase) without an expert on hand.  In 
response, the Good Offices Mission would have to hire a 
part-time consultant.  "Brussels generally treats Turkey like 
sh-t," the never-bashful Australian continued, "and they're 
overplaying their hand if they think the Turks will go 
begging." 
 
---------------------------------- 
Travel Woes, With Ercan Off-Limits 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C) Downer concluded the meeting by complaining about 
air links.  The UN's prohibition over using Ercan Airport 
meant that travel to Ankara from Nicosia was an all-day 
affair -- a productivity killer for the still part-time 
envoy.  The Turks had suggested instead that he conduct his 
monthly trip north via a chartered aircraft from the Akrotiri 
Sovereign Base Area; they would cover fuel and crew costs if 
Downer could secure the plane.  While Zerihoun and others in 
UNFICYP were queasy over the arrangement, citing UN rules, 
Downer was giving it full consideration. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶16.  (C) Downer is correct that the June UNFICYP renewal 
discussion in the UN Security Council likely will be a 
significant milestone in this phase of the Cyprus talks.  So 
far, both sides continue to put forth rather maximalist 
positions.  By the time Downer presents his first report in 
May, however, we should have a much better idea of real 
intentions.  It will be then that we should consider a public 
UNSC discussion on the future of UNFICYP and other measures 
the U.S. might take, either unilaterally or multilaterally in 
New York.  Downer's assessment of European Union performance 
during these talks is all-too-accurate, however. 
Urbancic