VZCZCXRO6826
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0097/01 0820807
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230807Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6797
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE PRIORITY 0019
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0191
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0562
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000097 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR GAVIN AND HUDSON 
PARIS FOR POL - DELIA AND KANEDA 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
ADDIS PASS TO USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF MASS MARR UN PKO SU LY
CD 
SUBJECT: MINURCAT RISING:  REINFORCED UN PKO REPLACES EUFOR 
IN CHAD, SRSG BRIEFS ON STATUS AND DARFUR REFUGEE SITUATION 
 
REF: A. A. USUN 0281 
     ¶B. B. NDJAMENA 0057 
 
NDJAMENA 00000097  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
------ 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) The EU PKO EUFOR, one of two PKOs authorized by 
UNSC 1778, stood down March 15, transferring its authority to 
provide security to civilians in Eastern Chad and 
Northeastern CAR to the UN's MINURCAT, whose mandate was 
enhanced to include such a role by UNSC 1861. Many of EUFOR's 
EU-member and other troops were re-hatted to MINURCAT March 
15 and will continue for varying lengths of time in the UN 
PKO, as new troop contingents are folded into MINURCAT.  SRSG 
victor Angelo's planning for the transition appears likely to 
obviate any security gap in eastern Chad as the UN assesses 
its ability to absorb more refugees if Khartoum's post-ICC 
indictment actions provoke Darfur IDPs to cross into Chad. 
The SRSG has stressed to diplomats here that MINURCAT's 
mandate under UNSC 1861 is virtually identical to the 
combined mandate of EUFOR and MINURCAT under UNSC 1778, with 
the addition in 1861 of "benchmarks" to assess MINURCAT's 
performance and give the SRSG observer status in the Dakar 
Accord.  Angelo has also emphasized that he is keen to 
implement the "civilian" aspects of the mandate -- in the 
areas of human rights, including use of child soldiers, and 
reform and strengthening of the judicial and penal systems in 
eastern Chad, which will complement the deployment of 
UN-trained Chadian police and gendarmes to provide security 
inside the refugee camps and IDP sites.  The SRSG underlines 
that progress on the civilian side will depend on adequate 
funding of the Trust Fund that provides money for the 
civilian projects and activities. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Transfer of Authority ceremonies went well on the 
ground here, and MINURCAT II has begun to take control of the 
role, personnel, and facilities of EUFOR.  The SRSG's plan 
for the gradual departure of major EUFOR troop contributors 
France and Poland, who will not stay in MINURCAT, appears 
sensible and viable.  SRSG Angelo's ability to plan, 
organize, and negotiate with the GOC will be of key 
importance if the situation in Darfur results in significant 
new refugee flows into Chad.  The USG should be prepared to 
assist him if negotiations with the GOC for more sites and 
refugees become necessary.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------- 
EUFOR STANDS DOWN 
----------------- 
 
¶3.  Ambassador attended ceremonies in N'Djamena (March 14) 
and Abeche (March 15) to mark the Transfer of Authority from 
EUFOR to MINURCAT March 15.  UN PKO Chief Alain LeRoi and 
French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner were the leading 
visiting EU and UN officials taking part.  The EU PKO EUFOR, 
one of two PKOs authorized by UNSC 1778, stood down March 15 
and its authority to provide security to civilians in Eastern 
Chad and Northeastern CAR was transferred to MINURCAT, whose 
mandate was enhanced to include that role by UNSC 1861.  Many 
of EUFOR's troops were re-hatted to MINURCAT March 15 and 
will continue for varying lengths of time in the UN PKO, as 
new troop contingents are folded into MINURCAT.  SRSG Victor 
Angelo's planning for the transition appears likely to 
obviate any security gap in eastern Chad as the UN assesses 
its ability to absorb more refugees if Khartoum's post-ICC 
indictment actions provoke Darfur IDPs to cross into Chad. 
 
----------- 
MINURCAT II 
STANDS UP 
--------- 
 
¶4. (U)  SRSG Victor Angelo briefed UNSC member ambassadors 
resident in Chad March 18 on the nascent MINURCAT's 
operational status and planning. (COMs of U.S., France, 
Libya, China, and Russia comprise the group, which meets with 
the SRSG bi-weeekly.) He stressed that MINURCAT's mandate 
under UNSC 1861 was virtually identical to the combined 
 
NDJAMENA 00000097  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
mandate of EUFOR and MINURCAT under UNSC 1778.  Exceptions 
were the addition in UNSC 1861 of "benchmarks" to assess 
MINURCAT's performance of its responsibilities, and the 
granting of observer status to the SRSG in the Dakar Accord 
implementation process between Chad and Sudan.  Angelo 
stressed also that he was keen to implement the "civilian" 
aspects of the mandate -- in the areas of human rights, 
including use of child soldiers, and reform and strengthening 
of the judicial and penal systems in eastern Chad, which 
would complement the deployment of UN-trained Chadian police 
and gendarmes to provide security inside the refugee camps 
and IDP sites.  The SRSG underlined that progress on the 
civilian side depended on adequate funding of the Trust Fund 
that provides oney for civilian projects and activities. 
 
------------------- 
COUNTING THE TROOPS 
------------------- 
 
¶5.  The Current Lineup:  As of March 18, MINURCAT's military 
strength is some 4,890 out of a total authorized 5,200.  That 
includes 780 French, 400 Irish, 400 Polish, 160 Russians, 120 
HQs staff, 100 Austrians, 100 Finns, and 40 Croats. 
 
¶6.  In the Pipeline:  En route are: 850 Nepalese, 800 
Ghanaians, 500 Togolese, 300 Malawians, 150-200 Uruguayans, 
50 Egyptians, and 40 Bangladeshis.  Requests have been made 
to China, Libya, and Namibia for small specialized units -- 
logistics, medical, and transport specialties. 
 
¶7.  The force structure will change over time, as countries 
like France and Poland withdraw their troops as troops in the 
pipeline arrive and deploy.  French troops will be out of 
MINURCAT by September, but France will continue to provide 
logistical and transportation support to MINURCAT from EFT 
(Elements Francais au Tchad) based bilaterally here. 
 
----------------------- 
HOW IT WILL BE DEPLOYED 
----------------------- 
 
¶8.  MINURCAT Deployments: 
 
--  Northern Sector:  With bases at Iriba and Bahai: 
Currently manned by Poles and Croats, who will cede to troops 
from Malawi on the latter's arrival. 
--  Central Sector:  With bases at Farchana and Guereda: 
Currently manned by the French, who will cede to Ghanaian 
troops on arrival. 
--  Southern Sector:  With base at Goz Beida:  Currently 
manned by the Irish and Finns, who will continue in MINURCAT. 
--  Central African Republic:  With base at Birao:  Currently 
French, who will cede to Togolese. 
--  Headquarters and Strategic Reserve:  With base in Abeche: 
 Nepalese, Togolese, Austrians, Russians, Norwegians, and 
Bangladeshis. 
 
------------------ 
U.S. MILADS ARRIVE 
------------------ 
 
¶9.  (U) Two U.S. military officers, an Army and an Air Force 
lieutenant colonel, assigned as Military Advisors to 
MINURCAT's Headquarters Staff, arrived here March 18. One is 
scheduled to do intelligence analysis in the HQ in N'Djamena 
and the other will assist in operations at Abeche airport. 
 
-------------------- 
DIS AND COORDINATION 
MECHANISMS 
----------- 
 
¶10.  SRSG Angelo reported that all 850 members of the 
Detachement Integre de Securite (DIS), Chadian police and 
gendarmerie officers trained by the UN, were now deployed in 
refugee camps in eastern Chad.  The GOC had agreed to arm all 
of them with side arms in the coming week.  The SRSG reported 
that the GOC was reviewing the structure and performance of 
its own specially-created agency for liaison between the GOC 
 
NDJAMENA 00000097  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
and EUFOR and MINURCAT, called the National Committee on 
International Forces in Chad (CONAFIT).  The goal was to make 
CONAFIT more streamlined and more efficient.  The SRSG said 
that MINURCAT elements would have a weekly coordination 
meeting with GOC elements -- CONAFIT, Chad military 
commanders, Chad police and gendarmerie commanders, local GOC 
officials.  MINURCAT would also hold weekly meetings with the 
INGOs active in eastern Chad, alternately in Abeche and 
N'Djamena. The SRSG said that the general agreement between 
MINURCAT and the GOC would soon be supplemented by a Status 
of Forces agreement (SOFA) to take into account MINURCAT's 
new military security role and personnel. 
 
-------------------- 
MORE DARFUR REFUGEES 
TO CHAD? 
-------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The SRSG said that as the senior UN official in 
Chad now, he was reviewing the situation in Darfur, 
especially if Khartoum's recent expulsion of INGOs and 
possible negative actions regarding security of Darfur IDPs 
were to motivate more Darfuris to cross the border into Chad. 
 Right now, the UN was not seeing too much movement of IDPs, 
but it was early still.  What movement among IDPs the UN was 
seeing was north-south movement, rather than east-west 
movement.  That was positive, as was the fact that IDPs in 
Darfur are generally not located near the Chadian border, 
which made eventual IDP decisions to cross the border more 
studied ones.  The SRSG said that UN agencies in Chad had 
estimated that they could accommodate up to 50,000 more 
Darfur refugees if necessary, with existing stocks in 
existing locations.  After that, negotiations with the GOC 
for more sites and more refugee acceptances would be 
necessary.  Such negotiations, he noted, were never easy. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The Transfer of Authority ceremonies went well on 
the ground here, and MINURCAT II has begun to take control of 
the role, personnel, and facilities of EUFOR.  The SRSG's 
plan for gradual departure of major EUFOR troop contributors 
who will not stay in MINURCAT (France and Poland) appears 
sensible and viable, obviating any security gap.  SRSG 
Angelo's ability to plan, organize, and negotiate with the 
GOC will be of key importance if the situation in Darfur 
results in the arrival of significant new numbers of refugees 
from Darfur into Chad.  The USG should be prepared to assist 
him if negotiations with the GOC for more sites and refugees 
becomes necessary. 
 
 
¶13.  (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NIGRO