VZCZCXRO0667
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0071/01 0641255
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 051255Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6763
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0548

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000071 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PREF UN EU AU PKO SU CT CD
SUBJECT: CHAD/CAR:  SRSG UPBEAT ON MINURCAT II DEPLOYMENT, 
EARLY OPERATIONS, AND TRANSITION FROM EUFOR ON MARCH 15 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 0057 
 
NDJAMENA 00000071  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
--------- 
SUMMARY 
--------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) SRSG Victor Angelo gave a generally positive 
briefing to the NDjamena Diplomatic Corps March 3 on the 
status of the March 15 transition of military security 
responsibilities from EUFOR to MINURCAT II; on MINURCAT's 
continued deployment; and on the PKO's current operations. 
All GOC-UN accords needed for the transition were signed; all 
EUFOR camps would revert to MINURCAT II; and a SOFA with the 
GOC would be signed soon.  Angelo reported on the status of 
arrival dates for troop contingents and said that on 15 
March, some 2,000 EUFOR would remain on the ground in Chad in 
transition mode. Angelo said he had 70 percent of his 
authorized civilian staff in country, including 236 UNPOLs. 
All authorized 850 DIS (Detachements Integres de Securites -- 
 Chadian police and gendarmes trained and mentored by UNPOL) 
were deployed to forward bases. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Angelo said that the general security situation in 
eastern Chad, including Abeche town, was improving as a 
result of MINURCAT deployment, especially DIS deployment in 
the camps, and better UN-GOC collaboration on security. 
MINURCAT was helping Chad local authorities to apprehend, 
try, and punish lawbreakers; DIS had already made some 81 
arrests and recovered four vehicles; and DIS presence had 
begun to change the dynamic on "politicization" of the camps, 
including recruitment of under-age men.  "We're seeing a 
change of attitude among the refugee families," Angelo said. 
At some camps, some  rebel fighters returning to visit 
families were registering with the UN and handing over arms 
to DIS.  Angelo emphasized that amidst a growing body of good 
news about MINURCAT II, one of his chief concerns now was the 
rapid depletion of the Trust Fund that financed DIS training 
and deployment and that was supposed to fund the good 
governance part of its mandate. Angelo said that he had the 
capability to make important strides in both DIS expansion 
and good governance -- judicial and prison reform, protection 
of human rights, etc -- but lack of adequate financing of the 
Trust Fund could threaten achievement of these goals. (See 
REFTEL.) 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  We were troubled by Angelo's public disclosure of 
his deep concern over the depletion of the Trust Fund that 
financed DIS training and deployment, and that should finance 
projects to implement MINURCAT's mandate in the areas of 
human rights, prison reform, and law enforcement reform in 
eastern Chad.  We fear that MINURCAT II's effectiveness will 
be limited by Trust Fund budgetary shortfalls that will 
undermine the effectiveness of its two "strategic 
instruments" -- the DIS and the good governance projects that 
could provide for security for cibvilians in eastern Chad 
after MINURCAT's eventual departure.  We hope the USG, along 
with other donors, will step up with renewed funding for the 
Trust Fund, which more directly provides for the security of 
Darfuri refugees in Chad than the much bigger and better 
understood military piece of MINURCAT II.   END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------- 
SIGNS OF PROGRESS 
----------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Angelo was generally upbeat regarding Chad 
developments.  All GOC-UN accords needed for the transition 
from EUFOR to MINURCAT II were signed; all EUFOR camps would 
revert to MINURCAT; conversations continued for purchase of 
EUFOR equipment by the UN for MINURCAT II. Angelo was 
discussing a SOFA with the GOC, which would be signed soon. 
MINURCAT had hosted ICAO team to improve air traffic 
facilities and operations at both NDjamena and Abeche 
airports.  The goal with the latter was to bring it up to 
international airport standards. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Angelo reported on the status of arrival dates for 
troop contingents from Ghana and Togo, and the possibility of 
a Malawi contingent. On 15 March, some 2,030 EUFOR troops 
would remain on the ground in Chad to ensure a smooth 
transition to MINURCAT II, after which most would eventually 
leave.  Plans were being finalized for the ceremonial 
transition, with events in NDjamena and Abeche to which the 
diplomatic corps would be invited, March 14-15. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Angelo said that 70 per cent of his authorized 
civilian staff were in country.  Of the 300 UNPOL officers 
authorized, some 236 were in country, deployed to all forward 
bases, including remote and difficult Baghai. The UN had 
resumed recruiting UNPOLs, and three Libyan police officers 
 
NDJAMENA 00000071  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
soon would be on board.  All 850 DIS individuals authorized 
to be part of the DIS (Detachements Integre de Securite -- 
Chadian police and gendarmes trained and mentored by UNPOLs) 
were deployed in eastern Chad in 87 vehicles, with more 
vehicles coming. Announcement would be made soon of the 
arrival of the Military Force Commander, Senegalese 
three-star Elhadji Kandji, expected to join an Irish two-star 
Deputy Commander and a Swedish Chief of Staff, whose staff 
officers were arriving in regular groups. 
 
--------------------- 
TRUST FUND DEPLETION? 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Angelo emphaszed that amidst a growing boduy of 
good news abou MINURCAT II, one of his chief concerns now 
was he rapid depletion of the Trust Fund that financedDIS 
training and deployment and that was suppose to fund the 
good governance part of its manate. Angelo said that he had 
the capability to make important strides in both DIS 
expansion and good governance -- judicial and prison reform, 
protection of human rights, etc. -- but lack of adequate 
financing of the Trust Fund could threaten achievement of 
these goals. 
 
---------- 
ICC RULING 
---------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Angelo described UN precautions regarding the 
expected announcement of the ICC ruling against Sudan 
President Bashir on March 4.  Angelo said he had GOC 
assurances that even in the event of rebel attacks from 
Sudan, the DIS would not be used for national defense, but 
would remain deployed in camps on police duties. 
 
--------------------------- 
DAKAR ACCORD IMPLEMENTATION 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Angelo said that scheduling conflicts had forced 
the postponement of the projected next meeting of the Contact 
Group at Khartoum February 28.  The GOC had been prepared to 
go to Khartoum -- FORMIN Faki had cleared his schedule -- and 
the GOS had been ready to host the meeting, but Congo/B and 
Gabon FORMINs, co-chair and member, respectively, of the 
Contact Group, had been obliged to attend a regional 
ministerial meeting in Brazzaville, so Chad, Sudan, Eritrea, 
and Libya had agreed to a postponement of the Khartoum 
meeting, for which a new date had not yet been set, but which 
likely would be after March 15. 
 
------------------------------- 
EASTERN CHAD SECURITY SITUATION 
------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Angelo said that the general security situation in 
eastern Chad, including in Abeche town, was slowly but 
noticeably improving, as a result of continuing MINURCAT 
deployments, including deployment of DIS in the camps, and 
better UN-GOC collaboration on security matters.  It was 
essential that lawbreakers be apprehended, brought to trial, 
and punished.  MINURCAT was working with Chad local 
authorities to help them do this.  As of last week, DIS had 
conducted some 900 escort patrols; in the course of their 
operations, DIS had made some 81 arrests and recovered four 
stolen vehicles.  GOC disarmament sweeps had helped.  In the 
camps, DIS presence had started to change the dynamic on 
recruitment of under-age men.  Where before the practice was 
encouraged, now it was discouraged and considered 
unacceptable.  "We're seeing a change of attitude among the 
refugee families," Angelo said.  Even in rebellious An-Nabok 
camp, where the rebel presence had encouraged refugee 
violence against UN workers (and where operations had been 
suspended for months), there was a change.  Some, but not 
all, rebel fighters returning to the camps from Sudan to 
visit families were registering with the UN and handing over 
arms to DIS on entering the camps.  Angelo said that even 
this perhaps symbolic mark of respect for GOC and UN 
authority was a hopeful sign.  Later on, when MINURCAT was 
fully deployed and fully functional, it would move more 
vigorously to disarm and "de-politicize" the camps, Angelo 
predicted. 
 
-------- 
COMMENT 
-------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) We were troubled by Angelo's semi-public 
disclosure of his deep concern over the depletion of the 
 
NDJAMENA 00000071  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Trust Fund that financed DIS training and deployment, and 
that should finance projects to implement MINURCAT's mandate 
in the areas of human rights, prison reform, and law 
enforcement reform in eastern Chad.  (REFTEL details the 
possibilities inherent in its mandate in these 
capacity-building areas.)  We fear that MINURCAT II's 
effectiveness will be limited by Trust Fund budgetary 
shortfalls that will undermine the effectiveness of its two 
"strategic instruments" -- the DIS and the good governance 
projects that could provide for security for civilians in 
eastern Chad after MINURCAT's eventual departure.  We hope 
the USG, along with other donors, will step up with renewed 
funding for the Trust Fund, which actually more directly 
provides for the security of Darfuri refugees in Chad than 
the much bigger and better understood military piece of 
MINURCAT II and that have the possibility of doing so even 
after MINURCAT has departed eastern Chad. 
 
NIGRO