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DE RUEHME #0869/01 0832104
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 242104Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5819
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0333
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0316

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000869 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2028 
TAGS: PINR PREL PGOV OAS PHUM VZ CU MX
SUBJECT: MEXICO ON THE 2009 SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS 
(C-AL9-00153) 
 
REF: STATE 20677 
 
MEXICO 00000869  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay.  Reason 
: 1.4 (b),(d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary.  Mexico believes future prospects for the 
Summit of the Americas (SOA) very much rely on the success of 
U.S. President Obama in injecting a new sense of purpose for 
the gathering.  To Mexico's view, it is imperative the summit 
tackle the ongoing financial crisis.  Interestingly, Mexico 
does not believe the Summit should take on the issue of Cuba 
but rather leave it for the U.S. to manage on a bilateral 
level.  Mexico is ill-disposed to wager bets on Chavez' plans 
for the meeting but was inclined to think that he might scale 
back on some of his more bombastic rhetoric from past 
multilateral events.  Mexico feels confident about its role 
in Latin America as a leader.  It sees the proliferation of 
multilateral fora as contributing to the subregionalization 
of Latin America.  While it seeks to join as many of the new 
organizations as possible, Mexico also has its sights on 
consolidating several of the groups.  Mexico's Foreign 
Ministry expects the subject of the upcoming SOA will come up 
during the Secretary's visit.  End Summary. 
 
To Be or Not to Be ... 
 
¶2.  (C)  Jose Antonio Zabalgoitia, the Foreign Ministry's 
(SRE) Director General of the Office of Inter-American 
Regional Organizations and Mechanisms told poloff that the 
future of the SOA rested with the United States.  The last 
summit in Mar de Plata was commonly perceived as a failure. 
In general, there is a sense that the SOA has lost its sense 
of bearings.  Zabalgoitia thought the upcoming summit in 
Trinidad and Tobago would offer President Obama his one 
chance to project a new, more constructive U.S. "attitude" 
toward the region and inject the gathering with more vitality 
and a greater sense of purpose.  Zabalgoitia considered the 
SOA meaningful only to the extent the U.S. engaged 
effectively with the rest of the region.  If for some reason 
-- perhaps forewarned of an impending nasty verbal assault by 
Chavez -- President Obama were to decide not to attend this 
year's summit, Zabalgoitia said that the SOA as a viable 
forum for future hemispheric discussions would cease to 
exist. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Zabalgoitia thought leaders, including President 
Obama, had to tackle the ongoing financial crisis given the 
impact it is having on the world economy, including all of 
Latin America.  It would be misguided and inopportune to 
focus on free trade as it would only generate controversy.  A 
discussion of energy could also provoke a debate, with Chavez 
proving particularly sensitive to overtures stressing the 
importance of reducing reliance on oil upon which his economy 
depends so enormously.  While Zabalgoitia offered few 
specifics but thought it essential the SOA demonstrate it was 
able to foster focused debate and generate significant 
consensus on several key matters engaging the region. 
 
Hands Off Cuba 
 
¶4.  (C)  Interestingly enough, Zabalgoitia told poloff that 
SRE had instructed its delegation to the summit to reject any 
language in the declaration referring to Cuba.  Mexico 
understood that Cuba had clearly communicated that it was 
not/not interested in rejoining the OAS.  Unless Cuba changed 
this position, Mexico did not believe it was appropriate for 
the summit declaration to broach the subject of a country not 
party to its proceedings.  Zabalgoitia went on further to 
suggest that Mexico perceived the question of U.S. policy 
toward Cuba as something the U.S. needed to resolve 
bilaterally with Cuba.  The U.S. could well prove resentful 
if it felt unduly pressured by the international community on 
its Cuban policies. 
 
All Bets Off on Predicting Chavez's Plans 
 
¶5.  (C)  Zabalgoitia remarked that there was no way to 
predict what Chavez would do at the summit, particularly 
given the dynamic of President Obama's attendance and the 
expectation his attitude and overarching message to the 
region would be well-received.  He described Chavez as a 
"political animal" who often acted "instinctively."  He 
suggested Chavez could take one of three different approaches 
at the summit.  First, he could look to turn the page 
entirely on relations with the U.S. and make nice with 
President, declining to confront the U.S. on any 
controversial matter.  Second, he could prod President Obama 
respectfully on Cuba and the U.S. embargo or other sensitive 
 
MEXICO 00000869  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
issues without entering into a rant.  Third, he could let 
loose a vitriolic attack on the U.S. of the kind witnessed at 
other gatherings. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Zabalgoitia thought the second approach most 
realistic.  Chavez likely would not be able to restrain 
himself entirely.  However, he would likely want to appear 
"reasonable" with President Obama who thus far has scored 
high marks with many of the region's leaders.  Zabalgoitia 
described Venezuela as a "Caribbean" country keen on 
demonstrating proper respect for the summit's Caribbean host 
and the region's full array of Caribbean states.  As such, he 
thought Chavez would be further compelled not to create a 
nasty scene at the summit. Zabalgoitia was prepared to make a 
bet, however, that Chavez would land a photo with President 
Obama -- either in a full embrace or wagging his finger -- 
that he would then use for his own political ends at home and 
abroad. 
 
Human Rights Not an Issue 
 
¶7.  (C)  Zabalgoitia was not aware of any proposal within the 
interamerican community to change the approach on human 
rights.  Mexico has been the subject of several recent cases 
before the Interamerican Human Rights Commission.  It is keen 
to address concerns that are lodged there and meet its 
obligations fully.  At the same time, Zabalgoitia conveyed 
Mexico's desire that the court demonstrate greater 
"objectivity," suggesting he thought the court may be 
predisposed towards complainants 
 
Dealing with Regional Alphabet Soup 
 
¶8.  (U)  Zabalgoitia spoke to the proliferation of regional 
organizations -- particularly in South America -- over recent 
years as part and parcel of a process of subregionalization. 
He described Latin America and the Caribbean as principally 
made up of three regions -- Central America, the Caribbean 
states, and South America.  The first two had long 
established a series of regional organizations to tackle a 
common agenda; South America was only now taking up this same 
effort in earnest. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Mexico was not impressed with Brazil's performance 
at the inaugural Latin American and Caribbean Summit on 
Integration and Development (CALC) that it convened last 
December.  According to Zabalgoitia, Brazil appeared to have 
no vision of what it wanted this new group to do beyond meet. 
 Mexico assured us the group's inspiration did not lie in 
creating an organization that excluded the U.S. but rather 
stressed the inherent need for the region to integrate.  That 
said, Brazil dropped the ball when it came to describing the 
value added that CALC brought to the table.  Mexico attached 
greater import to the Rio Group and hoped by February 2010 
when the CALC would convene next it would move towards 
merging its functions with the Rio Group. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  According to Zabalgoitia, Mexico is confident of 
its status as a leader together with Brazil of Latin America 
given its size, economy, population and culture. Brazil might 
want to claim it is the supreme leader of the region, but 
Mexico knew otherwise.  In point of fact, Mexico brought more 
to the table given its location in North America and its 
close relationship with the U.S.  Mexico was not overly fond 
of the proliferation of organizations but thought it 
important to belong to as many as possible.  When possible, 
it favored the consolidation of subregional groups.  This was 
the case in Mexico's seeking to bring Project Mesoamerica 
(which focuses on infrastructure projects in Central America) 
into closer contact with the South American Regional 
Infrastructure Integration Initiative (IIRSA) and a migration 
conference focused on South America with another that covers 
the region extending from Panama to Canada. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Comment.  Mexico believes the future of the SOA 
relies heavily on the attitude, energy, and vision the U.S. 
brings to the upcoming meeting.  The financial crisis must be 
discussed with a view to forging a more integrated response. 
Mexico does not favor addressing Cuba in the summit 
declaration but would be surprised if other states don't 
pressure the U.S. to change its policy.  No one can predict 
how Chavez will behave but Mexico is inclined to believe 
he'll want to strike a reasonable stance in his first meeting 
with President Obama.  Mexico considers itself a leader in 
Latin America and seeks to secure membership in full array of 
regional and subregional organizations.  That said, Mexico 
supports the consolidation of some groups that tackle the 
same agenda.  Mexico's FM Espinosa may well seek to discuss 
 
MEXICO 00000869  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
U.S. priorities for the upcoming SOA with the Secretary 
during her visit. 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 
BASSETT